참고문헌 (54)

1. A New Alliance for the Next Century: The Future of U.S.-Korean Security Cooperation 1995 

2. America's Asian Alliances 122 2000 

3. 10.1525/as.2001.41.5.777 1999. Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power 288-79. London: Routledge. While Alastair I. Johnston and Robert S. Ross have characterized Seoul as shying away from hedging between Washington and China, different findings are also available. See “Conclusion,” in Johnston and Ross, eds. (For contrasting findings, see Jae Ho Chung, “South Korea between Eagle and Dragon: Perceptual Ambivalence and Strategic Dilemma,” Asian Survey , Vol. 41, No. 5 (September-October 2001, 778 

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4. For instance, compare Washington Post , June 21, 2000 with Renmin Ribao (Peoples' Daily), June 16, 2000. 

5. Do the Ties Still Bind?: The U.S.-ROK Security Relationship after 9/11 2003 

6. See Brzezinski, Hamilton, and Lugar, Foreign Policy into the 21st Century , p. 49. 

7. 2001. Korea at the Center: Regionalism in Northeast Asia 59-60. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe. See Kurt M. Campbell and Mitchell B. Reiss, “Korean Changes, Asian Challenges and the U.S. Role,” Survival , Vol. 43, No. 1 (Spring, 63; and Charles Armstrong, Samuel S. Kim, Stephen Kotkin and Gilbert Rozman, eds. (2005. 

8. For a persuasive cultural-affinity argument, see Han Zhenshe, “Fazhan Zhonghan huoban guanxi yingjie 21 shiji de tiaozhan” (Challenges for the Development of China-Korea Relations in the 21st Century), Dangdai yatai (Contemporary Asia-Pacific), No. 1 (2000), pp. 39-40. 

9. Hangook Ilbo 2002 

10. Zhang, Jianhua, ed. 2000. Jiejue zhongguo zaidu mianlin de jinyao wenti (On the Resolution of the Urgent Problems China Has Faced Again) 523-524. Beijing: Jingji ribao chubanshe. For the concept of “comprehensive cooperative partnership,” see, ed. 

11. February 1999. Next Generation Leaders in the Republic of Korea: Opinion Survey Report and Analysis February, 15-16. Washington, DC: Potomac Associates. For the perceptions of the South Korean elite and public toward the United States and China, see Jae Ho Chung, The Korean-American Alliance and the “Rise of China ,” Occasional Papers, Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, available athttp://iis-db.stanford.edu/viewpub;Chung, “South Korea between Eagle and Dragon,” pp. 783-88; William Watts, (April 2002; U.S.Korea Relations: Opinion Leaders Seminar (Washington, DC: The Korean Economic Institute, July 2003, and Derek J. Mitchell, ed. Strategy and Sentiment: South Korean Views of the United States and the U.S.ROK Alliance (Washington, DC: CSIS, June 2004. 

12. 2001. For the crucial role of public opinion in affecting America's foreign policy, see Richard Sobel, The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy Since Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press. 

13. The Idea Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy Elite 1991 

14. American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword 1996 

15. Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power Nye Joseph S. 1991 

16. See Harris Interactive Survey #61, Nov. 4, 1998, available athttp://www.harrisinteractive.com;and South China Morning Post, Nov. 21, 2002. 

17. The Harris Poll #37, July 22, 1998; #41, July 7, 1999; #45, Aug. 16, 2000; #39, Aug. 10, 2001; #40, Aug. 14, 2002; and #57, Aug. 11, 2004, available athttp://www.harrisinteractive.comaccessed on Jan. 15, 2005. 

18. The Harris Poll #47, Sept. 11, 2002; and # 62, Sept. 1, 2004. 

19. Elusive Partnership: U.S. and European Policies in the Near East and the Gulf 2002 

20. For such concerns, see Husain Haqqani, “The American Mongols,” Foreign Policy (May-June 2003); and Renmin ribao (People's Daily), March 11, 2003. 

21. 10.2307/20033972 Joseph S. Nye, “The Decline of America's Soft Power: Why Washington Should Worry,” Foreign Affairs , Vol. 83, No. 3 (May/June 2004), pp. 16-20. According to the author's interviews with 33 Chinese policy experts during 2004, threefourths responded that America's soft power was on the rapid decline. 

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22. See, for instance, two Pew polls of April 1999 and June 2001 available athttp://people-press.org/reports. 

23. 2003. George W. Bush and Asia: A Mid-Term Assessment 43-56. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars. See Harry Harding, “Asia in American Grand Strategy: The Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Security Strategy,” in Robert M. Hathaway and Wilson Lee, eds. 

24. See American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1995, ch. 3, pp. 4-5; and American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1999, pp. 13, 15. These are available athttp://www.ccfr.org. 

