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NTIS 바로가기Games and economic behavior, v.106, 2017년, pp.38 - 50
Arzumanyan, Mariam (Economic Research Department, Central Bank of Armenia, Armenia) , Polborn, Mattias K. (Department of Economics and Department of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, United States)
Abstract We analyze a costly voting model with multiple candidates under plurality rule. In equilibrium, the set of candidates is partitioned into a set of “relevant candidates” (which contains at least two candidates) and the remaining candidates. All relevant candidates receive votes ...
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