In a representative democracy, candidates are thought to be judged by voters on the basis of both "proposed policies" and "non-policy or random policy characteristics" in voters" voting decision. We include a "random policy variable" (misperceived benefit levels) which is separate from or independent of a policy variable (tax policy). We suppose that taxes and benefits are separate in relation, and voters have asymmetric perception about tax and benefit policies proposed by candidates. That is, tax policy is visible and direct to the voters, while benefit policy is less visible and hidden to the voters. Thus, voters may have misperception, or inaccurate perception, of the benefits from public services because of its invisibility. Then, by using "probabilistic linkage" between tax and benefit policies, we examine the implications of misperceived benefit policies for the electoral equilibrium tax policy in a probabilistic voting framework.
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