본 연구는 북한이 경제 수준이나 규모에 비해 국방비를 과도하게 지출하게 되는 정책적 전환인 ‘경제·국방 병진노선’을 해부해보려는 것이다. 김일성이 1960년대 초반 이러한 노선을 왜 제기하였으며 어떻게 진행하고 어떤 결과를 낳았는지를 조명하려는 것이다. 김일성은 이 노선을 채택한 이유로 대외 안보적 위협을 들고 있다. 하지만 북한은 중·소 분쟁에 휘말리는 것을 피하고 이들의 정책적 간섭을 배제하기 위해 추구한 자주노선 등도 군사력 확충 정책을 추동하는 요인이 되었다. 김정일도 제국주의자들의 고립·압살 책동 등 안보 위협을 주민들에게 전파하면서 ‘단호한 반격’을 촉구하였다. 하지만 김정일의 ‘선군경제노선’ 역시 자신의 지배체제를 지키는 것이 최대의 목표였다.
‘경제·국방 병진노선’은 사실상 경제의 자원을 국방부문으로 돌린 것이다. 이러한 자원 배분의 전환은 국가가 사회로부터 자원을 동원함을 의미한다. 김일성이 안보 위협을 강조하면서 대규모 자원의 배분 전환을 시도한 것은 경제성장을 통한 자원의 축적이 있었고 사회적·정치적으로 자원의 동원 시스템이 구축돼 있었기 때문에 가능했다.
자원의 동원에는 국제전략, 적응전략, 구조조정전략을 쓸 수 있다. 김일성은 소련의 원조가 급감한 가운데 ‘경제·국방 병진노선’을 추진해 초기에는 적응전략을 실시하다가 사회에 국방부담을 더 지우기 위해 구조조정전략을 사용했다.
1962년 제시된 ‘경제·국방 병진노선’에 따라 1967년부터 예산의 30% 이상을 군사비로 투자해 ...
본 연구는 북한이 경제 수준이나 규모에 비해 국방비를 과도하게 지출하게 되는 정책적 전환인 ‘경제·국방 병진노선’을 해부해보려는 것이다. 김일성이 1960년대 초반 이러한 노선을 왜 제기하였으며 어떻게 진행하고 어떤 결과를 낳았는지를 조명하려는 것이다. 김일성은 이 노선을 채택한 이유로 대외 안보적 위협을 들고 있다. 하지만 북한은 중·소 분쟁에 휘말리는 것을 피하고 이들의 정책적 간섭을 배제하기 위해 추구한 자주노선 등도 군사력 확충 정책을 추동하는 요인이 되었다. 김정일도 제국주의자들의 고립·압살 책동 등 안보 위협을 주민들에게 전파하면서 ‘단호한 반격’을 촉구하였다. 하지만 김정일의 ‘선군경제노선’ 역시 자신의 지배체제를 지키는 것이 최대의 목표였다.
‘경제·국방 병진노선’은 사실상 경제의 자원을 국방부문으로 돌린 것이다. 이러한 자원 배분의 전환은 국가가 사회로부터 자원을 동원함을 의미한다. 김일성이 안보 위협을 강조하면서 대규모 자원의 배분 전환을 시도한 것은 경제성장을 통한 자원의 축적이 있었고 사회적·정치적으로 자원의 동원 시스템이 구축돼 있었기 때문에 가능했다.
자원의 동원에는 국제전략, 적응전략, 구조조정전략을 쓸 수 있다. 김일성은 소련의 원조가 급감한 가운데 ‘경제·국방 병진노선’을 추진해 초기에는 적응전략을 실시하다가 사회에 국방부담을 더 지우기 위해 구조조정전략을 사용했다.
