초록 ▼

A method for group travel and group communications, wherein the group travel parameters and group communications are combined for verifying and validating ADS-B data on aircraft. The full connectivity within a navigating group of aircraft allows all the group members to communicate spatial/temporal

A method for group travel and group communications, wherein the group travel parameters and group communications are combined for verifying and validating ADS-B data on aircraft. The full connectivity within a navigating group of aircraft allows all the group members to communicate spatial/temporal observations and collaborate in group protocols, e.g., majority voting protocol, which can determine if a received ADS-B message is corrupted or from a false target aircraft. Well-established distributed protocols based on group communications and majority voting exist for (1) detecting compromised members, i.e., false target aircraft, and (2) verifying message integrity, i.e., ADS-B data, given a minority fraction of members are compromised/colluding. Such protocols can be based on IP multicast communications over the IP networking data links available on the aircraft. Also disclosed is a method for verification and validation of position indicator message data on aircraft.

대표청구항 ▼

1. An aircraft of a plurality of aircraft navigable as a group of aircraft, the aircraft comprising: a receiver configured to receive a position indication message broadcast by a source aircraft to the aircraft and other aircraft of the group of aircraft, the position indication message including a

1. An aircraft of a plurality of aircraft navigable as a group of aircraft, the aircraft comprising: a receiver configured to receive a position indication message broadcast by a source aircraft to the aircraft and other aircraft of the group of aircraft, the position indication message including a claimed position of the source aircraft; andan in-aircraft control network configured to: record a first time of arrival of the position indication message at the aircraft;receive messages broadcast by the other aircraft and containing second times of arrival of the position indication message at the other aircraft;perform a position estimation based on the first time of arrival and second times of arrival to produce an estimated actual position of the source aircraft; andverify the claimed position of the source aircraft based on the estimated actual position of the source aircraft, andwherein the in-aircraft control network is further configured to: compose a message including the first time of arrival of the position indication message at the aircraft; andcause broadcast of the message to at least some of the other aircraft to enable the at least some of the other aircraft to independently perform the position estimation and verify the claimed position of the source aircraft based thereon. 2. The aircraft of claim 1, wherein the position indication message received by the receiver is an automatic dependent surveillance broadcast message, and wherein the position estimation performed by the in-aircraft control network includes time-difference-of-arrival multilateration. 3. The aircraft of claim 1, wherein the messages broadcast by the other aircraft further contain a keyed hash generated using a group key, and wherein the in-aircraft control network is further configured to verify the messages based on the keyed hash. 4. The aircraft of claim 3, wherein the in-aircraft control network is further configured to initiate a group join protocol in at least one instance in which the claimed position is verified and the source aircraft is not within the group of aircraft, the group join protocol being initiated to join the source aircraft to the group of aircraft and share group secrets with the source aircraft, the group secrets including the group key. 5. The aircraft of claim 1, wherein the in-aircraft control network being configured to compose the message includes being configured to compose the message further containing a keyed hash generated using a group key. 6. The aircraft of claim 1, wherein the in-aircraft control network being configured to verify the claimed position includes being configured to determine whether the claimed position and the estimated actual position are approximately equivalent. 7. The aircraft of claim 1, wherein the in-aircraft control network is further configured to initiate a group join protocol in at least one instance in which the claimed position is verified and the source aircraft is not within the group of aircraft, the group join protocol being initiated to join the source aircraft to the group of aircraft. 8. The aircraft of claim 7, wherein the group join protocol is initiated to further share group secrets with the source aircraft, the group secrets including a group key. 9. The aircraft of claim 1, wherein the in-aircraft control network is further configured to enter into a distributed voting protocol with the other aircraft of the group of aircraft in at least one instance in which the claimed position is not verified, the distributed voting protocol being entered into to decide whether or not the source aircraft is compromised. 10. A method for verification a claimed position of a source aircraft by an aircraft of a plurality of aircraft navigable as a group of aircraft, the method comprising: receiving a position indication message broadcast by the source aircraft to the aircraft and other aircraft of the group of aircraft, the position indication message including the claimed position of the source aircraft;recording a first time of arrival of the position indication message at the aircraft;receiving messages broadcast by the other aircraft and containing second times of arrival of the position indication message at the other aircraft;performing a position estimation based on the first time of arrival and second times of arrival to produce an estimated actual position of the source aircraft; andverifying the claimed position of the source aircraft based on the estimated actual position of the source aircraft, andwherein the method further comprises:composing a message including the first time of arrival of the position indication message at the aircraft; andcausing broadcast of the message to at least some of the other aircraft to enable the at least some of the other aircraft to independently perform the position estimation and verify the claimed position of the source aircraft based thereon. 11. The method of claim 10, wherein the position indication message is an automatic dependent surveillance broadcast message, and wherein the position estimation includes time-difference-of-arrival multilateration. 12. The method of claim 10, wherein the messages broadcast by the other aircraft further contain a keyed hash generated using a group key, and wherein the method further comprises verifying the messages based on the keyed hash. 13. The method of claim 12 further comprising: initiating a group join protocol in at least one instance in which the claimed position is verified and the source aircraft is not within the group of aircraft, the group join protocol being initiated to join the source aircraft to the group of aircraft and share group secrets with the source aircraft, the group secrets including the group key. 14. The method of claim 10, wherein composing the message includes composing the message further containing a keyed hash generated using a group key. 15. The method of claim 10, wherein verifying the claimed position includes determining whether the claimed position and the estimated actual position are approximately equivalent. 16. The method of claim 10 further comprising: initiating a group join protocol in at least one instance in which the claimed position is verified and the source aircraft is not within the group of aircraft, the group join protocol being initiated to join the source aircraft to the group of aircraft. 17. The method of claim 16, wherein the group join protocol is initiated to further share group secrets with the source aircraft, the group secrets including a group key. 18. The method of claim 10 further comprising: entering into a distributed voting protocol with the other aircraft of the group of aircraft in at least one instance in which the claimed position is not verified, the distributed voting protocol being entered into to decide whether or not the source aircraft is compromised.