The purpose of this study is to critically compare Aristotle’s virtue ethics and Jonathan Haidt’s social intuitionist model of moral judgments and Joshua D. Greene’s dual-process model. First of all both of Haidt and Greene present a kind of model integrating intuition and reasoning in moral judgment even though they take different positions on the degree of reasoning. Aristotle, too, aims for an integration model when he says that choice requires both of deliberation and desire. However there are significant differences between the two models and Aristotle in the features and method of integration. Haidt and Greene suggest a Humean model of integration while Aristotle pursues for an intellectualist one. And the integration mainly occurs interpersonally in Haidt’s model or it varies with the kinds of moral judgment in Greene’s while Aristotle insists that deliberation and desire work inseparably within a virtuous person. Here it is necessary to compare Aristotle’s arguments with the implications of the two models upon moral philosophy. The philosophical implications of the two models show that the more naturalizing ethics, the more predominant the intuition and that the more reflecting moral philosophy-oriented positions, the more central the reasoning. It is the same with Aristotle. Aristotle’s metaphysical and teleological positions have an important bearing on his ethical naturalism and this explains why he pursues for an intellectualist integration and an inseparable interaction of deliberation and desire. A considerable portion of the differences among Haidt, Greene, and Aristotle has to do with how normative conclusions in moral philosophy are connected to descriptive premises in moral psychology and what kind of normativity is involved in.