1962년 제시된 ‘경제·국방 병진노선’에 따라 1967년부터 예산의 30% 이상을 군사비로 투자해 군수산업 육성에 나선 결과 무기 국산화와 수출에는 일정한 성과를 냈지만 군사사회화 분위기 속에서 북한판 군산복합체가 나타나게 되었고 당경제 군경제에 치인 인민경제는 피폐해졌다. 김일성도 군사력 확충을 위한 투자가 과도했음을 시인하고 있는데, 능력 이상의 투자는 북한 경제의 침체를 초래했다.
김정일은 여러 면에서 김일성과 극단적으로 다른 환경에서 체제생존과 경제회생의 책임을 떠맡게 되었다. 1980년대 말 사회주의 제국의 붕괴로 이념적 군사적 동맹과 함께 사회주의 시장과 원조 기대도 사라졌다. 내부적으로는 식량난, 재정난으로 주민을 자력갱생하도록 방기하는 처지였고 시장화에 따른 비사회주의 현상에다 권력보위에도 신경을 써야 하는 상황을 맞았다.
1990년대 초에는 사회주의 제국의 붕괴와 계획경제체제의 문제점 누적으로 경제위기를 맞닥뜨렸다. 김일성 사후 김정일은 피포위의식에 사로잡혀 ‘선군정치’를 내세워 생존을 도모하면서 핵무기 개발을 통한 핵위협외교와 전방위 외교에 나섰다. 김정일의 ‘선군경제노선’은 국방공업에 우선 투자하겠다는 것으로 군산복합체의 유지전략이었다. 자원이 훨씬 제약된 상태에서 ‘경제와 국방’의 문제를 ‘병진’이 아닌 ‘집중’으로 풀려고 한 것이다. 배급제의 중단 속에 시장이 자생적으로 발달하자 김정일은 허용과 통제를 오가면서 부분개방을 추진하기도 했지만 모든 것은 체제유지의 목표에 맞춰져 있었다. 개혁·개방을 거부하면서 시장 허용까지 감행한 것은 김정일에게 전략적 선택이 남아 있지 않았기 때문이었다. 외부의 원조를 기대할 수 없게 돼 국제전략은 쓸 수 없는 처지였고 적응전략으로는 부족한 재원을 마련하기 어려웠다. 따라서 김정일은 제약이 심해진 자원의 동원을 위해 시스템을 고쳐야 했다. 이 점이 자원의 배분 방식의 변경으로도 군사부문의 확충이 가능했던 김일성의 노선과 큰 차이다.
본 연구는 아울러 경제학에서 사용하는 생산가능곡선(Production Possibility Frontier· PPF) 및 무차별곡선(Indifference Curve)과 예산선(Budget Constraint) 등 분석도구를 활용하여 북한의 과도한 군사비 지출 확대에 따른 인민경제의 부족현상, 선군정치에 따른 군부정권의 속성 상 나타날 수 있는 통치체제의 비효율 등의 가능성을 동태적으로 짚어볼 것이다.
한편 3대 세습한 김정은의 2013년 ‘핵무력·경제 병진노선’은 사실상 두 노선의 계승형 모델이다. 두 노선의 실패에서 교훈을 얻지 못한 채 무리한 정책이 이어지고 있다.
본 연구는 북한이 경제 수준이나 규모에 비해 국방비를 과도하게 지출하게 되는 정책적 전환인 ‘경제·국방 병진노선’을 해부해보려는 것이다. 김일성이 1960년대 초반 이러한 노선을 왜 제기하였으며 어떻게 진행하고 어떤 결과를 낳았는지를 조명하려는 것이다. 김일성은 이 노선을 채택한 이유로 대외 안보적 위협을 들고 있다. 하지만 북한은 중·소 분쟁에 휘말리는 것을 피하고 이들의 정책적 간섭을 배제하기 위해 추구한 자주노선 등도 군사력 확충 정책을 추동하는 요인이 되었다. 김정일도 제국주의자들의 고립·압살 책동 등 안보 위협을 주민들에게 전파하면서 ‘단호한 반격’을 촉구하였다. 하지만 김정일의 ‘선군경제노선’ 역시 자신의 지배체제를 지키는 것이 최대의 목표였다.
