참고문헌 (74)

1. The Oregonian, 1 November 1998. 

2. Smith and Cerrina (1997), pp. 10-15. 

3. ‘U.S.-Funded Technology Stays Here, For Now’, US News & World Report, 18 May 1998, p. 5. 

4. It is interesting to note in this connection that the SEMATECH consortium ultimately abandoned a similar policy of exclusive access (involving a two-year period of exclusivity) by member firms to tools incorporating SEMATECH-funded improvements because of opposition by equipment firms participating in the consortium, who argued that the more restrictive policy limited the market for their tools (Grindley et al., 1994). 

5. Ham, Rose Marie, Mowery, David C. Improving the effectiveness of public–private R&D collaboration: case studies at a US weapons laboratory. Research policy, vol.26, no.6, 661-675.

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6. Stix, Gary. Lithography Becomes Political Pork. Scientific american, vol.272, no.5, 30-30.

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7. A recent report on ‘Fundamentals of Technology Roadmapping ’ (Garcia and Bray, 1997) argues that ‘… at the industry level, technology roadmapping involves multiple companies, either as a consortium or an entire industry (industry technology roadmapping). By focusing on common needs, companies can more effectively address critical research and collaboratively develop the common technologies…. This level of technology roadmap allows industry to collaboratively develop the key underlying technologies, rather than redundantly funding the same research and underfunding or missing other important technologies. This can result in significant benefits because a certain technology may be too expensive for a single company to support or take too long to develop, given the resources that can be justified. However, combining the resources across companies may make developing the technology possible and consequently the industry more competitive’. 

8. Henderson, Rebecca M., Clark, Kim B.. Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms. Administrative science quarterly, vol.35, no.1, 9-.

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9. Program officials anticipate that total spending in the EUV CRADA will exceed $250 million because of delays in achieving the original goals of the CRADA and a two-year extension of the project. As of April 2000, actual outlays on the EUV CRADA were roughly $200 million. 

10. Ham, Rose Marie, Linden, Greg, Appleyard, Melissa M.. The Evolving Role of Semiconductor Consortia in the United States and Japan. California management review, vol.41, no.1, 137-163.

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11. For a discussion of pork-barrel projects in earlier lithography development funding, see Stix (1995), p. 30. 

12. US General Accounting Office. 1994. Technology Transfer: Improving the Use of Cooperative R&D Agreements at DoE's Contractor-Operated Laboratories. Report RCED-94-91. 

13. ‘U.S. Official Raps German Role in Lithography Group’, Electronic Engineering Times, 2 June 2000. 

14. ‘Pork-Barrel Spending on Academe Reaches a Record $797-Million’, Chronicle of Higher Education, 23 July 1999, p. A44. 

15. Report 98-81 STM 1998 Schacht 

16. US General Accounting Office (1994). 

17. Nelson (1961), pp. 351-364. 

18. Randazzese, Lucien P.. Semiconductor Subsidies. Scientific american, vol.274, no.6, 46-49.

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19. Bloomstein et al. (1997), pp. 2112-2116. 

20. 10.1016/S0048-7333(97)00041-3 See Ham and Mowery (1995), pp. 67-73, and Ham and Mowery (1998), pp. 661-675, on earlier CRADAs. 

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21. A micron is one millionth of a meter, and a nanometer is one thousandth of a micron (i.e., one billionth of a meter). The dramatic shrinkage in linewidths has required the use of shorter-wavelength lithography exposure sources, because the wavelength is one of the key factors limiting the size of features that can be drawn on the chip. The wavelength of visible light extends down to roughly 400 nm. For about thirty years, lithography tools used a 435 nm light source to produce circuit lines that gradually became as narrow as 0.6-micron. In the early 1990s, high-end lithography adopted a 365 nm light source, which has been used for feature sizes down to 0.35-micron (350 nm) using enhanced lithography techniques. Laser-based tools, with a wavelength of 248 nm, are currently used to make feature sizes as small as 180 nm, and a new generation of 193 nm laser-based tools was introduced commercially in 1999 to fabricate feature sizes down to 0.13-micron. 

22. ‘Chip Makers Gripe Bitterly, But Litho Costs Keep Soaring’, Semiconductor Business News (http://www.semibiznews.com/), July 1999; lithography accounts for one-third of semiconductor manufacturing costs (Silicon Valley Group Form 10-K for fiscal year ended 30 September 1998). 

23. Based on an internal DoE document ‘Preliminary A-11 Estimates’, dated 3 March 1999. 

24. Federal Funds for Research and Development: Fiscal Years 1997, 1998, and 1999 1999 

25. Henderson, Rebecca. Of life cycles real and imaginary: The unexpectedly long old age of optical lithography. Research policy, vol.24, no.4, 631-643.

