Abstract

In this paper, Nash equilibriums of generation markets are investigated using a game theory application for simplified competitive electricity markets. We analyze the characteristics of equilibrium states in N-company spot markets modeled by uniform pricing auctions and propose a new method for obtaining Nash equilibriums of the auction. We assume that spot markets are operated as uniform pricing auctions and that each generation company submits its bids into the auction in the form of a seal-bid. Depending on the bids of generation companies, market demands are allocated to each company accordingly. The uniform pricing auction in this analysis can be formulated as a non-cooperative and static game in which generation companies correspond to players of the game. The coefficient of the bidding function of company-n is the strategy of player-n (company-n) and the payoff of player-n is defined as its profit from the uniform price auction. The solution of this game can be obtained using the concept of the non-cooperative equilibrium originating from the Nash idea. Based on the so called residual demand curve, we can derive the best response function of each generation company in the uniform pricing auction with N companies, analytically. Finally, we present an efficient means to obtain all the possible equilibrium set pairs and to examine their feasibilities as Nash equilibriums. A simple numerical example with three generation companies is demonstrated to illustrate the basic idea of the proposed methodology. From this, we can see the applicability of the proposed method to the real-world problem, even though further future analysis is required.

주제어

#Equilibrium Set Pairs   #Generation Markets   #Nash Equilibrium   #Residual Demand  

참고문헌 (10)

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