참고문헌 (28)

1. Reuter Hourly News Summary, America online internet service, May 28, 1996. But US sources responded that DPRK military activities have been reduced. Hankook Ilbo , May 30, 1996, p. 2. 

2. Kim Myong-chul, “A North Korean Perspective on the 4-Way Talks Proposal,” Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network Daily Report , Berkeley, CA: Nautilus internet service, May 15, 1996. 

3. 1987. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 438-535. New York: Random House. For the theoretical reference, see Paul Kennedy, and also his Preparing for the Twenty-First Century (New York: Random House, 1993), pp. 3-15. 

4. A Chinese diplomat, Sun Guoxiang, who studied at SAIS of the Johns Hopkins University in 1996, said that several high-ranking officials from DPRK visited China's special economic zones after the collapse of Soviet Union to learn the model of socialist market economy from China. 

5. China's Economy in 1993 and 1994: The Search for a Soft Landing Overholt William H. 1994 

6. Sandler, Todd and Hartley, Keith. 1995. The Economics of Defense 220New York: Cambridge University Press. p.; Robert W. DeGrasse, Jr. Military Expansion Economic Decline: The Impact of Military Spending on US Economic Performance (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1983). 

7. “The Mystery of Growth,” The Economist , May 25, 1996, p. 2. “Many studies now show that ‘market-friendly’ policies work best: secure property rights; reliable enforcement of contracts; a liberal trade regime; low taxes and public spending; a welcome for foreign investors.” 

8. Theory and Practice of the North Korean Economy Jip Moon Byong 15 1996 

9. in The North Korean Economy in Transition Keun Kim Woon 1994 

10. 1996. Current Economic Trends of North Korea 22Seoul: KDI. The Korea Development Institute, It indicates that the DPRK's total demand for grains was 6.72 million M/T in 1995, while Woon Keun Kim (1994) estimated 9.06 million M/T in 1993. 

11. 1996. Economic Indicators of North and South Korea 108Seoul: Korean Government. The National Unification Board, pp. and 112. 

12. Larry Niksch, “North Korean Food Shortages: U.S. and Allied Responses,” CRS Report for Congress 96-334 F , Washington, DC: CRS, April 11, 1996. The study mentioned that causes of the shortages are the maintenance of a Stalinist collective and state farm system, shortages of fertilizers and agro-chemicals, and petroleum shortage for farm machines. It pointed out problems of allocation policies of the North Korean Government: an allocation of about 17% of total grain production for industrial uses, a priority in allocation of rice to the larger cities, failure to shift food from the better provinces to the three hardest hit provinces, and military stockpiling for use in case of war (1.2 million tons). 

13. Recently, it is said that the DPRK discontinued normal operations for a 70% of all factories because of the shortage of energy. 

14. 10.2307/20047488 Kent E. Calder, “Asia's Empty Tank,” Foreign Affairs 75(2) (March/April 1996): 55-69. China's oil imports will be 19% of Asia's total imports by 2010, while 37% for Japan's, 18% for South Korea, 17% for ASEAN, and 9% for Taiwan and Hong Kong will be imported. 

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15. 1996. North Korean Economic Situations 1995 114Seoul: KDI. Korea Development Institute 

16. National Unification Board. December 1995. Economic Indicators of North Korea December, 234Seoul: ROK government. For historical data, see, For 1995 data, see Byong Keun Kim, “Foreign Debts of North Korea $11.5 Billion,” Hankook Ilbo , May 18, 1996, p. 2. 

17. Korea Trade Development Corporation, “1995 Trade Development in North Korea,” a short report for circulation (Seoul: KTDC, May 1996), p. 8. 

18. This section was discussed in WheeGook Kim, “The Impact of Regional and Global Developments on the Korean Peninsula,” presented to a joint conference on Change and Challenge on the Korean Peninsula: Developments, Trends, and Issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC on September 20-21, 1995, sponsored by CSIS (Washington) and RINU (Seoul). East-West Research Mimeo pp. 16-19. To be printed soon by CSIS. 

19. 1975. Equality and Efficiency: The Big Trade Off 117-20. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. For a theoretical reference, see Arthur M. Okun 

20. “Energy Shortage Halts 70 Percent of Factories in NK,” Korea Herald , June 5, 1996, p. 2. This was quoted by NAPS Net Daily Report , Berkeley, CA: Nautilus Internet Service, June 6, 1996. 

21. This is a modification of WheeGook Kim, “Performance and Prospects of the South Korean Economy and The Direction of Economic Cooperation between Two Koreas,” Presented to the 10th Annual Conference on The Korean Peninsula: Security Issues while Moving into The Twenty First Century held at Hyatt Hotel, Arlington, Virginia, on October 25-26, 1995, sponsored by The Council on US-Korean Security Studies. East-West Research Mimeo, p. 30. 

22. The Half Century of the Korean Economy: Historical Evaluation and Visions for the Twenty-First Century Chun Hong-tack 693 1995 

23. For the details of this issue, see WheeGook Kim, “Alternative Growth Strategies of North Korea: Lessons from Experiences of South Korea and Taiwan,” presented at the 1996 Annual Convention of Allied Social Science Associations in San Francisco, California, on January 5-7, 1996. East-West Research Mimeo, pp. 33-37. Pyongyang's Strategies for Capital Formation. 

24. A Study of Investment Environment on the DPRK's Special Economic Zone: Comparison with China and Vietnam NamKoong Young 1995 

25. Tseng, Wanda and Staffs, IMF. November 1994. Economic Reform in China: A New Phase November, 52-53. Washington, DC: IMF. One-third of state-owned enterprises were estimated to be making losses, and another one-third were breaking even in China by 1993. Jeffrey D. Sachs, “Accelerating Privatization in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland,” Proceedings of the World Bank: Annual Conference on Development Economics 1991 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1992), pp. 15-30. 

26. August 1994. China's Economy in 1993 and 1994: The Search for a Soft Landing August, 36Washington, DC: GPO. CIA, “Central leaders are concerned, for example, that local officials are pocketing the proceeds from selling state property or, at a minimum, failing to split earnings with state banks and central government organizations that have a claim on the assets…. Beijing tightened controls in May 1994 by forbidding the unauthorized sales of state property and demanding stricter appraisals by the regime's state asset watchdog agency.” 

27. Theory and Practice of the North Korean Economy Lee Young-sun 390 1996 

28. Economic Situations of North Korea Chung Sung-shik 76 1996