참고문헌 (66)

1. See essay on “Kim Jong-il's Strategic Goals by Kim Myong Chol” carried by Pacific Forum CSIS Pac Net, No. 33, September 15, 1995. 

2. 10.1007/BF03023333 See Mark Valencia's “Preparing for the Best: Involving North Korea in the New Pacific Community,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies , Vol. XIII, No. 1, Spring 1994, pp. 65-76, for a balanced overview of the potential advantages and incentives for the North in being drawn more actively into regional cooperative efforts, as well as the risks of their being an unhelpful “partner.” 

   

3. 10.1525/as.1995.35.6.01p0027v The most useful recent survey of Chinese attitudes toward Korea, and a major basis for the judgements in this section, is Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser's “Looking Across the Yalu: Chinese Assessments of North Korea,” Asian Survey , Vol. XXXV, No. 6, June 1995, pp. 528-45. 

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4. Lee Choon-shik's “China's Strategy Toward Korea” in Korea Focus , Jan.Feb. 1995, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 113-15, sketches such a scenario. 

5. For example, see “Main Points of Roundtable Discussion” (p. 1) of a roundtable discussion on “Korean Outcomes and Major Power Interests: Implications for the US” on March 17, 1994, sponsored by the Office of Secretary of Defense and the Defense Nuclear Agency under the direction of SAIC (Science Applications International Corp.); and Garrett and Glaser, p. 545. 

6. Weaving the Web: Conditional Engagement with China , James Shinn, ed. Council on Foreign Relations, 1996, includes a number of essays to explore the likelihood of hegemonic Chinese policy toward its neighbors. All writers agree China will be an increasingly strong power but argue its policies will not necessarily be hegemonic, particularly if the US and other regional states pursue policies designed to integrate China within the region. See in particular (op. cit.) Jonathan Pollack, “Designing a New American Strategy for Asia”, pp. 99-132 and articles by Masashi Nishihara, “Japan's Receptivity to Conditional Engagement”, pp. 175-190, and Ahn Byung-joon, “The US in Asia: Searching for a New Role,” pp. 191-219, and Amitav Acharya, “ASEAN and Conditional Engagement,” pp. 220-48. For a more pessimistic view, see David Shambaugh, “Growing Strong: China's Challenge to Asian Security,” Survival , 36, No. 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 43-59. For a more benign attitude, see “China After Deng,” William Overholt, Foreign Affairs , May-June 1996, pp. 63-78. 

7. 10.1080/00927678.1995.9933702 Trade was $3 billion in 1989, over $11 billion in 1994, and expected to continue to rise in 1995. Yi Xiaoxiong, “China's Korean Policy: from ‘One Korea’ to ‘Two Koreas’,” Asian Affairs , Summer 1995, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 119-40. 

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8. For example, the effusive speech by Jiang Zemin on the 50th anniversary of the DPRK, October 6, 1995, and the parallel message from Jiang to Kim Jong-il. Nevertheless neither referred to defense cooperation or the mutual friendship treaty nor did North Korean comments on the Chinese observance of the anniversary. FBIS-CHI-95-195, October 10, 1995, pp. 9ff and FBIS-EAS-95-195, October 10, pp. 28ff. Another view is that the Chinese defense commitment remains intact and was exemplified by Chinese military exercises on the Liaodong peninsula in August 1994. The Chinese officially described these exercises as aimed at Taiwan but a Hong Kong journalist alleged they were really linked to a promise by Jiang to North Korean Chief of Staff Choe Kwang in late May or early June 1994 to help defend North Korea with Chinese arms. FBIS-CHI-94-196, October 11, 1994, pp. 15ff, “Revealing Secrets About Landing Exercise of the Shenyang Military Region;” Hong Kong Ching Pao in Chinese, October 5, 1994. 

9. Foreign Minister Kong No-myung was quoted on October 10, 1995, as saying, “I was told by Chinese officials that the automatic military involvement clause of the North Korea-China Mutual Friendship Treaty was practically canceled when South Korea and China normalized relations.” FBIS-EAS-95-195, October 10, 1995, p. 65, citing Seoul Yonhap of the same day. It may be true that “automaticity” is no longer a factor-if it ever was-but Chinese continue to say privately that there are circumstances in which they might become involved in a conflict on the peninsula. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace scholar Selig Harrison states that Chinese with whom he has spoken in 1995 consistently insist that the PRC-North Korean treaty remains in effect (personal communication). 

10. Private communication from Garrett and Glaser. Other scholars do not share this view, for example, Yi Xiaoxiong, “China's Korean Policy,” p. 129, who argues that “China has no reason to fear a North Korean nuclear capability.” 