‘경제·국방 병진노선’은 사실상 경제의 자원을 국방부문으로 돌린 것이다. 이러한 자원 배분의 전환은 국가가 사회로부터 자원을 동원함을 의미한다. 김일성이 안보 위협을 강조하면서 대규모 자원의 배분 전환을 시도한 것은 경제성장을 통한 자원의 축적이 있었고 사회적·정치적으로 자원의 동원 시스템이 구축돼 있었기 때문에 가능했다.
자원의 동원에는 국제전략, 적응전략, 구조조정전략을 쓸 수 있다. 김일성은 소련의 원조가 급감한 가운데 ‘경제·국방 병진노선’을 추진해 초기에는 적응전략을 실시하다가 사회에 국방부담을 더 지우기 위해 구조조정전략을 사용했다.
1962년 제시된 ‘경제·국방 병진노선’에 따라 1967년부터 예산의 30% 이상을 군사비로 투자해 군수산업 육성에 나선 결과 무기 국산화와 수출에는 일정한 성과를 냈지만 군사사회화 분위기 속에서 북한판 군산복합체가 나타나게 되었고 당경제 군경제에 치인 인민경제는 피폐해졌다. 김일성도 군사력 확충을 위한 투자가 과도했음을 시인하고 있는데, 능력 이상의 투자는 북한 경제의 침체를 초래했다.
김정일은 여러 면에서 김일성과 극단적으로 다른 환경에서 체제생존과 경제회생의 책임을 떠맡게 되었다. 1980년대 말 사회주의 제국의 붕괴로 이념적 군사적 동맹과 함께 사회주의 시장과 원조 기대도 사라졌다. 내부적으로는 식량난, 재정난으로 주민을 자력갱생하도록 방기하는 처지였고 시장화에 따른 비사회주의 현상에다 권력보위에도 신경을 써야 하는 상황을 맞았다.
1990년대 초에는 사회주의 제국의 붕괴와 계획경제체제의 문제점 누적으로 경제위기를 맞닥뜨렸다. 김일성 사후 김정일은 피포위의식에 사로잡혀 ‘선군정치’를 내세워 생존을 도모하면서 핵무기 개발을 통한 핵위협외교와 전방위 외교에 나섰다. 김정일의 ‘선군경제노선’은 국방공업에 우선 투자하겠다는 것으로 군산복합체의 유지전략이었다. 자원이 훨씬 제약된 상태에서 ‘경제와 국방’의 문제를 ‘병진’이 아닌 ‘집중’으로 풀려고 한 것이다. 배급제의 중단 속에 시장이 자생적으로 발달하자 김정일은 허용과 통제를 오가면서 부분개방을 추진하기도 했지만 모든 것은 체제유지의 목표에 맞춰져 있었다. 개혁·개방을 거부하면서 시장 허용까지 감행한 것은 김정일에게 전략적 선택이 남아 있지 않았기 때문이었다. 외부의 원조를 기대할 수 없게 돼 국제전략은 쓸 수 없는 처지였고 적응전략으로는 부족한 재원을 마련하기 어려웠다. 따라서 김정일은 제약이 심해진 자원의 동원을 위해 시스템을 고쳐야 했다. 이 점이 자원의 배분 방식의 변경으로도 군사부문의 확충이 가능했던 김일성의 노선과 큰 차이다.
본 연구는 아울러 경제학에서 사용하는 생산가능곡선(Production Possibility Frontier· PPF) 및 무차별곡선(Indifference Curve)과 예산선(Budget Constraint) 등 분석도구를 활용하여 북한의 과도한 군사비 지출 확대에 따른 인민경제의 부족현상, 선군정치에 따른 군부정권의 속성 상 나타날 수 있는 통치체제의 비효율 등의 가능성을 동태적으로 짚어볼 것이다.
한편 3대 세습한 김정은의 2013년 ‘핵무력·경제 병진노선’은 사실상 두 노선의 계승형 모델이다. 두 노선의 실패에서 교훈을 얻지 못한 채 무리한 정책이 이어지고 있다.
