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Sizing Up Chinese Military Buildup: The Limitations to Defense Modernization 원문보기

The Korean journal of defense analysis, v.8 no.1, 1996년, pp.231 - 251  

Yuan, Jing-dong ,  Zhu, Yuchao

초록이 없습니다.

참고문헌 (56)

  1. Barbara Opall, “Study Rings Alarm on PLA Budget,” Defense News , May 29-June 4, 1995, pp. 1-37. 

  2. Barbara Opall, “US Allies Fear Chinese Buildup,” Defense News , April 26-May 2, 1993, p. 1. 

  3. 10.1016/0030-4387(94)90039-6 These alarms and concerns are captured in such news headlines as “China's Ominous Military Muscle,” “China Moves to Fill Naval Power Vacuum,” “New Arms, New Attitude: China Flexing Its Muscles,” to cite just a few. Some go further to claim that China is pursuing typical traditional great-power strategies, which pose serious threats to regional security. See, e.g., Larry M. Mortzel, “China Pursues Traditional Great-Power Status,” Orbis , Vol. 38, No. 2, Spring 1994, pp. 157-75; Denny Roy, “Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security,” International Security , Vol. 19, No. 1, Summer 1994, pp. 149-68; David Shambaugh, “Growing Strong: China's Challenge to Asian Security,” Survival , Vol. 36, No. 2, Summer 1994, pp. 43-59; Esmond D. Smith, Jr. “China's Aspirations in the Spratly Islands,” Contemporary Southeast Asia , Vol. 16, No. 3, December 1994, pp. 274-94. 

  4. Zonghe Guoli Lun [On Comprehensive National Strength] 1992 

  5. Huang, On Comprehensive National Strength , pp. 13, 102. 

  6. See Xu Xin, “China's Defense Strategy under New Circumstances,” International Strategic Studies (Beijing), 1993, No. 3. General Xu is a former deputy chief of the General Staff of the PLA. 

  7. Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3 (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1993), pp. 274-75. 

  8. Huang, On Comprehensive National Strength , pp. 275-76. 

  9. 1988. On Study of War and Strategy 258Beijing: Chinese Academy of Military Science Press. Department of Planning and Organization, Chinese Academy of Military Science, (p. 

  10. 10.1016/0030-4387(94)90040-X Huang, On Comprehensive National Strength , p. 271. Regarding China's effort in military-related high technology and war preparation, see Shulang Chu, “The PRC Girds for Limited, High-Tech War,” Orbis , Vol. 38, No. 2, Spring 1994, pp. 177-91. 

  11. Xi, Coming of the Post-Nuclear Age , pp. 15-16. 

  12. Asian-Pacific Whirlpools (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Military Science Press, 1989), pp. 9-11. 

  13. Michael Richardson, “China Raises Spratly Fears,” Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter , February 1991, p. 16. 

  14. Li, Yihu. 1992. The Shattered Myth: The Split and Integration of the World 304Changsha: Hunan Press. 

  15. Wu Gifu, “Worldwide Trend of Integration of Strategies of Security and Development,” International Strategic Studies (Beijing), 1989, No. 3. He particularly cited French Strategic researcher Andre Beaufort's view about the so-called “overall strategy.” 

  16. Li, Shattered Myth , pp. 326-27. 

  17. On Study of War and Strategy, pp. 194, 238-39. In specific terms, China's defense strategy is said to include three schools: active defense and flexible response, flexible response and effective deterrence, and multiple deterrence. 

  18. 10.1007/978-1-349-11049-0 Rosita Dellios, Modern Chinese Defence Strategy: Present Development, Future Directions (London: Macmillan, 1989), Chapter 2; Keith Jacobs, “China's Military Modernization and the South China Sea,” Jane's Intelligence Review , June 1992, pp. 278-81. 

  19. 10.1080/01402399408437559 An excellent study of the changing role for the Chinese navy can be found in Jun Zhan, “China Goes to the Blue Waters: The Navy, Seapower Mentality and the South China Sea,” Journal of Strategic Studies , Vol. 17, No. 3, September 1994, pp. 180-208. 