11. Garrett and Glaser, p. 533. 

12. Ibid., p. 534. 

13. Yi Xiaoxiong, “China's Korean Policy”; and Samuel S. Kim, “China's Pacific Policy: Reconciling the Irreconcilable,” International Journal , Summer 1995, Vol. L, No. 3, p. 472, sketch persuasively the rationale behind a Chinese “de facto/de jure” “two Koreas” policy. On the other hand, Selig Harrison says that Chinese have consistently expressed considerable ambiguity over what kind of “unified Korea” they expect in the indefinite future (personal communication). 

14. 10.1080/00396339508442787 See Greg Austin, “The Strategic Implications of China's Public Order Crisis,” Survival , Vol. 37, No. 2, Summer 1995, pp. 10-11. Austin also cites a Hong Kong press report on a May 1994 public security conference in China in which Liaoning was one of eight provinces in which “social disturbance in the rural areas will erupt on a large scale at any time” and Heilungkiang was one of nine other provinces in which the situation was “not stable enough,” p. 9. 

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15. 10.1007/BF03023331 Rowena Fong and Paul R. Spickard in a survey of Chinese students at Nankai University in 1989 found little suspicion or concern about ethnic Chinese Koreans, who seemed to be accepted as “honorary” Chinese and were uniformly described in positive terms-although not as particularly desirable, marriage partners. “Ethnic Relations in the People's Republic of China: Images and Social Distance Between Han Chinese and Minority and Foreign Nationalities,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies , Vol. XIII, No. 1, pp. 26-48. Policy-oriented officials in Beijing, looking at this same minority, could easily have different perceptions. 

    

16. E.g., see Garrett and Glaser, pp. 539, 545, but this phrase has been used by a number of Chinese to Westerners as well as in public speeches. 

17. Wall Street Journal, October 9, 1995; Steve Glain, “After 1,300 Years, White Collar Armies Target Manchuria.” 

18. Garrett and Glaser, p. 541. 

19. Jin-Hyun Paik (draft paper not authorized for citation in published works) “Exploitation of Natural Resources: Potential for Conflicts-Northeast Asia,” prepared for CSCAP Maritime Cooperation Working Group, June 2-3. 1995, pp. 4-5. Paik notes 1,302 Chinese fishing violations of Korean territorial waters or the Korean Fishery Resources Protection Zone in 1993 and that the situation has recently worsened due to increasing “Chinese fishing operations in the militarily sensitive area around the Five Islands in the Yellow Sea off North Korea, [in] which the South Korean government restricted fishing even for its nationals for fear of possible conflicts with North Korea.” Paik notes that although China and the ROK have begun to negotiate a fisheries agreement, “little progress has so far been made…. [T]he Korean government may consider employing corresponding counter-measures.” Eight months later, the Korea Times (February 9, 1996) reported 7,000 instances of Chinese fishing boats engaged in illegal fishing in South Korean waters in 1996, prompting both sides to resume talks on a bilateral fishing agreement in early February 1996. (FBIS-EAS-96-024, 5 February 1996, pp. 36-37) And between April 6-16, 1996, a joint Chinese-South Korean maritime survey of currents in an extensive area of the Yellow Sea marked a further step in cooperative efforts aimed at easing potential maritime frictions (Yonhap, April 1, 1996 as carried in FBIS-EAS-06-064, April 2, 1996, p. 18). 

20. Ibid., p. 539. 

21. Korea Herald, October 5, 1995, quoting Korean Chief of Naval Operations Admiral An Pyong-tae. FBIS-EAS-95-193, October 5, 1995, p. 58. 

22. Private conversation with an official of the Chinese Institute for Contemporary International Relations. 

23. Comments at an informal meeting in Washington September 29, 1995, by two senior Chinese research scholars from the Chinese State Council's Development Research Center and the Chinese Academy of Sciences. 

24. Beijing Liaowang, August 14, 1995, translated in FBIS-Chi-95-198, September 29, 1995, p. 2. 

25. See FBIS-EAS-95-237, December 11, 1997, p. 45 for the Yonhap report of returning Ambassador Hwong Pyong-tae's comment, and FBIS-EAS-96-024, February 5, 1996, pp. 36-37, for his successor's observation. 

26. Presumably Jiang Zemin's scheduled trip to South Korea in November 1995 will provide opportunities for sketching out the broad direction of future bilateral ties. 

27. For example, the range of programs described in Rhee Sang-woo's short article on a “New Defense Posture for Next Century,” Korea Focus , March-April 1995, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 59-69. 

28. Lee Sook-jong, “Korean Perceptions on National Security,” Korean Focus , July-August 1995, Vol. 3, NO. 4, pp. 13-23. 

29. During the period in which there were sixty shipping incidents in the East China Sea involving Chinese pirates or quasi-official Chinese ships between April 1992 and June 1993 only one involved a Korean-registered ship. 

