참고문헌 (63)

1. See interview with Viktor B. Khristenko to “Gazeta,” Ministry of Industry and Energy, June 15, 2004, Moscow, available athttp://www.mte.gov.ru/docs/1/1682.html.Mr. Viktor B. Khristenko is the Minister of Industry and Energy of the Russian Federation. 

2. Russia is important to world energy markets because it holds the world's largest natural gas reserves (1,680 trillion cubic feet, TcF), the second largest recoverable coal reserves (173 billion short tons), and the eighth largest oil reserves (60 billion barrels). Russia is also the world's largest producer (21 TcF) and exporter (6.5 TcF) of natural gas, the second largest producer (8.4 million bbl/day) and exporter (5.76 million bbl/day) of oil, and the third largest energy consumer. See Russia Country Analysis Brief , May 2004, available athttp://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/russia.html. 

3. See Alexei Kudrin, “Real Growth in Wages is Likely to be 7.8 Percent in the Next Ten Years, Assuming the 5-7% Annual GDP Growth Rate,” Russian Ministry of Finance, PRIME-TASS , Moscow, Nov. 29, 2004, available athttp://www.minfin.ru/off inf/1123.htm.Mr. Alexei Kudrin is the Minister of Finance of the Russian Federation. 

4. Experts from the Moscow Center for the Analyses of Strategies and Technologies, a military-related think tank, estimate the Russian arms exports at US$5.1-5.4 billion in 2003, available athttp://www.newsru.com/arch/finance/01sep2004/weapons.html, accessed on Sept. 1, 2004. 

5. Russian government external debt stood at US$139.3 billion, US$129.3 billion, US$122.1 billion, and US$118.9 billion, respectively, on Jan. 1, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004. See “Program of Government External Borrowings of the Russian Federation in 2004,” Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, available athttp://www.minfin.ru/debt/pres090703.ppt. 

6. See Alexei Kudrin, interview at the Russian Ministry of Finance, Moscow, Dec. 9, 2004, available athttp://www.strana.ru/stories/02/05/29/3045/235399.html. 

7. On Feb. 11, 2005, President Putin told Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin that “the economic rationality of pre-paying the entire foreign debt as early as possible is self-evident.” See Irina Alyeshina, “Putin Ordered to Settle the Debts with Paris Club,” Kommersant Daily , Feb. 11, 2005, p. 1. 

8. See Alexei Kudrin, interview at the Russian Ministry of Finance. 

9. See German Greff, speech at the first all-Russian conference of the heads of foreign economic departments of the provinces of the Russian Federation, p. 14, July 2004, Moscow, Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, available athttp://www.economy.gov.ru/wpa/portal/ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_BD/.cmd/ad/.ar/sa.detailURI/.ps/X/.c/6_0_6P/.ce/7_0_1M5/.p/5_0_JP/.d/0/_th/J_0_documentld=1089717463734&documentType=interviewdated July 12, 2004. Mr. German Greff is the Russian Minister of Economic Development and Trade. 

10. See “Main Directions of Government Activities,” Cabinet of Ministers , July 8, 2004, Moscow. 

11. See WTO accession database, available athttp://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_russie_e.htm. 

12. See interview with Maxim Medvedkov, “We will Not Leave Geneva,” Kommersant Daily , July 16, 2004, p. 6. Maxim Medvedkov is Director of the trade negotiations department of the Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Trade. He is the chief Russian negotiator with the WTO. 

13. See interview with Maxim Medvedkov, “Until Everything is Agreed Upon-Nothing is Settled,” News Time , July 21, 2004, p. 4. 

14. See interview with German Greff, July 2004, Moscow, available athttp://www.economy.gov.ru/wpa/portal/ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_BD/.cmd/ad/.ar/sa. detailURI/.ps/X/.c/6_0_6P/.ce/7_0_1M5/.p/5_0_JP/.d/0/_th/J_0_documentld=1089717463734&documentType=interviewdated July 12, 2004. 

15. Courchevel is an expensive French ski resort popular among Russian nouveaux-riches. 

16. Lefortovo is the prison and investigation complex used by the Federal Security Service for the incarceration of high-ranking government officials, spies, and oligarchs. 

