초록 ▼

Computation environments are protected from bogus or rogue load modules, executables, and other data elements through use of digital signatures, seals, and certificates issued by a verifying authority. A verifying authority—which may be a trusted independent third party—tests the load

Computation environments are protected from bogus or rogue load modules, executables, and other data elements through use of digital signatures, seals, and certificates issued by a verifying authority. A verifying authority—which may be a trusted independent third party—tests the load modules and/or other items to verify that their corresponding specifications are accurate and complete, and then digitally signs them based on a tamper resistance work factor classification. Secure computation environments with different tamper resistance work factors use different digital signature authentication techniques (e.g., different signature algorithms and/or signature verification keys), allowing one tamper resistance work factor environment to protect itself against load modules from another tamper resistance work factor environment. The verifying authority can provide an application intended for insecure environments with a credential having multiple elements covering different parts of the application. To verify the application, a trusted element can issue challenges based on different parts of the authenticated credential that the trusted element selects in an unpredictable (e.g., random) way, and deny service (or take other appropriate action) if the responses do not match the authenticated credential.

대표청구항 ▼

What is claimed is: 1. In an electronic appliance including a secure execution space and an insecure execution space, a method for permitting an application executing within the insecure execution space to request one or more services from a trusted element executing in the secure execution space,

What is claimed is: 1. In an electronic appliance including a secure execution space and an insecure execution space, a method for permitting an application executing within the insecure execution space to request one or more services from a trusted element executing in the secure execution space, the method comprising: (a) issuing a challenge from the trusted element to the application executing within the insecure execution space, the challenge being based at least in part on randomly selected parts of an authenticated credential, the challenge requesting the application to provide one or more cryptographic hashes of one or more portions of the application, the one or more portions of the application including at least some executable software code; (b) sending, from the application to the trusted element, said one or more cryptographic hashes of one or more portions of the application; (c) comparing, at the trusted element, information provided by the authenticated credential with said one or more cryptographic hashes of one or more portions of the application; and (d) denying the application access to said one or more services if the comparison fails. 2. A method as in claim 1, in which steps (a)-(d) are performed multiple times during execution of the application. 3. A method as in claim 1, in which the authenticated credential is digitally signed. 4. A method as in claim 1, in which the authenticated credential is at least in part encrypted. 5. A method as in claim 1, in which the one or more portions of the application include code. 6. A method as in claim 1, in which at least one of the portions of the application overlaps another of the portions of the application. 7. A method as in claim 1, in which at least one of the one or more portions of the application corresponds to a predetermined byte range or virtual path in the application. 8. A computer readable storage medium storing a computer program, the computer program including instructions that, when executed by a processor of an electronic appliance, are operable to cause the electronic appliance to take actions comprising: (a) issuing a challenge from a trusted element executing in a secure execution space to an application executing in an insecure execution space, the challenge being based at least in part on randomly selected parts of an authenticated credential, the challenge requesting the application to provide one or more cryptographic hashes of one or more portions of the application, the one or more portions of the application including at least some executable software code; (b) receiving, from the application, said one or more cryptographic hashes of one or more portions of the application; (c) comparing information provided by the authenticated credential with said one or more cryptographic hashes of one or more portions of the application; and (d) denying the application access to one or more services provided by an application executing in the secure execution space if the comparison fails. 9. A computer readable storage medium as in claim 8, in which the computer program is operable to cause the electronic appliance to perform actions (a)-(d) multiple times during execution of the application. 10. A computer readable storage medium as in claim 8, in which the authenticated credential is digitally signed. 11. A computer readable storage medium as in claim 8, in which the authenticated credential is at least in part encrypted. 12. A computer readable storage medium as in claim 8, in which the one or more portions of the application include code. 13. A computer readable storage medium as in claim 8, in which at least one of the portions of the application overlaps another of the portions of the application. 14. A computer readable storage medium as in claim 8, in which at least one of the one or more portions of the application corresponds to a predetermined byte range or virtual path in the application. 15. An electronic appliance comprising: an insecure execution space; and a protected processing environment comprising a processor having a secure execution space including a trusted element, the trusted element configured to: (a) issue a challenge to an application executing in the insecure execution space, the challenge being based at least in part on randomly selected parts of an authenticated credential, the challenge requesting the application to provide one or more cryptographic hashes of one or more portions of the application, the one or more portions of the application including at least some executable software code; (b) receive, from the application, said one or more cryptographic hashes of one or more portions of the application; (c) compare information provided by the authenticated credential with said one or more cryptographic hashes of one or more portions of the application; and (d) deny the application access to one or more services provided by an application executing in the secure execution space if the comparison fails. 16. An electronic appliance as in claim 15, in which the secure execution space comprises a protected processing environment. 17. An electronic appliance as in claim 15, in which the authenticated credential is digitally signed and at least in part encrypted. 18. An electronic appliance as in claim 15, in which the one or more portions of the application include code. 19. An electronic appliance as in claim 18, in which at least one of the portions of the application overlaps another of the portions of the application. 20. An electronic appliance as in claim 19, in which at least one of the one or more portions of the application corresponds to a predetermined byte range or virtual path in the application. 21. In an electronic appliance including a secure execution space and an insecure execution space, a method for using a trusted element executing in the secure execution space comprising: validating at least one digital signature corresponding to a credential; selecting, based at least in part on the credential, at least one predetermined portion of an application executing in the insecure execution space, the predetermined portion of the application including at least some executable software code, and issuing a challenge requesting a response from the application, the response providing a computation of at least one cryptographic hash of the selected predetermined portion of the application, wherein the predetermined portion of the application has been selected to provide sufficient coverage of a particular component of the application; and checking the response against the credential.