본 논문은 플라톤의 행복주의를 과격한 소피스트의 쾌락주의나, 에피쿠로스의 금욕적 쾌락주의, 그리고 의무론과 공리주의와 비교․검토함으로써, 플라톤 행복주의의 차별성을 부각시키고자 하였다.아울러 플라톤의 행복주의를 통해 현대 윤리학의 두 축인 칸트의 의무론과 고전적 공리주의의 문제점을 극복할 수 있는 가능성을 모색해 보고자 한다. 플라...
본 논문은 플라톤의 행복주의를 과격한 소피스트의 쾌락주의나, 에피쿠로스의 금욕적 쾌락주의, 그리고 의무론과 공리주의와 비교․검토함으로써, 플라톤 행복주의의 차별성을 부각시키고자 하였다.아울러 플라톤의 행복주의를 통해 현대 윤리학의 두 축인 칸트의 의무론과 고전적 공리주의의 문제점을 극복할 수 있는 가능성을 모색해 보고자 한다. 플라톤은 쾌락과 고통의 동시(同時) 존재 가능성을 증명하고 쾌락과 선이 동일할 수 없다고 주장함으로써, 과격한 소피스트들의 쾌락주의와 자신의 행복주의를 차별화하고 있다. 그리고 그의 행복주의는 행복의 조건으로서 윤리적인 덕과 함께 외적인 좋은 것들을 부정하지 않는다는 점에서 금욕주의적인 쾌락주의와 차별화된다. 뿐만 아니라 플라톤의 행복주의는 의무론이나 공리주의와도 명백한 차별성을 가진다. 플라톤의 행복주의에서 덕은 그 자체로도 좋고, 그 결과로도 좋다. 플라톤의 행복주의는 의무론처럼 그 자체로 선한 것만을 목적으로 하거나, 공리주의처럼 행위의 결과만을 목적으로 하는 것은 아니지만 그러한 두 요소들을 부분적으로 공유하고 있다. 칸트의 의무론이나 고전적 공리주의의 문제점은 개인의 경향성이나 사적인 관심을 배제하는 공평성이 행위의 정당성을 보장하는 것으로 여기기 때문에, 행위자의 중요성은 약화되고 법칙화 된 원리의 준수 여부를 옳은 행위의 표준으로 삼는다. 그러나 이러한 입장은 윤리적 현실에서 여러 가지 문제점을 안고 있다. 첫째, 의무론의 지나친 의무 요구는 사소한 의무를 지키기 위해서 중대한 희생을 불러오거나, 윤리적으로 허용하기 어려운 중대한 나쁜 결과를 산출할 수 있다는 문제점이 있다. 한편 공리주의는 유용한 결과를 위해서 본성적으로 윤리적 가치를 가지는 것들조차도 다수에게 유용하다는 명분 때문에 무시될 가능성이 있다. 그러나 행위의 동기와 결과는 쉽게 분리되지 않으며, 윤리의 본성적 측면을 고려하지 않는 결과만을 옳은 행위라고 정당화 할 수는 없다. 둘째, 의무론이나 공리주의는 행위자를 배제하고 수용자의 관점에서 탐구된 것이기 때문에, 윤리적 행위의 결과가 행위자에 대한 고려 없이 수용자의 편으로 이익이 편향되어 있는 행위자 희생적 윤리설이다. 그래서 이 두 윤리설은 행위자에게 윤리적 행위의 동기를 부여하기 어렵다. 이 두 윤리설의 문제점을 해소하기 위해서 대안적으로 제시된 플라톤 행복주의의 독특성은 다음과 같이 세 가지로 요약될 수 있다. 첫째, 플라톤의 행복주의는 행위자 중심적인 윤리설이며, 둘째, 행위자-타자 비대칭적 윤리설이며, 셋째, 플라톤의 행복주의에서 선은 이중적인 의미를 가진다. 따라서 플라톤의 행복주의는 행위의 법칙보다는 그것을 활용하고 판단하는 행위자를 우선시하며, 윤리적 행위가 행위자와 타자에게 모두 유익이 되는 것이며, 플라톤의 행복주의에서 선은 본래적인 선이기도 하지만 결과로부터 생겨난 선을 포함하는 것으로서 외적인 좋은 것들도 포함한다.