  20. Quoted in Bradley Hahn, “PRC Policy in Maritime Asia,” Journal of Defense & Diplomacy , Vol. 4, No. 6, June 1986, p. 20; Yihong Zhang, “China Heads toward Blue Waters,” International Defense Review , November 1993, p. 879. Liu currently serves on the all-powerful Central Military Commission as its executive vice-chairman. 

  21. 10.1215/01636545-1993-55-135 Gordon Jacobs, “Chinese Naval Developments post Gulf War,” Jane's Intelligence Review , February 1993, pp. 81-85 

  22. Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific Klintworth Gary 106 1988 

  23. Tai Ming Cheung, “China's Regional Military Posture,” International Defense Review , June 1991, pp. 618-22. One should keep in mind that China now is claiming its territorial waters of 200 nautical miles. This claim increases the total area of China's territorial seas by 35.8 percent but also causes territorial disputes with at least eight of its neighbors. See Zhang, “China Heads toward Blue Waters,” p. 879. 

  24. Jane's Defence Weekly, February 19, 1994. 

  25. Joris Janssen Lok, “Spratly Islands Rivalries Bring Regional Navies into Focus,” Jane's Defence Weekly , August 22, 1992, p. 19; Bradley Hahn, “China: A Naval Transition,” Journal of Defense & Diplomacy , Vol. 6, No. 11, November 1988, p. 6. 

  26. Arms Industry Limited Frankenstein John 271 1993 

  27. The Peaceful Development of Defense Resources: A Study of the Conversion of Military Resources to Civilian Fields in China Zhou Jianshe 1992 

  28. Ibid., p. 141. 

  29. Ibid., p. 197. 

  30. Ibid., p. 199. 

  31. 10.55540/0031-1723.1740 Karl W. Eikenberry, “Does China Threaten Asia-Pacific Regional Stability?” Parameters , Vol. 15, No. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 82-103. 

  32. The commentary is cited in Chen Xiaogong and Liu Xige, “Several Questions Concerning China's National Defense Policy,” International Strategic Studies (Beijing), 1993, No. 2. 

  33. The Economist, May 16, 1986, p. 32; Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, “America's Military Relations with the People's Republic of China: The Need for Reassessment,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies , Vol. 7, No. 3, Fall 1988, p. 37. 

  34. 10.2307/2619165 William T. Tow and Douglas T. Stuart, “China's Military Turns to the West,” International Affairs , Vol. 57, No. 2, Spring 1981, pp. 286-300; Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow, “Chinese Military Modernization: The Western Arms Connection,” China Quarterly , No. 90, June 1982, pp. 253-70. 

  35. “US-China Discuss Sale of Military Technology,” Department of State Bulletin , March 1980, p. 45. 

  36. Paul Mann, “China, US Set Further Arms Buy Talks,” Aviation Week & Space Technology , June 11, 1984, pp. 22-23. 

  37. Paul Mann, “China Export Policy Takes Final Form,” Aviation Week & Space Technology , January 25, 1982, p. 57; Nayan Chanda, “TOWing the Peking Line,” Far Eastern Economic Review , June 28, 1984, pp. 12-13. 

  38. The following discussion draws on Eden Y. Woon, “Chinese Arms Sales and US-China Military Relations,” Asian Survey , Vol. 29, No. 6, June 1989, pp. 601-18; Larry M. Wortzel, “US Technology Transfer Policies and the Modernization of China's Armed Forces,” Asian Survey , Vol. 27, No. 6, June 1987, pp. 615-37; Kerry B. Dumbaugh and Richard E. Grimmett, “Arms Sales to China: The Limits to US-Chinese Military Cooperation,” Washington Quarterly , Vol. 9, No. 3, Summer 1986, pp. 89-102; Hickey, “America's Military Relations with the People's Republic of China,” pp. 2943; Byong-Moo Hwang, “The Evolution of US-China Security Relations and Its Implications for the Korean Peninsula,” Asian Perspective , Vol. 14, No. 1, Spring-Summer 1990, pp. 69-90. 