This study aims to explore the formation and execution of the Economy-Defense Parallel Policy by Kim Il Sung in the 1960s and the Military-First Economy Policy by Kim Jong-il in the 2000s. It also aims to establish a comparison between two policies and analyze the similarities and differences betwee...
This study aims to explore the formation and execution of the Economy-Defense Parallel Policy by Kim Il Sung in the 1960s and the Military-First Economy Policy by Kim Jong-il in the 2000s. It also aims to establish a comparison between two policies and analyze the similarities and differences between them.
First of all, the two policies share similarities in that they both sought to expand military power by allocating resources including finance preferentially to the defense industry. The point that the two policies strategically mobilized internal resources and made crucial impact in terms of economy, national security, and domestic politics suggests that these policies should not be seen merely as military or security strategies. Furthermore, both the Economy-Defense Parallel Policy and the Military-First Economy Policy have great relevance to the development of nuclear weapon. Kim Il Sung had built the foundation of nuclear weapon for more than 30 years, and Kim Jong-il achieved its actual development. Now Kim Jong-un maintains his family tradition with the nuclear power-economy parallel policy.
The most striking difference between the two policies is their nature. Kim Il Sung's Economy-Defense Parallel Policy assumed the characteristics of war preparation that focused on the development of munitions industry in response to external security threats. On the other hand, the Military-First Economy Policy by Kim Jong-il invested primarily in the defense industry despite limited resources in order to preserve the regime in the midst of regime crises and economic crises.
Such difference in the nature of the two policies derives from how each policy first came to life. The essence of Kim Il Sung's Economy-Defense Parallel Policy was not about giving equivalent weight to economy and defense; rather, the policy intended to construct self-defense power by converting investment for economy into military sector. The security threats from the United States and South Korea in the early 1960s and the security tension following the Vietnam War and the Cuban missile crisis were the main reasons that North Korea, an underdeveloped country, decided to prioritize its construction of national defense while delaying economic development. North Korea's seeking self-defense without external support can also be interpreted as an effort to break free from the Soviet and Chinese intervention. In addition, the DPRK hoped for a swift expansion of military power to realize the communization of South Korea, an urgent task of constructing socialism. Kim Il Sung emphasized the possibility of war by the US Imperialists in his New Year's address or speeches to the country and pressed the supply of resources for war preparation.
The implementation of Kim Il Sung's Economy-Defense Parallel Policy was possible because post-war Heavy Industry-First Policy was producing results and Self-reliance economic policy had been promoted since late 1950s. The fact that mobilization system including Chollima Movement for constructing socialism had been established and that the ‘August Incident,’ an event that purged Soviet Faction and Yanan Faction in the Korea Labors Party who favored the development of light industry, weakened the opposing voices towards Heavy Industry-First Policy enabled an abrupt change in policy.
In contrast to the Economy-Defense Parallel Policy, which was a war preparation strategy based on economic performance, Kim Jong-il's military-first economy policy was a survival strategy against regime crisis. The demise of Socialist empire including the Soviet Union, failure to reach the goal of an economic plan, and shortage of food led to the collapse of the foundation of social control, leaving Kim Jong-il's regime in the face of downfall. In early days, Kim's regime was busy trying to overcome the siege mentality and diplomatic isolation. Kim Jong-il came to increase investment in light industry and agriculture that he had previously neglected, decentralized trade, and connived black market.
After weathering its worst crisis, the DPRK asserted Practical Socialism (Shilli socialism) and thus secured a cause to nationalize the profit generated from marketization. Subsequently, North Korea announced the July Economic Reform that demanded the reinforcement of self-financing system, a drastic cut in welfare expense for its people, and the expansion of corporate autonomy. Based on the expansion of finance and economic recovery achieved through the reform, Kim Jong-il implemented Defense industry-first policy, Kim Jong-il emphasized the threats of Imperialists to the people in the process of implementation, but most were ideological, cultural, and indirect threats and far from military and direct ones. Similar to the Economy-Defense Parallel Policy, Defense industry-first policy showed a tendency of increasing investment in national defense when it was economically and financially affordable. At the same time, North Korea began to organize its regime for Military-First Politics with the People's army at its core.