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26. Nelson, Richard R.. Uncertainty, Learning, and the Economics of Parallel Research and Development Efforts. The review of economics and statistics, vol.43, no.4, 351-.

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27. US equipment producers participating in the 300 mm roadmapping exercise expressed great dissatisfaction with the delayed implementation of the standard, reflecting these deferred returns and higher costs. One equipment executive was quoted at the time as saying: ‘Feelings are running strong and deep. There is a lot of mistrust now’ (‘Chip Gear Executives Want Firm 300-mm Commitments’, Semiconductor Business News, 14 July 1998). During the summer of 1998, a ‘summit meeting’ of semiconductor manufacturers and equipment producers was hastily convened to address the grievances of the equipment producers (‘Summit Called To Help Avert 300-mm Crisis’, Semiconductor Business News, 13 July 1998). 

28. Semiconductor Leading Edge Technologies (SELETE) is a privately financed Japanese semiconductor R&D consortium that pursues more applied R&D than ASET. Its annual budget is about $90 million. 

29. Tech Transfer 2000: Making Partnerships Work 2000 

30. Warshofsky (1989), chapter 5. Young (1994) expressed these sentiments eloquently in his assessment of the rising prominence of Japanese equipment suppliers: ‘If U.S. [equipment] makers continue to remain independent of users, remain vulnerable to foreign investment, and are unable to match the advantages derived from keiretsu membership, U.S. [semiconductor materials and equipment] makers may disappear, and the future of the entire U.S. high technology food chain will be endangered’ (p. 95). 

31. Schacht and McLoughlin (1998). 

32. Smith Henry I. and Cerrina Franco . 1997. X-Ray Lithography for ULSI Manufacturing. Microlithography World Winter: 10-15. 

33. This requirement can be waived by the DoE if such a license creates a ‘net economic benefit’ to the United States. 

34. Although the Department of Commerce collects and intermittently publishes data on a variety of federal ‘technology transfer’ policies (US Department of Commerce, 2000), these data provide very little information on the structure, costs, or outcomes of the thousands of CRADAs initiated since 1987. See Mowery (2000) for further discussion. 

35. SEMATECH is a privately funded research consortium with a total annual budget of roughly $150 million. The membership in 1999 consisted of AMD, Conexant, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Intel, Lucent, Motorola, and Texas Instruments. In 2000, SEMATECH officially became ‘International SEMATECH’ with the addition of Hyundai of Korea, Infineon of Germany, Philips Semiconductors of the Netherlands, and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp. (TSMC). 

36. SCALPEL: Scattering with Angular Limitation Projection Electron Beam Lithography; PREVAIL: Projection-Reduction Exposure with Variable Immersion Layer. 

37. See Grindley et al. (1994) or Randazzese (1996) for a discussion of the case of GCA, formerly a leading U.S. semiconductor equipment supplier. GCA's attempts to commercialize its state-of-the-art optical lithography tool, despite assistance from SEMATECH, ultimately failed, partly because of the firm's poor reputation for product quality and field support. 

38. Gwynne (1999), pp. 2-4. 

39. The DoE laboratory operating budget estimate is based on federal expenditures on R&D and R&D plant in Federally Funded Research and Development Centers in the Department of Energy, as reported by the National Science Foundation (1999). The ‘total costs’ of FY 1998 CRADAs in DoE are taken from an internal DoE document, ‘Preliminary A-11 Estimates’, dated 3 March 1999. 

40. The International (formerly the National) Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors is coordinated and funded by SEMATECH under the aegis of the Semiconductor Industry Association, an industry trade group. Recent editions of the Roadmap can be accessed at http://www.itrs.net/ntrs/publntrs.nsf. 

41. The Extreme UV Concept Lithography Development System (EUCLIDES) is a supplier consortium led by ASM Lithography of the Netherlands. The collaboration is partially funded by the European Commission, with an EU contribution of $9 million for Year 1, as well as in-kind contributions from participating firms. 

42. ‘Intel Powers Up Research Labs’, The Oregonian (http://www.oregonian.com/), 1 March 1998. 

43. Federal financial contributions typically supported the work of the DoE laboratory participants. Federal agencies are prohibited by the CRADAs’ enabling legislation from using public funds to support the expenses of private participants in CRADAs. 

44. ASET launched its EUV program in 1998 with a budget of approximately $50 million for its first two years. Intel sent one assignee to ASET's EUV program starting in early 2000; no information is shared through Intel between ASET and EUV LLC. 

45. We are grateful to VLSI Research for supplying these data. 

46. The eight firms in EUV CRADAs were AT&T, Intel, AMD, KLA Instruments, and Ultratech Stepper, as well as JMAR Industries Inc. of San Diego, Tropel of Rochester, NY, and Micrion of Peabody, MA (‘EUV Takes Two Giant Steps’, Electronic Materials Technology News, August 1996). 

