The objective of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of how or in what way beliefs must be justified in order for them to be true; the understanding of how epistemic terms or properties are anchored in the world is examined. Hence the claim of this paper is neutral with respect to any doctrine of epistemic justification.In particular, in claiming that epistemic properties are determined by, or dependent upon, natural properties, the concept of supervenience espoused by Jaegwon Kim is presented and examined. Furthermore, the concept of supervenience concerning epistemic superveninece is develped, by applying Kim's technical claim about moral supervenience to the possibility of spistemic supervenience, in a way that shows that natural properties strongly and asymmetrically determine epistemic properties.This paper consists of four sections. In the first section of this paper, I examine the term "justified" by analyzing it. In the second section, I claim that, like the case of ethical properties, the term “justified,” and furthermore, epistemic properties, are committed to the matter of fact-value gap because they are evaluative properties; in so doing, it is claimed that there is an analogy between epistemic properties and moral properties. In the final two sections, I concentrate on the concept of epistemic supervenience: In the third section, I hold that the case of supervenience is analogous to the case of supervenience in value theory, and, in the final section, after claiming that epistemic properties strongly supervene on natural properties by applying Kim's technical claim about moral supervenience to epistemic supervenience, I argue that, if the so called genuine dependency exists between the epistemic and the natural, then it is possible that it vindicates naturalized epistemology.
The objective of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of how or in what way beliefs must be justified in order for them to be true; the understanding of how epistemic terms or properties are anchored in the world is examined. Hence the claim of this paper is neutral with respect to any doctrine of epistemic justification.In particular, in claiming that epistemic properties are determined by, or dependent upon, natural properties, the concept of supervenience espoused by Jaegwon Kim is presented and examined. Furthermore, the concept of supervenience concerning epistemic superveninece is develped, by applying Kim's technical claim about moral supervenience to the possibility of spistemic supervenience, in a way that shows that natural properties strongly and asymmetrically determine epistemic properties.This paper consists of four sections. In the first section of this paper, I examine the term "justified" by analyzing it. In the second section, I claim that, like the case of ethical properties, the term “justified,” and furthermore, epistemic properties, are committed to the matter of fact-value gap because they are evaluative properties; in so doing, it is claimed that there is an analogy between epistemic properties and moral properties. In the final two sections, I concentrate on the concept of epistemic supervenience: In the third section, I hold that the case of supervenience is analogous to the case of supervenience in value theory, and, in the final section, after claiming that epistemic properties strongly supervene on natural properties by applying Kim's technical claim about moral supervenience to epistemic supervenience, I argue that, if the so called genuine dependency exists between the epistemic and the natural, then it is possible that it vindicates naturalized epistemology.
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