The processes of development of the two policies were in other words the processes of resource mobilization. Resource referred to any of the finance, supplies, and manpower that could be mobilized. Kim Il Sung once spent more than 30% of the national budget in national defense in order to speed up the development of munitions industry, but presumably the numbers are understated considering the undisclosed part of historical record. It was a time when the development of munitions industry was possible merely by changing the way of financial distribution, maybe to an excessive degree. According to domestic and foreign studies, although not consistent, excessive military expenses in socialist states or developing countries have a negative influence on economy. Even Kim Il Sung admitted that raising the standard of living was burdensome as the portion of national budget for economy was passed on to military expenditures. Although North Korea's defense industry made it possible to produce weapons domestically and such feat led to the exportation of weapons, it is considered a major factor that brought about economic stagnation by failing to contribute sufficiently to domestic economy.
The international strategy, accommodation strategy and restructuring strategy are to be used for mobilization. The first strategy Kim Il Sung implemented was accommodation strategy including urging frugality and high productivity as he launched the Economy-Defense Parallel Policy when he could not expect the free aid from USSR. So he moved the budget for economy to defense sector which was a restructuring strategy. After that even when USSR restarted the aid to DPRK, Kim Il Sung did not stop the mobilization his own country's resources into war preparation. In this result, the wide expanding of the military economy revoked the turmoil in the national economy by making the economy three folded: the party economy, military economy and people's economy.
Prior to the development of defense industry, Kim Jong-il was forced to try recovering the socialist economic system that had been being paralyzed and reconstructing financial condition. In particular, for the recovery of finance, Kim cut spending by abolishing food rationing system, imposed tax on the market through the July Economic Reform, executed currency reform, and promoted hard currency earnings by the military. By making a change in the system itself, Kim Jong-il introduced the elements of market economy and relied on the market when changing the way of financial distribution was no longer sufficient to support defense construction as financial shortage worsened. Even in time of economic crisis, Kim Jong-il continued to import weapons from overseas. Kim owned 1.1 million troops, the fourth most in the world in those days, who were deployed to construction sites, business, and farming to make a breakthrough for economic recovery. The troops were deemed an example of combat mentality. Military-First Politics can be interpreted as an ‘Ideology-Economy Parallel Policy’ with emphasis on the military.
Utilizing the Production Possibility Frontier (PPF), widely applied in Economics, this study attempted a dynamic explanation with a graph that the increased military expenses by North Korea may lead to the shortage phenomenon of people's economy. Moreover, another dynamic analysis was performed using Indifference Curve and Budget Constraint to examine that inefficiency in the ruling system may be displayed as side effects of the expansion of military expenses and promotion to high positions by military regime. Due to lack of relevant statistics and data, the explanation provided by this study is not comprehensive enough, but it is useful in that the study may help understand relevant phenomena.
This study aims to explore the formation and execution of the Economy-Defense Parallel Policy by Kim Il Sung in the 1960s and the Military-First Economy Policy by Kim Jong-il in the 2000s. It also aims to establish a comparison between two policies and analyze the similarities and differences between them.
First of all, the two policies share similarities in that they both sought to expand military power by allocating resources including finance preferentially to the defense industry. The point that the two policies strategically mobilized internal resources and made crucial impact in terms of economy, national security, and domestic politics suggests that these policies should not be seen merely as military or security strategies. Furthermore, both the Economy-Defense Parallel Policy and the Military-First Economy Policy have great relevance to the development of nuclear weapon. Kim Il Sung had built the foundation of nuclear weapon for more than 30 years, and Kim Jong-il achieved its actual development. Now Kim Jong-un maintains his family tradition with the nuclear power-economy parallel policy.
