참고문헌 (25)

1. Unless noted otherwise, all statistical data concerning China's relations with the two Koreas are based on the official publications of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT). Occasionally, such primary sources as the data compiled by the Trade Research Institute (TRI) of the Korea International Trade Association (KITA) are employed; but they can be easily corroborated with those of MOFAT. 

2. This is the term used by Brad Glosserman for describing the longer-term nature of the Sino-ROK relationship. See his “U.S.China: The Next Alliance?”South China Morning Post, Oct. 30, 2003. 

3. See, for example, Xia Liping and Jiang Xiyuan, Zhongguo Heping Jueqi [China's Peaceful Rise] (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehuikexueyuan Chubanshe, 2004); Zheng Bijian, “China's Peaceful Rise and Opportunities for the Asia Pacific Region,” China Strategy , Vol. 3 (July 20, 2004), pp. 2-4. 

4. For a difference between “peaceful rise” and “peaceful development,” see Sukhee Han, “The Rise of China and East Asia's Changing Order [in Korean],” New Asia , Vol. 11, No. 3 (Autumn 2004), pp. 113-34, particularly pp. 116-23. 

5. Hegemon: China's Plan to Dominate Asia and the World Mosher Steven W. 2000 

6. According to the recent data released by MOFAT, South Korea's trade with China in 2004 was US$79.3 billion, with a surplus of US$20.2 billion. According to the Chinese statistics-which includes the ROK's trade portions with Hong Kong, it was US$90.1 billion. China's accounts showing the size of the trade imbalance with South Korea in 2004 have not yet been released to date. 

7. The ROK's accumulated amount of investment in China up to 2004 was US$17.8 billion, which is close to its total investment in the United States (US$17.1 billion). 

8. The figures are drawn from an interview with the ROK's ambassador to the PRC. See Yonhap News, Feb. 13, 2004. 

9. The increase in China's exports to North Korea over the past few years should be interpreted as a form of Chinese assistance. The question of North Korea's dependency on Chinese oil and food has recently taken on new relevance in light of the discussion of possible international sanctions against North Korea. According to various official documents of the ROK, North Korea imported an average one million tons of oil from China in 1991-96 and it fell to a half million tons and below since 1997. Its grain imports from China are a far more complicated issue to account for, due in part to China's own harvest level and export policy, but approximately 300,000 tons of grain have been imported from China since 1997. For a series of recent, but higher-level, accounts of North Korea's oil and grain imports from China, see John J. Tkacik, Jr. “China Must Pressure Pyongyang (Dec. 17, 2002),” available atwww.heritage.org/Press/Commenrary/ed123102b.cfm;Phillip P. Pan, “China Treads Carefully Around North Korea,” Washington Post , Jan. 10, 2003, p. A14; Phillip C. Saunder and Jing-Dong Yuan, “Korea Crisis Will Test Chinese Diplomacy,” Asia Times , Jan. 8, 2003; Matthew Forney, “Family Feud: China vs. North Korea,” Time , Dec. 23, 2002; and Mark O'Neill, “Beijing Faces a Stern Test Over Nuclear Crisis in Its Back Yard,” South China Morning Post , Jan. 3, 2003. 

10. For an excellent discussion on the depth and prospects of North Korea's economic problems and their various effects, see Nicholas Eberstadt, “The Persistence of North Korea,” Policy Review , October/November 2004, pp. 23-48; Chaiki Seong, “A Decade of Economic Crisis in North Korea: Impacts on the Military,” KIDA Papers , No. 3 (October 2003), pp. 1-9; Paul VanWagenen, “U.S. Economic Sanctions-Non-traditional Success against North Korea,” Law and Policy in International Business , Vol. 32, No. 1 (Fall 2000), pp. 239-61. 

11. 10.1017/S0305741003000547 See, for example, Lowell Dittmer, “Leadership Change and Chinese Political Development,” China Quarterly , No. 176 (December 2003), pp. 903-25. For a recent discussion on the prospects for U.S-China relations under Hu Jintao, see Jaewoo Choo, “Hu Jintao's Foreign Policy and Sino-U.S. Relations: From A [sic] Korean Perspective,” New Asia , Vol. 11, No. 3 (Autumn 2004), pp. 80-112. 

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12. For a detailed analysis on the military-to-military relationship between China and North Korea up to 1997, see Taeho Kim, “Strategic Relations Between Beijing and Pyongyang: Growing Strains amid Lingering Ties,” in James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, eds. China's Military Faces the Future (Armonk: M. E.Sharpe, 1999), pp. 295-321; Taeho Kim, Recent Changes in Sino-North Korea Relationn and the ROK's Policy Options (Seoul: KIDA, 2001) [in Korean], pp. 60-68. 

