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NTIS 바로가기철학사상 no.40 2011년, pp.135 - 166 http://dx.doi.org/10.15750/chss..40.201105.004
김태희 (서울대학교)
The eternity of the transcendental I is concluded by traditional interpretations of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. This conclusion, based on references to Husserl’s own descriptions, has been a firm foundation for severe criticisms by post-Husserlian phenomenologists developing their own thoughts about the finitude of subjectivity. Nevertheless, further investigations into Husserl’s genetic analyses of time-consciousness, especially analyses of limit-cases, i.e.sleep (without dreaming), birth, and death in C-manuscripts propose a new interpretation claiming that the finitude of the transcendental I is possible. According to these analyses of limit-cases, the transcendental I is conscious of his/her own finitude on the basis of these phenomena being not merely accidental, but also transcendental for the constitution of the transcendental I’s lifetime. Furthermore, this consciousness of finitude based on limit-cases is of substantial importance for the intersubjective constitution of an objective world.Based on these phenomena, the transcendental I is conscious of himself/herself as having been born, periodically sleeping, and being bound to die in the intersubjective world. This consciousness is not only of the individual finitude of the transcendental I himself/herself,but also of an eternal world-time constituted intersubjectively.
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