본 논문은 플라톤의 행복주의를 과격한 소피스트의 쾌락주의나, 에피쿠로스의 금욕적 쾌락주의, 그리고 의무론과 공리주의와 비교․검토함으로써, 플라톤 행복주의의 차별성을 부각시키고자 하였다.아울러 플라톤의 행복주의를 통해 현대 윤리학의 두 축인 칸트의 의무론과 고전적 공리주의의 문제점을 극복할 수 있는 가능성을 모색해 보고자 한다. 플라톤은 쾌락과 고통의 동시(同時) 존재 가능성을 증명하고 쾌락과 선이 동일할 수 없다고 주장함으로써, 과격한 소피스트들의 쾌락주의와 자신의 행복주의를 차별화하고 있다. 그리고 그의 행복주의는 행복의 조건으로서 윤리적인 덕과 함께 외적인 좋은 것들을 부정하지 않는다는 점에서 금욕주의적인 쾌락주의와 차별화된다. 뿐만 아니라 플라톤의 행복주의는 의무론이나 공리주의와도 명백한 차별성을 가진다. 플라톤의 행복주의에서 덕은 그 자체로도 좋고, 그 결과로도 좋다. 플라톤의 행복주의는 의무론처럼 그 자체로 선한 것만을 목적으로 하거나, 공리주의처럼 행위의 결과만을 목적으로 하는 것은 아니지만 그러한 두 요소들을 부분적으로 공유하고 있다. 칸트의 의무론이나 고전적 공리주의의 문제점은 개인의 경향성이나 사적인 관심을 배제하는 공평성이 행위의 정당성을 보장하는 것으로 여기기 때문에, 행위자의 중요성은 약화되고 법칙화 된 원리의 준수 여부를 옳은 행위의 표준으로 삼는다. 그러나 이러한 입장은 윤리적 현실에서 여러 가지 문제점을 안고 있다. 첫째, 의무론의 지나친 의무 요구는 사소한 의무를 지키기 위해서 중대한 희생을 불러오거나, 윤리적으로 허용하기 어려운 중대한 나쁜 결과를 산출할 수 있다는 문제점이 있다. 한편 공리주의는 유용한 결과를 위해서 본성적으로 윤리적 가치를 가지는 것들조차도 다수에게 유용하다는 명분 때문에 무시될 가능성이 있다. 그러나 행위의 동기와 결과는 쉽게 분리되지 않으며, 윤리의 본성적 측면을 고려하지 않는 결과만을 옳은 행위라고 정당화 할 수는 없다. 둘째, 의무론이나 공리주의는 행위자를 배제하고 수용자의 관점에서 탐구된 것이기 때문에, 윤리적 행위의 결과가 행위자에 대한 고려 없이 수용자의 편으로 이익이 편향되어 있는 행위자 희생적 윤리설이다. 그래서 이 두 윤리설은 행위자에게 윤리적 행위의 동기를 부여하기 어렵다. 이 두 윤리설의 문제점을 해소하기 위해서 대안적으로 제시된 플라톤 행복주의의 독특성은 다음과 같이 세 가지로 요약될 수 있다. 첫째, 플라톤의 행복주의는 행위자 중심적인 윤리설이며, 둘째, 행위자-타자 비대칭적 윤리설이며, 셋째, 플라톤의 행복주의에서 선은 이중적인 의미를 가진다. 따라서 플라톤의 행복주의는 행위의 법칙보다는 그것을 활용하고 판단하는 행위자를 우선시하며, 윤리적 행위가 행위자와 타자에게 모두 유익이 되는 것이며, 플라톤의 행복주의에서 선은 본래적인 선이기도 하지만 결과로부터 생겨난 선을 포함하는 것으로서 외적인 좋은 것들도 포함한다.
This study on eudaemonism of Plato has basically two main concerns as discussed. One concern is to whom ethical conduct can be beneficial and the other is what Plato's a)gaqo/n is. That is, one concern is to identify the beneficiaries of ethical conduct, and the other is to define Plato’s a)gaqo/n. ...