17. Between Empire and Nation Pain Emil 2004 

18. Mr. Anatoly Chubais, former Deputy Prime Minister, head of the union of right forces party, and chairman of the United Energy Systems (RAO EES) Corporation of Russia, was the author and most ardent proponent of the “liberal empire-building” school of thought. See Anatoly Chubais, “ Russia's Mission ,” speech at the St. Petersburg State University of Engineering and Economics, Sept. 25, 2003, available athttp://www.chubais.ru/cgi-bin/cms/personal.cgi?news=00000000048 

19. Alexander Prokhanov is editor-in-chief of the “Zavtra,” a conservative nationalist pro-communist newspaper. See Alexander Prokhanov, “Does Russia Have to be an Empire?” Izvestiya , Moscow, Dec. 10, 2004, p. 1. 

20. Evgueni Zyuganov is the leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation in the State Duma. 

21. Alexander Dugin is the leader of the “Eurasia” Party, philosopher and political scientist, known for his geopolitical studies a la MacKinder. 

22. Dmitry Rogozin is the leader of the nationalist “Rodina” (fatherland) Party in the State Duma. 

23. Eduard Limonov is the leader of the chauvinist party “National Bolsheviks of Russia.” 

24. Vladimir Zhirinovsky is the leader of the ultra-nationalist “Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia” (LDPR) in the State Duma. 

25. See minutes of the roundtable “Patriotism and Nationalism” at the Liberal Mission Foundation headed by Dr. Evgueni Yasin, Feb. 5, 2004, available athttp://www.chubais.ru/cgi-bin/cms/smi.cgi?news=00000002318. 

26. See Andrei Piontkovsky, “Services of Empire will not be Welcomed,” The Novaya Gazeta , Moscow, Feb. 9, 2004, p. 1. Mr. Piontkovsky is a political observer of moderate liberal views. 

27. Unhappy about the European involvement in the “Orange Revolution” in the Ukraine, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov reportedly threatened to suspend Russia's membership of the OSCE in December 2004. On numerous occasions, Russia also threatened to reconsider its participation in the meetings of the Council of Europe and its Parliamentary Assembly, which are perceived as being too biased and critical of Russia's human rights violations in Chechnya. 

28. 10.1177/0967010694025004010 See Alexander Tsipko, an expert on Russian ethnic identity and nationality problems at the Moscow Institute for Economic and Political Research and a research associate at the Gorbachev Foundation, interview, “The Times with Vladimir Pozdner,” Nov. 26, 2004. From his earlier works, see Alexander Tsipko, “A New Russian Identity or Old Russia's Reintegration?” Security Dialogue , Vol. 25, No. 4 (1994). 

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29. See Ksenia Fokina, “Summit in The Hague Failed to Bring Together Russia and the EU,” November 25, 2004, available athttp://www.strana.ru/stories/01/12/04/2157/233939/html. 

30. As part of the quadrilateral coalition-building process, in addition to developing close and strong personal ties between President Putin and Chancellor Schroeder, President Chirak, and Prime Minister Berlusconi, Moscow granted Berlin, Paris, and Rome with numerous trade and investment privileges, agreed on a mutual visa exemption regime, opened unprecedented access to the Russian energy markets, offered to pre-pay the government debt obligations ahead of other Paris Club members, ratified the Kyoto Treaty, and took common political positions on many controversial issues at the United Nations, especially on the Iraq war and post-war reconstruction, Iran's nuclear program, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. 

31. See Ivan Preobrazhensky, “ China-Partner or Potential Enemy ?” Oct. 14, 2004, available athttp://www.strana.ru/stories/02/11/14/3205/229693.html. 

32. Specifically, Moscow insists on signing the second contract on the sale of 24 SU-30MK2 naval fighter jets to the People's Liberation Navy in early 2005, as a follow-up measure to the first contract on the sale of 24 SU-30MK2 naval fighter jets to the PLN, worth about one billion U.S. dollars, signed in January 2003, which was supposed to be completed in December 2004. In addition, Moscow presses Beijing to sign another contract on the continuation of licensed assembly of SU-27 fighter jets in China. The original license agreement was signed in 1996 and stipulated the licensed assembly of 200 planes, but Russia delivered only 105 assembly units to China as of Dec. 31, 2004. Reportedly, Russian Defense Minister Ivanov and his Chinese counterpart Cao Gangchuan agreed to sign these two contracts among other things in 2005 in their joint protocol on “Main Directions of Military Cooperation until 2010” during their talks in Beijing on Dec. 22, 2004. Another important agreement reached was to conduct joint army exercises in China in 2005, perhaps, in order to alleviate the Chinese concern about the implicitly anti-Chinese maneuvers of the Russian army, called “Mobility-2004” and held across Russia last summer. See “China is Ready to Resume Purchases of Russian Arms,” Moscow, Dec. 20, 2004, available athttp://www.newsru.com/arch/finance/20dec2004/weapons.html. 