30. The basic analysis presented in this author's paper “Strategic Change in Northeast Asia to 2010” prepared for the October 1994 CNA-KIDA Workshop describes the constraints and direction of these programs. Prof. Paul H. B. Godwin's unpublished paper “The PLA Towards 2000” prepared for the July 13-15, 1995, Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies/China Quarterly Workshop in Hong Kong elaborates this analysis with similar conclusions: “China's progress toward the strategic aspirations of its national defense modernization continue to be slow but, and as Beijing frequently states, with no major military threat to its security there is no requirement for undue haste” (p. 26). 

31. Godwin, pp. 15-20. 

32. The most thorough unclassified US study is by Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, and Jonathan D. Pollack, “China's Air Force Enters the 21st Century,” RAND, 1995. This study concludes “the modernization process will be prolonged and subject to fits, starts, and reversals…. Although the PLAAF will continue to replace older aircraft and to introduce more modern systems from abroad selectively, a comprehensive modernization process will only be possible over the longer term. Should China need to commit its air forces to battle again in the coming decade, leaders in Beijing will use their available assets, even if the present air force (and the air force that will continue to exist over the coming decade) is not judged equal to the task” (pp. 187-88). 

33. Ibid., pp. 182-87. 

34. For example, see Col. Min Zengfu, “A Glimpse at 21st Century Air Combat,” China Military Science , Feb 20, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-193, pp. 17ff in which Min describes the stand-off weapon systems, long-range transport aircraft, stealth capabilities, satellite and space navigation systems, smart weapons, and all weather capabilities required. 

35. 10.12781/978-1-907549-26-7-3 Godwin, pp. 20-24; and Min, p. 18. 

    

36. Paul Dibb of Australian National University, writing in the 1995 Strategic Survey of the International Institute of Strategic Studies sees somewhat greater likelihood of China's having two or three 60,000 ton aircraft carriers by 2016 as well as additional ballistic missile submarines. Godwin doubts China will be able to integrate carriers into its forces by this time even if it acquires one or two probably smaller ships. Both Godwin and Dibb agree that China will significantly increase the number of Kilo -class diesel submarines but Godwin is dubious how survivable these will be in view of their relative noisiness. Korea Times , April 21, 1995, citing AFP London. 

37. 10.1080/10163279509464531 Michael Nacht's “Multinational Naval Cooperation in Northeast Asia,” in the Korean Journal of Defense Analysis , pp. 29-48, Summer 1995, Vol. VII, No. 1 sums up a number of such options. 

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38. Hiroyoshi Ina, an editorial writer for Nihon Keizai Shimbun , writing in Gaiko Forum , July 1995, translated in FBIS-EAS-95-187, September 27, 1995, p. 10 writes: “There still remains a delicate component of emotional issues among the average citizen, despite the fact that Japan and South Korea, through their ties to the US, have a relationship similar to an alliance…. When the Korean peninsula is peacefully unified, however, would the US military become unnecessary? Such arguments may be viable from a purely military point of view; but realistically they are unlikely. Both Japan and [unified Korea] will probably seek a continued US military presence for psychological stability.” 

39. For example, the mainstream English-language magazine Japan Echo in its Spring 1995 issue included two long articles on Japanese policy toward Asia, neither of which addressed Korea except in the context of the nuclear threat from North Korea and support for solving subregional conflicts “such as those on the Korean Peninsula.” (pp. 10, 19, 20, 21) 

40. One recent illustration is the casual comment, without any answer, of Prof. Toshiuki Shikata of Teiyo University in a dialogue with former Ambassador Hisahiko Okazaki and former Vice-Defense Agency Minister Seiki Nishihiro: “Will the unified Korea become anti-American, pro-Chinese, or pro-Russian?” Gaiko Forum, p. 11. 

41. Shunji Taoka, “Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces in the Next Century,” Sekai No Kansen , December 1995 (translated in FBIS-EAS-96-068, April 8, 1996, pp. 31-37). 

42. Korea Times, April 24, 1995. 

43. Translated and reprinted in FBIS-EAS-95-141, pp. 21-34, July 24, 1995, p. 31. 

44. Korea Times, May 14, 1995. 

45. Korea Herald, October 7, 1995, in FBIS-EAS-95-197, October 12, 1995. 

46. Kyodo, April 24, 1996, FBIS-EAS-06-081, April 25, 1996, p. 12. 

47. See papers prepared for the CSCAP Maritime Cooperation Working Group in Kuala Lumpur, June 2-3, 1995. 

48. Nihon Keizai Shimbun/Walt Street Journal poll reported in Nihon Keizai Shimbun, April 23, 1995, summarized in article in Kaiko Forum , July 1995 by Hisayoshi ha, FBIS-EAS-95-187, September 17, 1995, p. 13. Among Japanese, 60.4% saw China as friendly in 1995 and 70.9% thought it would be friendly in 1015. 

