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Contending National, Regional and Global Imperatives in Australia's Post-Cold War Defense and Security Thinking 원문보기

The Korean journal of defense analysis, v.8 no.2, 1996년, pp.75 - 99  

Cheeseman, Graeme

초록이 없습니다.

참고문헌 (75)

  1. T. B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War , Second Edition, (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1991). 

  2. Department of Defense, Defence of Australia 1987 , (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1987). For a discussion of the evolution of Labor's defense posture, see Graeme Cheeseman, The Search for Self-Reliance: Australian Defence Since Vietnam , Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1993. 

  3. Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s , Second Edition, Melbourne University Press, 1995, p. 30. 

  4. Australia's Regional Security, Ministerial Statement by Senator the Hon. Gareth Evans QC, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Commonwealth of Australia, 1989, p. 1. 

  5. Australia's Regional Security, pp. 44-45. 

  6. 10.1080/10357719508445148 Gareth Evans, “Australia in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific: Beyond the Looking Glass,” Australian Journal of International Affairs , Vol. 49, No. 1, 1995, p. 99. 

  7. 10.1355/CS11-3A Paul Dibb, The Conceptual Basis of Australia's Defence Planning and Force Structure Development , Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 88, Strategic and Defense Studies Center, Australian National University, Canberra, 1992, p. 69. See also Andrew Mack, “Australia's Defence Revolution,” Working Paper No. 150, Strategic and Defense Studies Center, Australian National University, Canberra, 1988. Some of the specifics of the 1987 defense white paper were criticized by Ross Babbage, A Coast Too Long: Defending Australia Beyond the 1990s , Allen & Unwin, St. Leonards, 1990 and Thomas-Durrell Young, “Problems in Australia's Defence Revolution,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 11, No. 3, 1989, pp. 237-56. 

  8. Andrew MacIntyre, “Comprehensive Engagement and Australia's Security Interests in Southeast Asia,” in Greg Fry (ed.), Australia's Regional Security , Allen & Unwin, North Sydney, 1991, p. 115. 

  9. Greg Fry, ‘Constructive Commitment’ with the South Pacific: Monroe Doctrine or ‘New Partnership’?”, in Greg Fry (ed.), Australia's Regional Security , pp. 129-30. 

  10. Gary Brown, Australia's Security: Issues for the New Century , Australian Defense Studies Center, Australian Defense Force Academy, Canberra, 1994, pp. 13-19. 

  11. Department of Defense, Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s , Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1992, p. 3. 

  12. Department of Defense, Force Structure Review 1991 , Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1991, p. 1. 

  13. Department of Defense, Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s , p. iii. 

  14. See for example, Coral Bell, Agenda for the Nineties: Australian Choices in Foreign and Defence Policy , Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1991; F. A. Mediansky (ed.), Australia in a Changing World: New Foreign Policy Directions , Maxwell Macmillan, Australia, 1992; Richard Leaver and Jim Richardson, The Post-Cold War Order: Diagnoses and Prognoses , Allen & Unwin, St. Leonards, 1993; and T. B. Millar and James Walter (eds.), Asian-Pacific Security After the Cold War , Second Edition, Allen & Unwin, St. Leonards, 1993. 

  15. 10.1080/10357719508445144 A proposal to establish a “Pacific adaptation” of the CSCE had also been raised by Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark. See Kim Richard Nossal, “Seeing Things? The Adornment of ‘Security’ in Australia and Canada,” Australian Journal of International Affairs , Vol. 49, No. 1, 1995, pp. 33-48, at p. 37. 

  16. 10.1080/01636609509550136 Andrew Mack and Pauline Kerr, “The Evolving Security Discourse in the Asia-Pacific,” Washington Quarterly , Vol. 18, No. 1, 1995, pp. 123-40. 

  17. In his 1989 ministerial statement on Australia's Regional Security, Evans had argued, on page 36, that “[g]reater consideration should be given to what has been described as ‘second-track’ diplomacy: seeking to get our message across and exercise leverage through various semi-governmental and non-governmental organizations and personnel.” 

  18. 10.1177/0967010694025002004 Desmond Ball, “A New Era in Confidence-Building: The Second-track Process in the Asia-Pacific Region,” Security Dialogue , Vol. 25, No. 2, 1994, pp. 168-69. 