  39. 10.1525/as.1993.33.3.00p02662 The background analysis of the emerging Sino-Russian military relations can be found in Bin Yu, “Sino-Russian Military Relations: Implications for Asian-Pacific Security,” Asian Survey , Vol. 33, No. 3, March 1993, pp. 302-16. 

  40. For an excellent analysis of the origin of Soviet/Russian military sales to China, see Tai-ming Cheung, “Ties of Convenience: Sino-Russian Military Relations in the 1990s,” in China's Military: The PLA in. 1992/1993 , ed. Richard H. Yang (Taipei: Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, 1993), pp. 61-77. 

  41. SIPRI Yearbook 1995: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security Wezeman Siemon T. 518 1995 

  42. Tai Ming Cheung, “China's Buying Spree,” Far Eastern Economic Review , July 8, 1993, pp. 24, 26, idem; “Sukhois, Sam, Subs,” FEER , April 8, 1993, p. 23; Barbara Starr, “MiG Buy May Lead to Chinese Copies,” Jane's Defence Weekly , October 10, 1992, p. 18. 

  43. Tai, “China's Buying Spree,” p. 26. 

  44. Robert Karniol, “China to Buy Russian ‘Kilo’ Submarines,” Jane's Defence Weekly , November 19, 1994, p. 1. 

  45. It has been reported that China paid 65 percent of the US$I billion contract for the first batch of twenty-six Su-27s in foodstuffs and consumer goods and the balance in hard currency. See Tai Ming Cheung, “Loaded Weapons: China on Arms Buying Spree in Former Soviet Union,” Fur Eastern Economic Review , September 3, 1992, p. 21; Sophie Quinn-Judge, “Cannon for Fodder: Soviets Set to Swap Arms for Chinese Food,” Far Eastern Economic Review , March 28, 1991, p. 11. 

  46. Henry Kenny, “Underlying Patterns of American Arms Sales to China,” World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers (Washington, DC: Arms Controls and Disarmament Agency, 1986), pp. 40-41. 

  47. David A. Fulghum and Paul Proctor, “China Seeks to Build MiG-31,” AW&ST , October 5, 1992, p. 27. However, Qian Qichen, Chinese foreign Minister, has openly denied that China is planning to coproduce with Russia the MiG-31s. Shijie Ribao [World Journal] , New York, September 24, 1992, p. 10. 

  48. “‘Made in China’ Deal Is Forged for Su-27s,” Jane's Defence Weekly , May 6, 1995, p. 3; Tyler, “Chinese Get Top Russian Jets.” 

  49. Jim Mann, “Russia Boosting China's Arsenal,” Los Angeles Times (Washington Edition), November 30, 1992, p. 1; Tai, “China's Buying Spree,” p. 24; Fialka, “US Fears China's Success,” p. 12. 

  50. Tai, “China's Buying Spree,” pp. 24, 26. 

  51. Tai, “Loaded Weapons,” p. 21 

  52. “Cold War Era Curbs Chill China's High-Tech Future,” Reuter News , February 17, 1994. 

  53. 10.1080/09512749508719142 Bates Gill, “Determinants and Directions for Chinese Weapons Imports,” Pacific Review , Vol. 8, No. 2, 1995, pp. 359-82. 

  54. Naoaki Usui, “Financial Woes Limit Chinese Arms Buys,” Defense News , February 28-March 6, 1994, pp. 1, 28. 

  55. Gerald Segal, “Russia and the Chinas-New Risks,” Jane's Intelligence Review , September 1992, p. 416. 

  56. This may take decades, given the current status of China's defense industry, which remains deficient in terms of R & D, design, and overall technological base. See Eric Arnett, “Military Technology: the Case of China,” in SIPRI Yearbook 1995 , pp. 359-86. 

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