49. Shintaro Ishihara, “The Day Japan Becomes a Military Country,” Voice (in Japanese) June 1, 1995, translated in FBIS-EAS-95-139, July 20, pp. 5-6. 

50. Gaiko Forum, comments by Amb. Hisahiko Okazaki and Prof. Toshiyuki Shikata, p. 10. 

51. Constitutional revision is supported by 59% of Japanese in their 20s. 56% in their 30s, and 57% in their 40s. In contrast, only 46% in their 50s, 42% in their 60s, and 37% in their 70s favored such reform. “Results of Yomiuri Constitution Poll.” It is unclear how far Japanese supporting Constitutional revision on security issues (Article 9) would go; this was not covered by the Japanese polls. It is also striking that many of those who opposed revision in their 20s and 30s in 1981 have shifted ground to favor revision in the last few years. This is Yomiuri (in Japanese), June 1, 1995, translated in FBIS-EAS-95-132, July 11, 1995, p. 12. Unfortunately the published polling data does not break out the age and socio/economic/educational information on those who specifically cited rights or defense as reasons for revising the Constitution. 

52. Prof. Baek Jong-chun of the Sejong Institute in a paper for the Sejong Institute conference on the Northeast Asian security environment October 11-12, 1995. Korea Times , October 12, 1995. 

53. This is Yomiuri, June 1, 1995, “Comprehensive Security: Proposing a Policy Outline,” by Yomiuri Shimbusha Research Group, pp. 22-23. 

54. Ibid., p. 33. 

55. For example, in the Gaiko Forum discussion noted earlier, Nishihiro contrasted the past when “it was extremely important to strengthen the defense of Japan to contain the Soviet Union [and] Japan was confident that its assigned duty was to concentrate on self-defense…. However, Japan is no longer exposed to a specific menace, following the Soviet Union's collapse. Now, each time something happens somewhere in the world, Japan should discharge its duty to a certain degree depending on how much the matter affects Japan's national interests [emphasis added].” p. 15. 

56. For example, a Japanese Foreign Ministry Spokesman after the visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said on April 1, 1996, “[Qian] said that the Japan-US alliance should not jeopardize the friendly relations between China and Japan…. China is not targeted by the Alliance…. China should not be misled by the document which Japan and the US…. issue during President Clinton's visit to Japan.” Three weeks later, Deputy Chief of Staff or the Chinese PLA, Gen. Xiong Guang-kai, told a visiting Japanese delegation: Any expansion of [the scope of the US-Japan Security Treaty] might complicate the situation in East Asia. Similar expressions of view were frequent, and often even stronger, in articles in the Chinese press. 

57. Tokyo Kyodo in English, July 8, 1995, FBIS-EAS-132, July 11, 1995, p. 6. The basic National Defense Outline does not explicitly mention North Korean guerrillas but refers only to “dealing effectively with contingencies such as armed invasions, terrorist and guerrilla activities, and natural disasters.” The DA intelligence headquarters is described in Mainichi Shimbun on July 17, 1995, translated in FBIS-EAS-95-139, p.23. The Finance Ministry was skeptical about a guerrilla threat from North Korea and one unnamed official described this as “unrealistic,” a polite bureaucratic euphemism for “absolute nonsense.” 

58. 10.1016/S1353-4858(00)90008-4 LDP Security Research Council Report, March 1996, FBIS-EAS-96-071, April 11, 1996, pp. 11-14. 

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59. Lt. General (rtd) Yasuhiro Morino, preface to a study by the Morino Military Affairs Research Institute entitled “The Next Generation Ground Self-Defense Force: Fighting Future Wars This Way,” FBIS-EAS-96-080, April 24, 1996, pp. 5-7. 

60. Review article in Sankai Shinbun March 4, 1996, on the Morino report (FBIS-EAS-96- 079, April 23, 1996, pp. 15-16.) 

61. Gaiko Forum, p. 15. Quote (a) is from Professor Shikata, quote (b) is from Ambassador Okazaki. 

62. ”Rabbits' Ears and Doves Dreams,” translated in a special FBIS issue EAS-94, October 4, 1994, pp. 1-20. 

63. Gaiko Forum, Hisayoshi Ina, p. 14. 

64. Koichi Akaza in Yomiuri Shimbun , September 19, 1995. In FBIS-EAS-184, September 22, 1995, p. 3. 

65. The view expressed by at least one Japanese writer that China could at some point seize the Russian Maritime provinces and thereby intensify a threat to Korea is far-fetched at best. (Taoka, p. 33.) 

66. Exemplified by the completed demarcation, except for riverine islands, of the last portion of the Sino-Russian border early in October 1995.