  19. Desmond Ball, “A New Era in Confidence Building,” p. 169. 

  20. Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr, Presumptive Engagement: Australia's Asia-Pacific Security Policy in the 1990s , Allen & Unwin, St. Leonards, 1996, pp. 23-30. 

  21. Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations , Chapter 8; John Ravenhill, “Economic Objectives,” in F. A. Mediansky (ed.), Australia in a Changing World: New Foreign Policy Directions , pp. 102-24. 

  22. Gareth Evans, Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond , Allen & Unwin, St. Leonards, 1993. A critical discussion of Evans' book is contained in Stephanie Lawson (ed.), The New Agenda for Global Security: Cooperating for Peace and Beyond , Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1995. 

  23. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping , Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on January 31, 1992, New York, 1992. 

  24. Evans later acknowledged that many of the criticisms levelled at the UN stemmed from its member states' unwillingness to provide the organization with sufficient commitment and resources to carry out its expanded role. Two suggested approaches for offsetting this inertia were to refocus security concerns around the plight of the individual-thus moving the locus of the UN's efforts towards the preventive end of his response spectrum-and involve more existing or emerging regional security organizations. See “Cooperative Security and Interstate Conflict,” Foreign Policy , No. 96, Fall 1994, pp. 3-20 and “Australia's Commitment to Global Multilateralism and Its Implications for the Asia Pacific Region,” keynote paper given to the Conference on The United Nations: Between Sovereignty and Global Governance, La Trobe University, Melbourne, July 2-6, 1995. 

  25. Department of Defense, Strategic Review 1993 , DPUBS: 8009/93, Canberra, 1993, p. iii. 

  26. Department of Defense, Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994 , Australian Government Publishing Service, 1994. 

  27. Those involving capabilities which are available in the region, or which are likely to be introduced within a few years. 

  28. Department of Defense, Strategic Review 1993 , p. 2. 

  29. Department of Defense, Strategic Review 1993, p. 21. 

  30. Department of Defense, Strategic Review 1993, pp. 22-23 

  31. These contacts included ongoing intelligence and personnel exchanges, training programs, official visits, and the adoption of a range of formal agreements on defense and security cooperation. See Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr, Presumptive Engagement , pp. 63-70 and Desmond Ball, Building Blocks and Security: An Australian Perspective on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) in the Asia/Pacific Region , Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 83, Strategic and Defense Studies Center, Australian National University, Canberra, 1991, Chapter 4. 

  32. “Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia on Maintaining Security,” cited in Ball and Kerr, Presumptive Engagement , p. 143. 

  33. Greg Sheridan, “Keating's Own Grand Alliance,” Australian , December 16-17, 1995, p. 21. See also Alan Dupont, “The Australian-Indonesia Security Agreement,” Strategic and Defence Studies Center, Australian National University, Canberra, February, 1996. 

  34. Department of Defence, Strategic Review 1993, pp. 28-31. 

  35. A brief history of Australia's DCP program and a listing of past expenditure by region and country is contained in Allan Shephard, A Compendium of Australian Defence Statistics , Australian Defence Studies Center, Australian Defense Force Academy, Canberra, 1995, pp. 54-59. For a recent description of the Pacific Patrol Boat program, see Anthony Bergin, The Pacific Patrol Boat Project: A Case Study of Australian Defence Cooperation , Australian Foreign Policy Papers, Department of International Relations, Australian National University, Canberra, 1994. 

  36. The criteria for such interventions were spelt out by the former Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans, in his 1989 statement on Australia's Regional Security , p. 22. A critique of Australia's regional security policy at the time is contained in Graeme Cheeseman and St. John Kettle, The New Australian Militarism: Undermining Our Future Security , Pluto Press, Sydney, 1990. 

  37. Department of Defense, Force Structure Review , p. 28. 

  38. Department of Defense, Defence of Australia 1987 , p. 9. 

  39. Department of Defense, Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s , p. iv. 

  40. Australia's UN operations are detailed in Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia's Participation in Peacekeeping , Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1994, Appendix 5. 

