The paper examines how Dwight David Eisenhower government decided Korea policies and applied them toward the communist block including the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea, and Syngman Rhee government in South Korea for the period of 1953-1954. The objective of the study will be achieved through...
The paper examines how Dwight David Eisenhower government decided Korea policies and applied them toward the communist block including the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea, and Syngman Rhee government in South Korea for the period of 1953-1954. The objective of the study will be achieved through an analysis of the policy-making process of the policy makers in Eisenhower government. Thesis of this study is that American Korea policy showed limitations of Cold War diplomacy in which the United States based its communist policy on power politics and supported undemocratic and corruptive government of South Korea just because it was anti-communist regime. Right after the conclusion of the Korean War in July 1953, the United States faced two major difficulties in dealing with the Korean problem. The first one was communists in North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union who brought about the Korean War and were American counterparts in negotiation tables discussing Korean issues. The other was provided by Syngman Rhee, the president of South Korean government and a vehement anti-communist, who opposed any American negotiations with the communists. To overcome the difficulties given by both groups, Eisenhower government applied a typical strategy: power politics based on economic and military strength. In negotiations with the communists Eisenhower government’s ultimate goal was to achieve the unification of Korea under the domination of South Korean political system. The United States, however, estimated that the objective could not be achieved through negotiations because the communists had no intention to give up their ideology and political systems. Admitting that it was so, the United States believed that it could obtain three alternative objectives which were its real objectives: the status quo in Korea, the shift of blame for the breakdown of the negotiations and failure of the unification onto the communists, and binding together of American allies. In view of Syngman Rhee who saw the status quo in Korea as the permanent separation of Korea, the American Korea policy should not be applied as what it was because it played to please the communists. The real intention of Rhee’s objection to the American policy was to achieve two objectives: more free rooms in his dealing with the Americans and the recovery of his fallen political prestige due to dictatorship and corruption. Eisenhower government, which desperately needed Rhee’s co-operation in negotiations with the communists, applied flexible strategies: threat and conciliation. Eisenhower government tried to subjugate Rhee by maintaining strong positions which based on power politics, but sometimes it could not help but complying with Rhee’s requests. Even though American Korea policy gave United States a high hand over South Korea and the communists, it revealed its limitations of Cold War diplomacy which was destined to depend upon power politics and to support anti-communist regimes whether they had democratic systems and values or not. In view of both Americans and Koreans who possess democratic belief and the principle of reciprocity in international relations, the United States Korea policy of 1953-1954 may not be evaluated as successful.
The paper examines how Dwight David Eisenhower government decided Korea policies and applied them toward the communist block including the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea, and Syngman Rhee government in South Korea for the period of 1953-1954. The objective of the study will be achieved through an analysis of the policy-making process of the policy makers in Eisenhower government. Thesis of this study is that American Korea policy showed limitations of Cold War diplomacy in which the United States based its communist policy on power politics and supported undemocratic and corruptive government of South Korea just because it was anti-communist regime. Right after the conclusion of the Korean War in July 1953, the United States faced two major difficulties in dealing with the Korean problem. The first one was communists in North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union who brought about the Korean War and were American counterparts in negotiation tables discussing Korean issues. The other was provided by Syngman Rhee, the president of South Korean government and a vehement anti-communist, who opposed any American negotiations with the communists. To overcome the difficulties given by both groups, Eisenhower government applied a typical strategy: power politics based on economic and military strength. In negotiations with the communists Eisenhower government’s ultimate goal was to achieve the unification of Korea under the domination of South Korean political system. The United States, however, estimated that the objective could not be achieved through negotiations because the communists had no intention to give up their ideology and political systems. Admitting that it was so, the United States believed that it could obtain three alternative objectives which were its real objectives: the status quo in Korea, the shift of blame for the breakdown of the negotiations and failure of the unification onto the communists, and binding together of American allies. In view of Syngman Rhee who saw the status quo in Korea as the permanent separation of Korea, the American Korea policy should not be applied as what it was because it played to please the communists. The real intention of Rhee’s objection to the American policy was to achieve two objectives: more free rooms in his dealing with the Americans and the recovery of his fallen political prestige due to dictatorship and corruption. Eisenhower government, which desperately needed Rhee’s co-operation in negotiations with the communists, applied flexible strategies: threat and conciliation. Eisenhower government tried to subjugate Rhee by maintaining strong positions which based on power politics, but sometimes it could not help but complying with Rhee’s requests. Even though American Korea policy gave United States a high hand over South Korea and the communists, it revealed its limitations of Cold War diplomacy which was destined to depend upon power politics and to support anti-communist regimes whether they had democratic systems and values or not. In view of both Americans and Koreans who possess democratic belief and the principle of reciprocity in international relations, the United States Korea policy of 1953-1954 may not be evaluated as successful.
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