This study on eudaemonism of Plato has basically two main concerns as discussed. One concern is to whom ethical conduct can be beneficial and the other is what Plato's a)gaqo/n is. That is, one concern is to identify the beneficiaries of ethical conduct, and the other is to define Plato’s a)gaqo/n. With respect to beneficiaries of ethical conduct, the traditional ethics (Sophists' hedonism, Epicureanism, deontology and utilitarianism) benefit unilaterally one party. But in the eudaemonism of Plato, the actors and the others all could profit from ethical acts. I have tried to determine whether Plato's eudaemonism can become an alternative ethics to overcome the limitations of deontology and utilitarian ethics. With respect to a)gaqo/n, conventionally it is regarded as something moral, inner and psychological. Thus, happiness is something moral, inner and psychological. But in this thesis, I advocate that Plato' s a)gaqo/n is a kind to love both for its own sake and for its consequences and that his happiness caused by? a)gaqo/n includes not only inner good but also external good. In order to do this, by comparing Plato's eudaemonism to stems of ethics. part Ⅱ, I have outlined Plato's eudaeimonsm. Also, in order to enable understanding of Plato’s eudaemonism, I have criticized and reorganized his eudaemonism centered on features which are distinguished from different ethics. Plato doesn't identify the good(a)gaqo/n) with the pleasure(h(donh/), and so he keeps his distance from other-sacrificed hedonism of sophism. His ethics is distinguished from Epicurean's abstemious hedonism because Plato permits different external goods in the constituent of happiness. In addition, the good of utilitarianism is the useful consequences that will contribute to greatest happiness of the greatest number. The good of deontology is to follow duty regardless of the results. But in Plato's eudaemonism, the good per se is good as a result. So Plato's eudaemonism involves the factor of utility and duty, but it is not utilitarianism or deontology. When duty and utility are conflicted with each other, it is difficult for deontology and utilitarianism to resolve the conflict. Deontology and utilitarianism were act-centered ethics, which regard only the result of an act very highly. But Plato's eudaemonism is agent-centered ethics, which regards highly a good agent. virtuous people practice virtuous and good acts, but to practice virtuous acts doesn't make a someone a virtuous person. As this ethical system evaluates the agent himself, it can resolve the problems of act-centered ethics that performs duties but damages a number of people(deontology) and pursues the utility but questions the utility because of disregarding the ethical good(utilitarianism). After considering Plato’s eudaemonism as a whole, I have studied Plato’s happiness. According to Plato, happiness is composed of the good(a)gaqo/j). The good has two senses. One of them is the moral or inner good, the other is external goods. So, happiness is composed of the moral or inner good and external goods. In Part Ⅲ, to understand exactly Plato's eudaemonism, I have studied happiness(eu)daimoni/a) in Republic, one of Plato's middle dialogues. In Republic the soul(yuxh/) consists of three components. The three components play their allotted roles equally. This is justice(dikaiosu/nh) in Republic. Justice is that the three components are united and in harmony. At Popper’s insistence, the harmony of the three parts acts as to the ruling ideology of the ruling class. But in Plato's ideal state, a ruler is a citizen, collaborator, and helper and there is no distinction between the ruling class and the subjugated class. ‘po/lij’ doesn't play a role in the ruling class's political ideology that suppress freedom of the subjugated class. It means merely the whole body of citizens, and is not the ideological term to suppress the people. In Plato's Republic, happiness of polis can't be separate from the individual happiness. Though today moral philosophers who have studied the ethics of virtue have tried to resolve the problem of deontology and utilitarianism, their attempt isn't entirely successful, because they still can't understand that virtue has relation to happiness. On Plato's viewpoint, the highest good for which virtue aims is happiness. It is possible that Virtue can profit the agent and others, for happiness is the harmony of the three parts of the soul. In order to be happy, Plato excludes possessions but preserves the ordering and harmonizing of possessions. Plato doesn't think that things like fortune or fame are worthless. He was concerned that the Soul is a slave to desire. Plato believes that justice of soul is the harmony and order of it. The