  41. Department of Defense, Peacekeeping Policy: The Future Australian Defence Force Role , DPUBS: 2092/93, Canberra, June 1993, p. 7. The document did provide an indicative list of types of units and sub-units that “could in principle be made available for peacekeeping duties.” The list, which had been forwarded to the UN in August 1990, included an infantry battalion group, APC squadron, signals squadron, medical unit, field supply company, transport squadron, field workshop, light and medium helicopter flight, military police platoon and movement control unit. 

  42. Department of Defense, Defending Australia , p. 108. 

  43. Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade, United Nations Peacekeeping and Australia , Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1991, p. 124. 

  44. Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade, Australia's Participation in Peacekeeping . pp. 62-63. 

  45. Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade, Evidence , October 9, 1993, p. 240. 

  46. “A Confident Australia: Coalition Foreign Affairs Policy,” February 10, 1996, p. 3. 

  47. “A Confident Australia,” p. 3. 

  48. “A Confident Australia,” p. 27. 

  49. Greg Sheridan, “Alliance is an appreciating regional asset,” Australian , July 26, 1996, p. 34 and “Howard bolsters US links,” Australian , July 27, 1996, pp. 1-2. 

  50. Ian McPhedran, “Defence resources to focus on Sharp end,” Canberra Times , August 21, 1996, p. 20. 

  51. Don Greenlees, “Foreign aid hits record low after 10pc cut,” Australian , August 21, 1996, p. 26. 

  52. Detailed discussions of Australia's evolving defense relationship with the United States are contained in Graeme Cheeseman, The Search for Self-Reliance , Chapter 6; Gary Brown, Australia's Security: Issues for the New Century , Chapter 4 and Paul Dibb, The Future of Australia's Defence Relationship with the United States , The Australian Center for American Studies, Sydney, 1993. 

  53. In addition to its high public and parliamentary profile, the ADF's peacekeeping activities were also the subject of a number of academic conferences and workshops held in Australia. See, for example, Hugh Smith (ed.), Peacekeeping: Challenges for the Future , Australian Defense Studies Center, Australian Defense Force Academy, Canberra, 1993; Hugh Smith (ed.), International Peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodian Experience , Australian Defense Studies Center, Australian Defense Force Academy, Canberra, 1994; and Kevin Clements and Christine Wilson (eds.), UN Peacekeeping at the Crossroads , Peace Research Center, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, 1994. 

  54. Address to the 44th General Assembly of the United Nations by Senator Gareth Evans, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, New York, October 5, 1989. Cited in Department of Foreign Affairs' Submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade, Hansard , February 22, 1991, p. 584. 

  55. Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s , p. 95. The same message was given in the Department's submission to the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade's 1994 inquiry. See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Submission, Hansard , September 28, 1993, p. S238. 

  56. In his opening address to a conference on UN Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, held in Canberra in March 1993, Evans stated that even though “national earmarking or identification of forces would appear to be a practicable way of assisting the UN to improve planning,” it was no longer necessary “to nominate specific units for peacekeeping duties, let alone place specific forces on standby: we believe we can respond quickly and professionally to new situations as they arise without going this far.” Cited in Kevin Clements and Christine Wilson (eds.), UN Peacekeeping at the Crossroads , p. 20. 

  57. See Alan Thompson, “Australia's Strategic Defence Policy: A Drift Towards Neo-Forward Defence,” Working Paper No. 29, Australian Defense Studies Center, Australian Defense Force Academy, November 1994 and Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr, Presumptive Engagement , pp. 88-90. 

  58. Edy Prasetyono, “The Regional Focus of Australia's Defence Policy-An Indonesian Perspective,” Working Paper No. 15, Australian Defense Studies Center, Australian Defense Force Academy, Canberra, July 1993. 

  59. On the last issue, see Paul Dibb, The Conceptual Basis of Australia's Defence Planning and Force Structure Development, Chapter 2, and Department of Defense, Defending Australia , Chapter 4. For a discussion of the implications for Defense of this contradiction, see Gary Brown, “DA 94: Weaknesses and Contradictions,” in Jennelle Bonnor and Gary Brown (eds.), Security for the Twenty-First Century? Australia's. 1994 Defence White Paper , Australian Defense Studies Center, Australian Defense Force Academy, Canberra, 1995, pp. 109-111. 