25. 2002. American and European Public Opinion and Foreign Policy 9Chicago: CCFR. For the finding, see Worldviews 2002 (December 2002 

26. See “On China,” by the Pew Research Center, June 11, 2001. 

27. The Harris Poll #45, Sept. 2, 1998, Table 3; #51, Sept. 1, 1999, Table 3; #50, Aug. 30, 2000, Table 3; #54, Oct. 31, 2001, Table 3; and #47, Sept. 11, 2002, Table 3. 

28. See American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1995, ch. 3, pp. 4-5; and American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1999, pp. 13, 15. The 2002 poll did not have comparable questions. 

29. Chinese Military Power: Report of an Independent Task Force 2003 

30. See Harris Poll #26, April 21, 1999. 

31. U.S.-China Relations in a Post-September 11th World 2002 

32. See American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1995, ch. 3, p. 4; and American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1999, pp. 31-32. 

33. 10.2307/20049129 Only 9 percent of the 56 American elite interviewees agreed that America's Asia policy was based upon a good understanding of the history of the region. For America's insensitivity, see Nicholas D. Kristof, “The Problem of Memory,” Foreign Affairs , Vol. 77, No. 6 (November/December 1998), pp. 37-49. 

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34. 1997. The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History 85-94. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. See Don Oberdorfer, (101-108. 

35. 1992. The U.S. Korean Alliance: Time for A Change 146-48. New Brunswick: Transactions. Edward A. Olsen, “Korean Security: Is Japan's Comprehensive Security Model A Viable Alternative?” in Doug Bandow and Ted Carpenter, eds. 

36. See Chung, “South Korea between Eagle and Dragon,” p. 785; Dong-A Daily, December 5, 2000; and Sisa Journal , March 2002, cited in Korean Journal (December 2002), p. 30. 

37. It is interesting that many Chinese experts interpret the “stability” on the peninsula to mean that, in the long run, South Korea will tilt increasingly toward China at the expense of the United States On the other hand, the United States seems to assess that South Korea's “China fever” is mainly economic in nature. See, for instance, Office of Research of the Department of the State, “For South Koreans, China's Draw Is Mainly Economic,” Opinion Analysis, M-127-03 (Sept. 30, 2003), pp. 59-60, 63. 

38. See Chung, The Korean-American Alliance and the “Rise of China,” pp. 16-22; and Mitchell, ed., Strategy and Sentiment. 

39. The Eagle's Shadow: Why America Fascinates and Infuriates the World 2002 

40. See Chosun Ilbo , July 23, 1995. 

41. 10.1006/reli.2000.0294 Harris Poll #8, Jan. 31, 2001. 

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42. Harris Poll #1, Jan. 3, 2001. 

43. 10.1017/CBO9780511617126 

    

44. 10.1006/reli.2000.0294 See Harris Poll #8, Jan. 31, 2001, Table 2. 

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45. 10.1006/reli.2000.0294 See Harris Poll #8, Jan. 31, 2001, Table 3. 

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46. 1999. Americans Look at Asia 42Washington, DC: Asia Society Washington Center. See William Watts, ( 97 Seyon chosa bokoso (1997 Survey Report for the Sejong Institute) (Seoul: Dongseo Research Co., 1997, 12; and Dong-A Ilbo, Dec. 5, 2000. 

47. Chosun Ilbo , Feb. 24, 2002. 

48. For this elite-public divergence on China, see Chung, “South Korea between Eagle and Dragon,” pp. 785-87. 

49. Dong-A Ilbo , April 19, 2004. The impact of the Goguryeo controversy-i.e., Seoul resenting Beijing's effort to incorporate this ancient dynasty into the history of China-on South Koreans' view of China has been mostly negative although its durability remains largely uncertain. 

50. According to the Chinese interviewees (n=33), only 42 percent concurred that China regards the Korean peninsula as its core sphere of influence. Perhaps, American elites have overestimated the Chinese influence over the region. 

51. Japan and Taiwan were chosen as the number one and two supporters, respectively. 

52. Quite the contrary, 85 percent of the Chinese interviewees thought that the United States would ask South Korea for non-military assistance in such a contingency. For South Korea, this will constitute a key dilemma particularly considering the controversy surrounding the concept of strategic flexibility of the U.S. forces in South Korea. 

53. The Chinese counterargument, of course, is that “a relative far-off may not be as helpful as a friend close-by” (yuanqin buru jinlin). See, for instance, Pang Zhongying, “China-ROK Cooperation in East Asia and Its Implications for the ROK-U.S. Alliance: A Chinese Perspective,” presented at Fifty Years' Alliance: Reflections and Future Vision on the ROK-U.S. Security Cooperation , KAIS conference in Seoul, Korea (September 25-26, 2003). 

54. Twilight of American Culture 2000