참고문헌 (39)

1. Korea Approaches Reunification Eberstadt Nicholas 1995 

2. 10.1525/as.1991.31.11.00p0110k Nicholas Eberstadt and Judith Banister, “Military Buildup in the DPRK: Some New Indications from North Korean Data,” Asian Survey , Vol. 31, No. 11 (November 1991), pp. 1095-1115. 

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3. For more details on the DPRK program and other past or present programs, see Monterey Institute for International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Chemical and Biological Weapons Resource Page, available athttp://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/possess.htmaccessed on Sept. 20, 2004. 

4. Joseph Bermudez Jr. “North Korea deploys new missiles,” Jane's Defence Weekly , Aug. 2, 2004. 

5. For example, Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), “KPA will answer U.S. aggression forces' challenge with annihilating blow (Statement of KPA general staff spokesman),” Dec. 2, 1998, available athttp://www.kcna.co.jpaccessed on Jan. 13, 2005. 

6. Thus, for example, the following pronouncements from the NDFSK's “Chief of Pyongyang Mission” in June 2003: Reverence for Kim Jong Il is daily mounting in South Korea because the South Korean people's attraction and worship for him….The vigorous anti-U.S. struggle of the South Korean people is an eruption of national self-respect….[W]e should follow the road of Songun [military first politics] indicated by Kim Jong Il…. Songun might is a powerful war deterrent force…enough to decisively overpower the U.S. in a showdown with the United States.KCNA, “Chief of Pyongyang Mission of NDFSK interviewed by reporters,” June 14, 2003, available athttp://www.kcna.co.jpJan. 13, 2005. 

7. For data on global export trends, see WTO Statistical Database, available athttp://stat.wto.org/StatisticalProgram/WSDBStatProgramHome.aspx?Language=E;for DPRK export trends, see Figure 3, below. 

8. Korea: The Economic Race between the North and the South 1978 

9. Calculations derived from WTO statistics databases, World Development Indicators 2003 database, and U.S. Census Bureau. 

10. Nicholas Eberstadt, “The Persistence of North Korea,” Policy Review , No. 127 (October/November 2004). 

11. Socialism Mises Ludwig von 1951 

12. Monitoring The World Economy: 1820-1992 Maddison Angus 1995 

13. Pyongyang's 1999 “Law on Socialist Economic Planning” can be seen as an implicit acknowledgement that the statistical apparatus necessary for central planning had effectively broken down. For details of earlier signs of trouble in the DPRK's statistical system, see Eberstadt, Korea Approaches Unification , ch. 1. 

14. M. Kimura, A Planned Economy without Planning: Su-ryong's North Korea , Discussion Paper, F-081, Faculty of Economics, Tezukayama University, 1994. 

15. War, Economy, and Society: 1939-1945 Milward Alan S. 1977 10.1525/9780520341401 

    

16. Nicholas Eberstadt, Policy and Economic Performance in Divided Korea, 1945-1995 , unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1996. 

17. Eberstadt, Policy and Economic Performance in Divided Korea, 1945-1995. 

18. Eberstadt, “The Persistence of North Korea.” 

19. Avoiding The Apocalypse: The Future of the Two Koreas Noland Marcus 2000 

20. “C.i.f.” stands for “cost, insurance and freight,” and refers to the difference in price between the actual purchase of merchandise in a foreign country and the ultimate expense of bringing the merchandise to the importing country. In the figures cited here we assume that the DPRK's c.i.f. costs add a flat 10% to reported purchase prices for merchandise. This 10% markup is standard practice by the IMF and other organizations in cases where actual c.i.f. charges are unknown. 

21. Note that we are examining only public sources of finance here-the potential for private finance could be an additional and possibly very important source of international revenue for a more “normal” DPRK, but that issue should be left for a different discussion. 

22. Kim, Kwan Bong. 1971. The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of the Korean Political System 57New York: Praeger Publishers. 

23. Mark E. Manyin, “North Korea/Japan Relations: The Normalization Talks and the Compensation/Reparations Issue,” Congressional Research Service, Congressional Reports for Congress , order Code RS 20526, June 13, 2001, available athttp://www.fcnl.org/pdfs/01june13_nkjapan.pdfaccessed on Sept. 25, 2004. 

24. If the package were somewhat “front-loaded,” as might also possibly be arranged, it might be structured to provide more during the first five years of the agreement, with less in the out-years: for example, $1.6 billion annually for the initial period, $800 million annually for the out-years. 