47. Indeed, one participant interviewed for this study characterized the level of cooperation among the labs as unusually high, and argued that this effective collaboration was attributable in part to the unusual nature (and large size) of this CRADA. 

48. Mowery (1999). 

49. ‘U.S. Gives OK To ASML On EUV Effort’, Electronic Engineering Times, 24 February 1999; ‘Energy Agency Signs Deal With Intel Supplier’, The Oregonian, 3 March 1999. 

50. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1999 meetings of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management and benefited from the comments of participants. Support for this research was provided by the Sloan Alfred P. Foundation and the Mellon Andrew W. Foundation. We are grateful to David Attwood, Charles Gwyn, Gib Marguth, Bill Spencer, and an anonymous reviewer for valuable comments and insights. None of these individuals bear any responsibility for errors, omissions, or conclusions in this paper. 

51. See Henderson (1995) for a thorough discussion of past extensions of optical lithography. 

52. U.S. Industry in 2000 1999 Mowery 

53. The Chip War: The Battle for the World of Tomorrow 1989 Warshofsky 

54. The Association of Super-advanced Electronics Technologies (ASET) is a multi-year research collaboration funded primarily by Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry with projects related to semiconductors, flat panel displays, and hard disk drives. Its average annual budget is about $90 million, of which nearly two-thirds goes to semiconductor research. 

55. International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors: 1998 Update 1998 

56. Bloomstein, T. M.. Lithography with 157 nm lasers. Journal of vacuum science & technology. processing, measurement, and phenomena : an official journal of the American Vacuum Society. B, Microelectronics and nanometer structures, vol.15, no.6, 2112-.

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57. Research-Technology Management Unusual Energy Dept.-Industry Partnership To Build 21st Century Computer Chip May Be Co-Op Model 42 2 1999 Gwynne 

58. Ham et al. (1998), pp. 137-163. 

59. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) provided support services, including precise measurements of mirror surfaces created at LLNL. 

60. 10.2172/471364 

    

61. Micro-Electronics Development for European Applications (MEDEA) is a four-year, $2.5 billion program funded jointly by government and industry. MEDEA's IPL project has a budget of $36 million covering four years. Infineon, formerly Siemens Semiconductor, is a participant in the MEDEA IPL project. 

62. Grindley, Peter, Mowery, David C., Silverman, Brian. SEMATECH and Collaborative Research: Lessons in the Design of High-Technology Consortia. Journal of policy analysis and management : [the journal of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management], vol.13, no.4, 723-.

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63. ‘IBM Builds Prototypes Using X-ray Lithography’, Electronic Engineering Times (http://www.eet.com/), 19 April 1999. 

64. Ham and Mowery (1998), pp. 661-675. 

65. Issues in Science and Technology Improving Industry-Government Cooperative RandD 11 67 1995 Ham 

66. Semiconductor Industry Association (1998), Figure 18. 

67. GCA pioneered in the development of optical lithography ‘steppers’, but the firm's failure to incorporate technological advances into its tools, as well as a poor reputation for support of its products, had weakened the firm considerably by the late 1980s (see Henderson and Clark, 1990). GCA participated in SEMATECH's equipment development programs, which supported roughly 20% of the costs of developing the firm's advanced XLS stepper. SEMATECH also purchased fourteen GCA ALS 200 i-line steppers and leased them to semiconductor manufacturers for beta-site testing and qualification, at a cost of $19 million. GCA technology was considered excellent, but SEMATECH member firms failed to make sufficient advance purchase commitments to sustain GCA's commercial introduction of its new steppers, and the firm was shut down in May 1993. See Grindley et al. (1994) for further discussion. 

68. See Ham and Mowery (1995), pp. 67-73, and Ham and Mowery (1998), pp. 661-675. 

69. The Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 and its 1989 amendments extended the legislative framework developed in the Stevenson-Wydler and Bayh-Dole Acts of 1980, which authorized recipients of federal research to gain title to the intellectual property created in such projects. 

70. The 1997 National Roadmap was updated in 1998 to reflect the input of newly formed Working Groups with membership from Europe and Asia, and 157 nm lithography appears for the first time in the resulting document (Semiconductor Industry Association, 1998, Figure 18). 

71. Silicon Sumo: U.S.-Japan Competition and Industrial Policy in the Semiconductor Equipment Industry 1994 Young 

72. The federal government is free to use the technology in other applications under the terms of the standard nonexclusive, royalty-free license extended to federal agencies in all CRADAs. 

73. Mowery David C. 2000. Using Cooperative Research and Development Agreements as S&T Indicators: What do We Have and What Would We Like?” Paper presented at the National Science Foundation Workshop on ‘Strategic Research Partnerships ’, October. 

74. SEMATECH estimate reported in ‘Advanced Lithography At Critical Juncture ’, Electronic News (http://www.electronicnews.com/), 13 October 1997.