참고문헌 (33)

1. Strategy and Sentiment: South Korean Views and the U.S.-ROK Alliance Kim Seung-hwan 2004 

2. Bush at War Woodward Bob 2002 

3. 10.1162/016366003761036525 As for recent writings on the anti-American sentiment, see Seung-hwan Kim, “Anti-Americanism in South Korea,” Washington Quarterly , Vol. 26, No. 1 (Winter, 2003). For a similar topic with more opinion poll data, see Yong-shik Bong, “Anti-Americanism and the U.S.Korea Military Alliance,” in Yong-shik Bong, eds. Confrontation and Innovation on the Korean Peninsula (Washington, DC: KEI, 2003); Sook-Jong Lee, “Anti-Americanism in Korean Society: A Survey-Based Analysis,” in Sook-Jong Lee, eds., Joint U.S.Korea Academic Studies, Vol. 14, The United States and South Korea: Reinvigorating the Partnership (Washington, DC: KEI, 2004). 

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4. After separate trials of the driver and commander of the armored mine-clearing vehicles, Sgt. Mark Walker and Sgt. Fernando Nino, respectively were found not guilty on charges of negligent homicide. Following these rulings of November 20 and 23, the mass rallies against their acquittals began. 

5. 10.1017/S1598240800001351 Byung-kook Kim, “The U.S.South Korean Alliance: Anti-American Challenges,” Journal of East Asian Studies , Vol. 3, No. 2 (May-August, 2003). 

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6. In a meeting with a Korean envoy representing the newly-elected government of President Roh, U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld had first broached the subject of relocating U.S. forces. He also told the Senate Armed Service Committee on February 13 that he was considering plans to reposition U.S. forces farther away from the demilitarized zone and even to reduce their numbers. Washington Post , Feb. 14, 2003. 

7. Korea Herald , April 10, 2003. As the two sides agreed on the Korean forces' “selected mission” due to its enhanced defense capabilities, however, security experts interpreted this as expanded responsibilities for the Korean military in the defense of the DMZ in preparation for an eventual relocation of the 2nd U.S. Infantry Division to the south. See also, Chosun IIbo , April 10, 2003. 

8. Washington File, Text: U.S., S. Korean Officials Explore Ways to Enhance Security, available athttp://U.S.info.state.gov, accessed on June 6, 2003. 

9. This point was echoed in the speech delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz in a speech to the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry on June 2, 2003. He maintained that the effectiveness of the alliance must be guided by two principal considerations: strengthening deterrence and sustaining a strong alliance over the long run. On June 3, USFK Commander LaPorte said in a forum at the Korean National Assembly that the United States was planning to redeploy 6,000 of its 7,000 troops stationed in Seoul to a location south of the capital. Korea Herald , June 4, 2003. 

10. In a speech delivered on March 11, 2003 at the commencement ceremony of the Korea Military Academy, President Roh Moo-hyun said his government would thoroughly prepare to cope with a possible realignment of USFK. Korea Herald , March 11, 2003. Also at the meeting with the newly-promoted Korean military officials on April 21, he reiterated the need to strengthen South Korea's self-defense capabilities to prepare for possible U.S. redeployment. Korea Herald , April 21, 2003. The same point was made during his speech commemorating the liberation day from the Japanese colonial rule on Aug. 15, 2003. 

11. National Security Council, Pyeong-Hwa Pun-Young kwa Kuk-Ka An-Bo (Peace-Prosperity and National Security) (Seoul: March 2004). 

12. May 20 2004. May 20, Blue House Briefings, “Readjustment of U.S. Forces in Korea,” 

13. Chosun Ilbo , June 4, 2004. 

14. However, the U.S. Congress opposed this idea and President Carter lowered the size of the reduction from 6,000 to 3,400 as a compromise in 1978. 

15. This Act called for the Asian allies of the United States to shoulder more responsibilities and costs in hosting the U.S. troops and for gradual and partial U.S. troop reduction in South Korea and Japan. 

16. Civic Network for a Peaceful Korea, “Appeals for Peace in Korea and Northeast Asia,” April 20, 2004. 

17. Office of Research, Opinion Analysis , Oct. 17, 2002 (Washington, DC: Department of State). 

18. Koreans who responded that they did not have special feelings toward the United States have decreased from 2.3% to 33.6%. 

19. JoongAng Ilbo , Poll on Koreans' attitudes on U.S.Korea Relations, Dec. 15-16, 2002; Poll on Korean atitudes one year after the deaths of schoolgirls, June 9-10, 2003. 

20. Jinwung Kim, “Recent Anti-Americanism in South Korea,” Asian Survey , Vol. XXIX, No. 8 (August 1989). 

21. Korea-U.S. Relations in Transition Lee Sook-Jong 161 2002 

22. Asian Survey Shin Gi-Wook 1996 

23. 10.1017/CBO9780511510229.006 Katharine H. Moon, “Korean Nationalism, Anti-Americanism, and Democratic Consolidation,” in Samuel Kim, ed. Korea's Democratization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 135-57. 

    

24. As for such arguments, see Sung-han Kim, “Anti-American Sentiment and the ROK-U.S. Alliance,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis , Vol. XV, No. 2 (Fall 2003). 

25. Sook-Jong Lee, “The Rise of Korean Youth as a Political Force,” in Richard C. Bush et al., eds., Brookings Northeast Asia Survey 2003-2004 (Center for Northeast Asian Studies, Brookings Institution, 2004), pp. 15-30. 

26. To the question, “Cooperation with North Korea and the United States are both important, but which one do you think should come first?” 39.4% of all respondents of the survey answered that inter-Korean cooperation comes first, while 24.4% answered in favor of U.S.Korea cooperation. Another 34.4% answered that cooperation with each party is equally important. 

27. An earlier poll by the JoongAng Ilbo June 2003 couched the options in different wording. While 54.2% of older Koreans aged 50 and over favored the continued presence of the U.S. forces, only 13.5% of Koreans in their 20s and 14.9% in 30s favored the same idea. Instead, more than half of younger Koreans favored the gradual withdrawal, with which only 16.9% of older Koreans agreed. 

28. Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Post-war Japan Katzenstein Peter J. 10.7591/9781501731464 

    

29. Khalilzad. 2001. The United States and Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture 9Santa Monica: RAND. Zalmay et als. 

30. A Blueprint or U.S. Policy Toward a Unified Korea 2002 

31. Strengthening the U.S.-ROK Alliance: A Blueprint for the 21st Century 2003 

32. Seong Ryoul Cho, “The ROK-U.S. Alliance and the Future of U.S. Forces in South Korea,” Korea Journal of Defense Analysis , Vol. XV, No.2 (Fall 2003), pp. 97-102. 

33. 48.3% of South Koreans surveyed indicated that China will be important to South Korea's diplomacy and national security while 38.1% chose the United States for the same question. As for the economic importance in the future, 61.6% chose China whereas 26.2% chose the United States. Only in the question asking to choose a socially and culturally important country. did the United States score more than China-31.7% vs. 18.0%. See the telephone survey carried out by Dong-A Ilbo on May 21, 2004.