33. See an interview with Konstantin Makienko, research associate at Moscow's Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, “China is Ready to Resume Purchases of Russian Arms,” available athttp://www.newsru.com/arch/finance/20dec2004/weapons.html. 

34. See an interview with Marat Kenzhetaev, resident expert at the Moscow center for studies of disarmament problems at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, available athttp://www.newsru.com/arch/finance/20dec2004/weapons.htmlaccessed on Dec. 20, 2004. 

35. This amount means 150,000 barrels per day, which accounts for 7 percent of Chinese total daily consumption of crude oil, with 100,000 barrels going to CNPC and 50,000 barrels to SINOPEC. 

36. “Chinese Comrades Will Pay on Behalf of YUKOS,” Kommersant Daily , Moscow, Aug. 18, 2004, p. 1. 

37. The YUKOS management resorted to such a high-profile drastic measure in order to broaden the scope of conflict and draw the international attention to its unfair prosecution by the Russian government. Specifically, it wanted the Russian courts and Ministry of Taxes and Revenues to unfreeze its bank accounts so that it could continue normal business operations and pay its counterparts for the railroad tariffs and other utilities due as a result of its oil exports to China. See Erin Arvedlund, “A Clever Move by YUKOS,” New York Times , New York, Sept. 21, 2004. 

38. See “Sino-Russian Trade Likely to Surpass US$20 Billion in 2004,” Beijing, December 1, 2004, Xinhua News Agency ; and “Trade Volume between Russia and China May Exceed 25 Billion U.S. dollars,” ITAR-TASS, Beijing, Feb. 8, 2005, available athttp://www.strana.ru/stories/02/11/14/3205/239889.html. 

39. See Memorandum on WTO talks with the PRC, Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, Moscow, November 2004, available athttp://www.economy.gov.ru/wps/portal/ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_PL/.cmd/ad/.ar/sa.datailURI/.ps/X/.c/6_0_AB/.ce/7_0_1Q2/.p5_0_NM/.d/o/_th/J_0_documentld=1101804 959078&documentType=material 

40. In fact, the Russian government repeatedly blocked Chinese participation in the privatization auctions of such Russian oil majors as “Slavneft,” “TNK,” and, most recently, “YUGANSKNEFTEGAS.” 

41. Accordingly, Russian and Chinese governments signed a series of agreements in this regard-Additional Agreement on Russian-Chinese State Border in its Eastern Segment, Protocol on Navigation of Russian and Chinese Vessels in the Areas Adjacent to the Islands Bolshoy Ussuri and Tarabarov, Protocol to the Inter-Governmental Agreement on Joint Near-Border Use of Islands, Memorandum on the Application of Existing Agreements to the New Delimitated Segments of the Russian-Chinese Inter-State Border. See “Russia and China Showed State Wisdom, Reached Well Balanced and Mutually Acceptable Solutions,” Oct. 15, 2004, available athttp://www.strana.ru/stories/02/11/14/3205/229754.htmlaccessed on Oct. 14, 2004. 

42. See Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov, RIA-Novosti , New Delhi, Nov. 30, 2004. 

43. See Memorandum on trade and economic cooperation between Russia and India, Department of information and media , Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow, May 7, 2004. 

44. This commission consists of 12 sectoral groups and 12 subgroups; it is convened twice a year, and has already held ten sessions since formation. On the Russian side, it is headed by the First Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Zhukov. 

45. Joint space exploration and collaboration on a flight to the Moon are also mentioned as possible areas of inter-state cooperation. 

46. During his visit to Moscow in October 2004, the Indian Minister of Oil and Gas Mani Shankar Ayar made a rather emotional statement that “In so far as in the second half of the 20th century when India was developing as an independent state, Russia made a significant contribution to the preservation of our territorial integrity, these days Russia acts as a guarantor of our energy independence.” See Alexei Tamilin, “A New Russian-Indian Breakthrough in the Oil and Gas Sector is Coming,” Nov. 15, 2004, available athttp://www.strana.ru/stories/02/02/01/2447/232729.html. 

47. See “Largest Oil Company in India to Bid for YUKOS,” Moscow Times , Moscow, Dec. 7, 2004, available athttp://pdf.moscowtimes.ru/pdf/3064_20041207.pdf. 

48. See “Russia Ships Reactor Shell for Indian Atomic Power Plant,” Moscow, Asia Pulse , Nov. 19, 2004. 

49. See Alexei Tamilin, “Uneven-sided Triangle of Putin,” Dec. 3, 2002, available athttp://www.strana.ru/stories/02/11/28/3221/165965.html. 

50. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov, “Russia Signed Contracts Worth US$5 Billion with India,” RIA-Novisti , Nov. 30, 2004. 

51. Vladimir Levin, “Inmates Save Russian Arms Orders,” Vedomosti , March 21, 2002, Moscow. 

52. See “Putin to Visit Japan in Early 2005,” Interfax , Sea Island, June 10, 2004. 

53. The Sakhalin-I project is being led by Exxon Neftegaz, in conjunction with consortium members SODECO, ONGC Videsh, Sakhalinmorneftegaz, and RN Astra. The consortium members started drilling in May 2003 and expect preliminary oil production of 250,000 bbl/d in 2005. The project's oil output will be piped westward to the Russian port of De-Kastri and pumped into the Russian system. Sakhalin-I's natural gas is expected to be sent southward to Japan via a proposed pipeline. The partners are planning for natural gas exports to Japan to begin in 2008. 

54. The Sakhalin-II project is being developed by Shell, Mitsubishi, and Mitsui and entails the development of Russia's first LNG facility, to be built on the southern tip of the island, near the town of Prigorodnoye. Construction of the project's two-train, 9.6-million-tons-per year facility began in Spring 2003, and Shell expects that initial production could begin in 2005 with exports scheduled to commence in 2007. According to press reports, the Sakhalin-II partners have already secured sales contracts with four Japanese utilities worth 3.4 million tons per year, or approximately 35% of the plant's output capacity, for roughly 20 years. The most recent of these contracts was announced in March 2004, and entails the sale of 300,000 tons of LNG per year to Japan's Toho Gas between 2010 and 2033. 

55. This commission has held seven sessions since its formation in 1994. It is headed by Russian deputy prime minister responsible for economy and a Japanese foreign minister. It has two sub-commissions-on economic relations with Far Eastern region and on trade and investments. 

56. Japanese Defense Minister Ishiba visited Moscow in January 2003, and Russian Defense Minister Ivanov visited Tokyo in April 2003. For the first time in the history of bilateral military-to-military exchanges, The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces took part in the military exercises conducted by the Russian Pacific Fleet in August 2003. In 2004, the Japanese government agreed to finance a program involving the utilization of the Russian nuclear submarines decommissioned from the Pacific Fleet. 

57. Since October 2002, the two foreign ministries have been conducting regular consultations on various issues related to the global war against terrorism at the deputy foreign minister level. 

58. The commission has held six annual sessions since its formation in 1998. 

59. It is worth mentioning that in 2004, the Export-Import Bank of Korea began to finance South Korean exporters through Russian commercial banks. The ExIm Bank concluded an agreement with Rosbank for a US$30 million credit facility. It is also in the process of negotiations with Alfa Bank for a US$50 million loan. 

60. During President Roh Moo-hyun's four-day trip to Russia, the two governments reportedly signed an agreement on space technology transfer, which would allow the ROK to develop its own rocket to launch satellites into orbit and put one of the country's astronauts in space on a Russian spacecraft in the years to come. Russia also agreed to build a rocket-launch facility for civilian satellites in Goheung, South Jeolla province in the ROK by 2007. See “Russia to Send South Korea Joint Satellite Project Proposal,” Asia Pulse , Sept. 22, 2004; “Korea and Russia Agree on Space Launch Facility,” Joongang Ilbo , Oct. 28, 2004, p. 4. 

61. In 2000, Russia and the ROK signed the inter-governmental agreement on energy cooperation. Following this agreement, Russia Petroleum (a TNK-BP-led consortium), South Korea's state-owned Korea Gas Corporation (Kogas), and the Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) announced plans to construct a pipeline connecting Russia's Kovykta field to China's northeastern provinces and across the Yellow Sea to South Korea. The plan calls for a 1.2 Bcf per year pipeline, which would deliver roughly two-thirds of its gas annually to China, while delivering the rest to South Korea and smaller quantities to the domestic market en route. The partners expect that the pipeline could come on stream in 2008. 

62. See interview by I. I. Klebanov, Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, ITAR-TASS , Feb. 28, 2001; also, see Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov, “Russian Armed Forces: Current State, Prospects for Development, and Ability to Counter Contemporary Threats and Challenges,” General Staff senior academy, December 10, 2004, available athttp://www.mil.ru/articles/article8649.shtml. 

63. Victor Sokolov, “Russia Continues to Cement Positions in APR,” Vientiane, Nov. 29, 2004, available athttp://www.strana.rustories/02/04/17/2753/234292.html.