harmonious and ordered soul is healthy, and then a just soul is a happy soul. virtue including justice is, however, the good both for its own sake and for its consequences. Happiness from virtue includes moral factor (the good for its own sake) and external factor (for its consequences). In Part Ⅳ, I'd like to propose that Plato's early dialogues do not also exclude external goods for happiness. In Crito 48b8-9, Plato says that virtu e is the same as happiness. According to it, Irwin asserts that only virtue is happiness. But Plato inquires, "Is life or the living when the body is worthless and ruined?" At Crito 46e-3, he regard as sound body as a factor of happiness. I have argued that in Plato's early dialogues, Happiness is composed of not only moral virtue, but external goods. To prove that Plato's happiness includes external goods, I criticized Irwin in the eyes of Vlastos, Brickhouse, and Smith. In Part Ⅴ, The principle of Plato’s eudaemonism was discussed. For sophists fu/sij is the law that the strong prey upon the weak and no/moj is a man-made law created by the weak. Therefore they deny no/moj, and they support the strong's happiness using the concept of fu/sij. But for Plato, fu/sij in which the strong prey upon the weak is not true fu/sij and is incomplete. Incomplete fu/sij is compensated by human te/xnh. When a human being contemplates true fu/sij, that is, the idea of the good, it is wisdom or te/xnh which occurs in the soul. Sophists' happiness is to satisfy freely their desires according to the principle of fu/sij. For Plato, sophists' happiness is not true happiness. The te/xnh or wisdom makes a human being to be happy. It makes the soul to be harmonious. The te/xnh or wisdom corresponds with the philosopher ruler in the state. The philosopher ruler makes the state to be happy with political te/xnh. In part Ⅵ, consequently, my argument is summarized. Plato's eudaemonism doesn't have an intention of pursuing duty and utility; it includes the factor of deontology and utilitarianism. Plato’s eudaemonism profits the agent and the others. And Plato's a)gaqo/n is a kind to love both for its own sake and for its consequences, and a)gaqo/n cause happiness. Therefore happiness in Plato's eudaemonism is not happiness in the ideal world, but happiness is reached by moral virtue and the result of moral virtue.
This study on eudaemonism of Plato has basically two main concerns as discussed. One concern is to whom ethical conduct can be beneficial and the other is what Plato's a)gaqo/n is. That is, one concern is to identify the beneficiaries of ethical conduct, and the other is to define Plato’s a)gaqo/n. With respect to beneficiaries of ethical conduct, the traditional ethics (Sophists' hedonism, Epicureanism, deontology and utilitarianism) benefit unilaterally one party. But in the eudaemonism of Plato, the actors and the others all could profit from ethical acts. I have tried to determine whether Plato's eudaemonism can become an alternative ethics to overcome the limitations of deontology and utilitarian ethics. With respect to a)gaqo/n, conventionally it is regarded as something moral, inner and psychological. Thus, happiness is something moral, inner and psychological. But in this thesis, I advocate that Plato' s a)gaqo/n is a kind to love both for its own sake and for its consequences and that his happiness caused by? a)gaqo/n includes not only inner good but also external good. In order to do this, by comparing Plato's eudaemonism to stems of ethics. part Ⅱ, I have outlined Plato's eudaeimonsm. Also, in order to enable understanding of Plato’s eudaemonism, I have criticized and reorganized his eudaemonism centered on features which are distinguished from different ethics. Plato doesn't identify the good(a)gaqo/n) with the pleasure(h(donh/), and so he keeps his distance from other-sacrificed hedonism of sophism. His ethics is distinguished from Epicurean's abstemious hedonism because Plato permits different external goods in the constituent of happiness. In addition, the good of utilitarianism is the useful consequences that will contribute to greatest happiness of the greatest number. The good of deontology is to follow duty regardless of the results. But in Plato's eudaemonism, the good per se is good as a result. So Plato's eudaemonism involves the factor of utility and duty, but it is not utilitarianism or deontology. When duty and utility are conflicted with each other, it is difficult for deontology and utilitarianism to resolve the conflict. Deontology and utilitarianism were act-centered ethics, which regard only the result of an act very highly. But Plato's eudaemonism is agent-centered ethics, which regards highly a good agent. virtuous people practice virtuous