25. We have explicitly avoided consideration of a possible resurrection of KEDO or a KEDO-like vehicle for political aid here. Such an institution, of course, might figure in the transfer of political aid to a “post-bold switchover” DPRK. 

26. East Asian Review Babson Bradley O. 65 16 2004 

27. Presumably any new UN commitments would also be countered by reduction or termination of “emergency” humanitarian food aid from the WFP. 

28. For example, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, United States. 

29. 2002. It is worth noting that Vietnam was the recipient of about $2.4 billion in ODA commitments in. To be sure: Vietnam's population is nearly four times as large as North Korea's. Yet such a figure may nevertheless suggest an upper boundary of plausible ODA commitments to a reforming DPRK, considering the scale of potential reconstruction that might be required in the initial years after a “bold switchover.” 

30. R. J. Barro, “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries,” Quarterly Journal of Economics , Vol. 106, No. 2 (1991), pp. 407-43. Earlier research on international structural development patterns would include the work of Hollis B. Chenery. See in particular Hollis B. Chenery and Moises Syrquin, Patterns of Development: 1950-1970 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975). 

31. The Population of North Korea Eberstadt Nicholas 1992 

32. Literacy levels, for example, bear upon a population's capabilities in productive employment. Urbanization levels tell us about the proportion of population that lives in non-rural areas-a broad indication of the level of productivity that has been attained by local agriculture, and more generally, about the level of complexity and differentiation in a population's labor force. Life-expectancy levels tell us about the health and thus the productive potential (“human capital”) in a population. 

33. The reason for the “semi-log” specification is that the semi-log curve happens more or less to match the patterns that have been observed internationally between illiteracy, urbanization, and life expectancy levels on the one hand and per capita output levels on the other (Our semi-log functions also allow us to estimate particular “elasticities”: the predicted percentage impact on per capita or per capita GNP for a point change in literacy, urbanization, etc.). 

34. The only exception to this generalization concerned the “statistical significance” of the illiteracy rate when life expectancy levels were also being examined-in three out of four such equations the coefficient for the illiteracy rate did not meet the basic 5% confidence test. This seems to be due to the strong evident “collinearity” between illiteracy and life expectancy. 

35. Our use of these “structural equations” to predict the economic performance of an “ordinary communist” DPRK rises a number of technical econometric questions, the most acute of these perhaps bearing on the issue of “heteroskedacity” in our regression results. (“Heteroskedacity,” one may recall, is the non-random distribution of errors in predicted OLS results-a phenomenon often especially characteristic in the sort of cross-sectional regressions we have just computed here.) Examination of the regression results in Tables 1-4 does indeed reveal some “heteroskedacity” in these “structural equations.” More specifically, our residuals showed a slight positive association with the reported value of a country's per capita exports or its per capita GNI. This means that our equations have some tendency to “overpredict” true per capita exports or per capita GNI when those quantities are low, and to “underpredict” them when those quantities are high. Fortunately, those biases were rather limited, as the relatively high “R-squared” values in our OLS equations might in themselves suggest. In the range of predicted values for per capita exports and per capita GNI most relevant to the DPRK in our equations, moreover, the distribution of errors generated by our equations did not appreciably deviate from zero. 

36. ROK Bank of Korea, “GDP of North Korea in 2003,” June 8, 2004, available athttp://www.bok.or.kr/contents_admin/info_admin/eng/home/press/pressre/info/timeseriesnk.xlsaccessed on Sept. 25, 2004. 

37. Another qualification to be noted is that the estimates generated by our 1980 equations would be in current 1980 dollars, while our 2000 equations generate estimates in 2000 dollars. Full standardization would require a deflator to link the two. We should note that, in an effort at “sensitivity analysis,” we replaced the export and GNI series from Tables 1-4 above with other export and per capita GNI or per capita GDP series available through the WDI dataset. All of the alternatives we tested revealed similar general relationships, and on the whole similar levels of statistical significance, to the equations presented in Tables 1-4-although the particular beta-coefficients for the independent variables naturally differed from one exercise to the next. 

38. For example, Anders Aslund's chapter in Ahn, Eberstadt and Lee, A New International Engagement Framework For North Korea? Contending Perspectives , and Bradley O. Babson and William J. Newcomb Economic Perspectives On Demise Scenarios For DPRK , a paper presented for the USIP Seminar, Jan. 2, 2004. 

39. In particular, the question of voluntary migration from DPRK to ROK-for economic or non-economic reasons-must be examined closely, especially in light of the ROK's constitutional guarantee to accept people from North Korea as ROK citizens. This issue is noted, but is beyond the scope of this paper.