13. Sept. 24 2004. Sept. 24, For an analysis on the mutual visits between Beijing and Pyongyang, see Yonhap News 

14. 10.1080/10163270409464060 Alliance fatigue, which is a natural symptom for any old alliance relationship, is particularly acute in the Sino-North Korea case as there is a growing divergence of interests between the two. See Sukhee Han, “Alliance Fatigue amid Asymmetrical Interdependence,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Spring 2004), pp. 155-79. 

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15. October 1999. China's Foreign Military Relations October, 66-68. Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center. This does not mean, however, that their military-to-military ties are balanced or symmetrical in terms of frequency and the ranks of the visiting officers. For a comprehensive treatment of the PLA's military diplomacy in the 1990s in general and China's military relations with both Koreas, see Kenneth Allen and Eric A. McVadon 

16. The Chinese government's position is that there are no North Korean “refugees,” let alone “dissidents,” in its territory. Its position has triggered a series of strong protestations from various NGOs based in South Korea and elsewhere. See the editorial, Chosun Ilbo , Dec.11, 1999, p. 2. The latest attempt by the Korean religious groups to invite the Dalai Lama was apparently foiled due to the ROK's concern over Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji's October 2000 visit to Seoul. See Chosun Ilbo , Oct. 19, 2000, p. 3. On cases of trade dispute see KOTRA, Dae jungguk muyeok bunkyu sarye [Cases of Trade Dispute with China] (Seoul: Korea Trade and Investment Promotion Agency, 2002). 

17. 10.1525/as.2001.41.5.777 An excellent perceptual study on this critical issue of Korea's emerging strategic problems is available. See Derek J. Mitchell, ed. Strategy and Sentiment: South Korean Views of the United States and the U.S.ROK Alliance (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004); Jae Ho Chung, “South Korea between Eagle and Dragon: Perceptual Ambivalence and Strategic Dilemma,” Asian Survey , Vol. 41, No. 5 (September/October 2001), pp. 777-96. 

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18. After the election for General Assembly members, 63 percent of the ruling party members (Uri Party) favored closer ties with China compared with the United States. After the Goguryeo affair escalated into diplomatic row between the two countries, the figure plummeted to 10 percent or below. Similar results can be found in other opinion surveys. See, for example, Yonhap News , Aug. 10, 2004 and Media Daum , Aug. 19, 2004. 

19. Unofficial translation by the author. 

20. 10.1080/10163270409464055 For the strategic context of the issues, see Jaeho Hwang, “Northeast Asia's Pandora's Box: North Korean Escapees,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis , Vol. 16, No. 1 (Spring 2004), pp. 49-72. 

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21. See a flurry of newspaper reports on the subject including B. J. Lee, “Historical Differences,” South China Morning Post, Aug. 13, 2004; Edward Cody, “China Gives No Ground in Spats over History,” Washington Post , Sept. 22, 2004, p. A25; Howard W. French, “China's Textbooks Twist and Omit History,” New York Times, Dec. 6, 2004; David Scofield, “China Ups and Downs in Ancient-Kingdom Feud with Korea,” Asia Times , Aug. 16, 2004; David Scofield, “China Puts Korean Spat on the Map,” Asia Times , Aug. 19, 2004. 

22. For this line of reasoning, see Jun-young Kang, “Hidden Motives behind China's Northeast Project,” Korea Herald , Aug. 24, 2004. The publication date, it should be noted, is the 12th anniversary of the ROK-PRC diplomatic normalization. 

23. See, for example, Bates Gill, “Contrasting Visions: United States, China and World Order,” an unpublished mimeo presented at the U.S.China Security Review Commission Session on the U.S.China Relationship and Strategic Perceptions, Aug. 3, 2001. A dated yet still usefull discussion on the impact of the diverging visions of the United States and China on the Korea peninsula can be found in Edward A. Olsen, “U.S. & China: Conflicting Korean Agenda,” Korea and World Affairs , Vol. 21, No. 2 (Summer 1997), pp. 254-69. 

24. In particular, see the conference proceedings on The First ROK-U.S.China Future Forum entitled “The Changing ROK-U.S.China Relationships and the Future of the Korean Peninsula,” co-hosted by the Institute for Diplomacy and Security Studies (IDSS) and the Center for Contemporary China Studies (CCCS), Hallym University, Shilla Hotel, Seoul, Oct. 30, 2004. 

25. For a critical assessment of the North Korean nuclear crisis and on the participating nations' difference interests, see Alexandre Y. Mansourov, “North Korea Is Poised to Cross the Nuclear Rubicon: Will the Canary Die in the Mine?” International Journal on World Peace , Vol. 20, No. 3 (September 2003), pp. 17-28; Michael O'Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki, Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to Deal With a Nuclear North Korea (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2003); Victor D. Cha, “North Korea's Weapons of Mass Destruction: Badges, Shields, or Swords?” Political Science Quarterly , Vol. 117, No. 2 (Summer 2002), pp. 209-30; C. Kenneth Quinones, “North Korea Nuclear Talks: The View from Pyongyang,” Arms Control Today , Vol. 34, No. 7 (September 2004). pp. 6-12.