and good acts, but to practice virtuous acts doesn't make a someone a virtuous person. As this ethical system evaluates the agent himself, it can resolve the problems of act-centered ethics that performs duties but damages a number of people(deontology) and pursues the utility but questions the utility because of disregarding the ethical good(utilitarianism). After considering Plato’s eudaemonism as a whole, I have studied Plato’s happiness. According to Plato, happiness is composed of the good(a)gaqo/j). The good has two senses. One of them is the moral or inner good, the other is external goods. So, happiness is composed of the moral or inner good and external goods. In Part Ⅲ, to understand exactly Plato's eudaemonism, I have studied happiness(eu)daimoni/a) in Republic, one of Plato's middle dialogues. In Republic the soul(yuxh/) consists of three components. The three components play their allotted roles equally. This is justice(dikaiosu/nh) in Republic. Justice is that the three components are united and in harmony. At Popper’s insistence, the harmony of the three parts acts as to the ruling ideology of the ruling class. But in Plato's ideal state, a ruler is a citizen, collaborator, and helper and there is no distinction between the ruling class and the subjugated class. ‘po/lij’ doesn't play a role in the ruling class's political ideology that suppress freedom of the subjugated class. It means merely the whole body of citizens, and is not the ideological term to suppress the people. In Plato's Republic, happiness of polis can't be separate from the individual happiness. Though today moral philosophers who have studied the ethics of virtue have tried to resolve the problem of deontology and utilitarianism, their attempt isn't entirely successful, because they still can't understand that virtue has relation to happiness. On Plato's viewpoint, the highest good for which virtue aims is happiness. It is possible that Virtue can profit the agent and others, for happiness is the harmony of the three parts of the soul. In order to be happy, Plato excludes possessions but preserves the ordering and harmonizing of possessions. Plato doesn't think that things like fortune or fame are worthless. He was concerned that the Soul is a slave to desire. Plato believes that justice of soul is the harmony and order of it. The harmonious and ordered soul is healthy, and then a just soul is a happy soul. virtue including justice is, however, the good both for its own sake and for its consequences. Happiness from virtue includes moral factor (the good for its own sake) and external factor (for its consequences). In Part Ⅳ, I'd like to propose that Plato's early dialogues do not also exclude external goods for happiness. In Crito 48b8-9, Plato says that virtu e is the same as happiness. According to it, Irwin asserts that only virtue is happiness. But Plato inquires, "Is life or the living when the body is worthless and ruined?" At Crito 46e-3, he regard as sound body as a factor of happiness. I have argued that in Plato's early dialogues, Happiness is composed of not only moral virtue, but external goods. To prove that Plato's happiness includes external goods, I criticized Irwin in the eyes of Vlastos, Brickhouse, and Smith. In Part Ⅴ, The principle of Plato’s eudaemonism was discussed. For sophists fu/sij is the law that the strong prey upon the weak and no/moj is a man-made law created by the weak. Therefore they deny no/moj, and they support the strong's happiness using the concept of fu/sij. But for Plato, fu/sij in which the strong prey upon the weak is not true fu/sij and is incomplete. Incomplete fu/sij is compensated by human te/xnh. When a human being contemplates true fu/sij, that is, the idea of the good, it is wisdom or te/xnh which occurs in the soul. Sophists' happiness is to satisfy freely their desires according to the principle of fu/sij. For Plato, sophists' happiness is not true happiness. The te/xnh or wisdom makes a human being to be happy. It makes the soul to be harmonious. The te/xnh or wisdom corresponds with the philosopher ruler in the state. The philosopher ruler makes the state to be happy with political te/xnh. In part Ⅵ, consequently, my argument is summarized. Plato's eudaemonism doesn't have an intention of pursuing duty and utility; it includes the factor of deontology and utilitarianism. Plato’s eudaemonism profits the agent and the others. And Plato's a)gaqo/n is a kind to love both for its own sake and for its consequences, and a)gaqo/n cause happiness. Therefore happiness in Plato's eudaemonism is not happiness in the ideal world, but happiness is reached by moral virtue and the result of moral virtue.
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