  60. See, for example, Gareth Evans, “Australia in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific: Beyond the Looking Glass,” and James L. Richardson, “Asia-Pacific: The Case for Geopolitical Optimism,” National Interest , No. 38, Winter 1994/95, pp. 28-39. 

  61. Department of Defense, Defending Australia , Chapter 2. See also Paul Dibb, Towards a New Balance of Power in Asia , Adelphi Paper No. 295, IISS, London, 1995. 

  62. Department of Defense, Defending Australia , p. 4. 

  63. Department of Defense, Strategic Review 1993, pp. 9-10. 

  64. Kim Richard Nossal, “Seeing Things?” p. 42. 

  65. Kim Richard Nossal, “Seeing Things?” p. 45. 

  66. Kim Richard Nossal, “Seeing Things?” pp. 45-46. 

  67. Stuart Harris, “Australia's Regional Security Environment,” Working Paper No. 1994/3, Department of International Relations, Australian National University, Canberra, 1994, p. 23. A similar view was advanced by Andrew Mack and Pauline Kerr in “Security Studies in Australia in the 1990s,” Working Paper No. 1994/2, Department of International Relations, Australian National University, Canberra, 1994. 

  68. Graeme Cheeseman, “Australia, Disarmament and Arms Control,” in James Cotton and John Ravenhill (eds.), Australian Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: Australia in World Affairs 1991-95 , Oxford University Press, Melbourne (forthcoming). 

  69. The failure of the Labor government to look beyond the issue of self-defense was demonstrated most starkly by its position on anti-personnel landmines (APLs). Despite growing public concern over the human and social costs of these weapons, the government, advised by the Department of Defense, refused to support moves for a global ban on the production, stockpiling, use and transfer of APLs on the grounds that they might be needed by the Australian Defense Force. This position was reversed by the incoming Coalition Government which directed that the Australian representative to the review Conference of the Inhumane Weapons Convention announce that Australia would henceforth support such a ban. 

  70. In recognition, perhaps, of the difficulties of using international arms control regimes to control the continuing proliferation of ballistic missile technologies over the longer-term, Australia is now seeking, in contravention of its earlier opposition to the American Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program, to cooperate with the United States in developing theater missile defenses. See Eric 

  71. See, for example, David Campbell, “The ‘New Mindset of International Relations’? Security, Sovereignty and Responsibility in Cooperating for Peace,” in Stephanie Lawson (ed.), The New Agenda for Global Security , Chapter 3; David Sullivan, “Sipping a Thin Gruel: Academic and Policy Closure in Australia's Defence and Security Discourse,” in Graeme Cheeseman and Robert Bruce (ed.), Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers: Australian Defence and Security Thinking After the Cold War , Allen & Unwin, St. Leonards, 1996, Chapter 2; and Jim George, “Some Thoughts on the ‘Givenness of Everyday Life’ in Australian International Relations: Theory and Practice,” Australian Journal of Political Science , Vol. 27, No. 1, 1992, pp. 31-54. 

  72. David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity , Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1992, p. 4. 

  73. 10.1017/S026021050011335X For a discussion of (American) foreign policy and strategic studies discourses, see Bradley Klein, “Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defense Politics,” Review of International Studies , Vol. 14, No. 2, 1988, pp. 133-48 and Strategic Studies and World Order: The Global Politics of Deterrence , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994. An important Australian perspective is provided by Michael Sullivan, “Australia's Regional Peacekeeping Discourse: Policing the Asia-Pacific,” in Graeme Cheeseman and Robert Bruce (eds.), Discourse of Danger , pp. 195-250. 

  74. Australia's strategic and popular cultures are discussed in Graeme Cheeseman, “Back to ‘Forward Defence’ and the Australian National Style,” in Graeme Cheeseman and Robert Bruce (eds.), Discourses of Danger , pp. 25-171 and ‘White Australia's Strategic Culture,’ in Ken Booth and Russell Trood (eds), Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region , Macmillan, London (forthcoming). 

  75. Michael Sullivan, “Australia's Regional Peacekeeping Discourse,” p. 209 

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