The most striking difference between the two policies is their nature. Kim Il Sung's Economy-Defense Parallel Policy assumed the characteristics of war preparation that focused on the development of munitions industry in response to external security threats. On the other hand, the Military-First Economy Policy by Kim Jong-il invested primarily in the defense industry despite limited resources in order to preserve the regime in the midst of regime crises and economic crises.
Such difference in the nature of the two policies derives from how each policy first came to life. The essence of Kim Il Sung's Economy-Defense Parallel Policy was not about giving equivalent weight to economy and defense; rather, the policy intended to construct self-defense power by converting investment for economy into military sector. The security threats from the United States and South Korea in the early 1960s and the security tension following the Vietnam War and the Cuban missile crisis were the main reasons that North Korea, an underdeveloped country, decided to prioritize its construction of national defense while delaying economic development. North Korea's seeking self-defense without external support can also be interpreted as an effort to break free from the Soviet and Chinese intervention. In addition, the DPRK hoped for a swift expansion of military power to realize the communization of South Korea, an urgent task of constructing socialism. Kim Il Sung emphasized the possibility of war by the US Imperialists in his New Year's address or speeches to the country and pressed the supply of resources for war preparation.
The implementation of Kim Il Sung's Economy-Defense Parallel Policy was possible because post-war Heavy Industry-First Policy was producing results and Self-reliance economic policy had been promoted since late 1950s. The fact that mobilization system including Chollima Movement for constructing socialism had been established and that the ‘August Incident,’ an event that purged Soviet Faction and Yanan Faction in the Korea Labors Party who favored the development of light industry, weakened the opposing voices towards Heavy Industry-First Policy enabled an abrupt change in policy.
In contrast to the Economy-Defense Parallel Policy, which was a war preparation strategy based on economic performance, Kim Jong-il's military-first economy policy was a survival strategy against regime crisis. The demise of Socialist empire including the Soviet Union, failure to reach the goal of an economic plan, and shortage of food led to the collapse of the foundation of social control, leaving Kim Jong-il's regime in the face of downfall. In early days, Kim's regime was busy trying to overcome the siege mentality and diplomatic isolation. Kim Jong-il came to increase investment in light industry and agriculture that he had previously neglected, decentralized trade, and connived black market.
After weathering its worst crisis, the DPRK asserted Practical Socialism (Shilli socialism) and thus secured a cause to nationalize the profit generated from marketization. Subsequently, North Korea announced the July Economic Reform that demanded the reinforcement of self-financing system, a drastic cut in welfare expense for its people, and the expansion of corporate autonomy. Based on the expansion of finance and economic recovery achieved through the reform, Kim Jong-il implemented Defense industry-first policy, Kim Jong-il emphasized the threats of Imperialists to the people in the process of implementation, but most were ideological, cultural, and indirect threats and far from military and direct ones. Similar to the Economy-Defense Parallel Policy, Defense industry-first policy showed a tendency of increasing investment in national defense when it was economically and financially affordable. At the same time, North Korea began to organize its regime for Military-First Politics with the People's army at its core.
The processes of development of the two policies were in other words the processes of resource mobilization. Resource referred to any of the finance, supplies, and manpower that could be mobilized. Kim Il Sung once spent more than 30% of the national budget in national defense in order to speed up the development of munitions industry, but presumably the numbers are understated considering the undisclosed part of historical record. It was a time when the development of munitions industry was possible merely by changing the way of financial distribution, maybe to an excessive degree. According to domestic and foreign studies, although not consistent, excessive military expenses in socialist states or developing countries have a negative influence on economy. Even Kim Il Sung admitted that raising the standard of living was burdensome as the portion of national budget for economy was passed on to military expenditures. Although North Korea's defense industry made it possible to produce weapons domestically and such feat led to the exportation of weapons, it is considered a major factor that brought about economic stagnation by failing to contribute sufficiently to domestic economy.
The international strategy, accommodation strategy and restructuring strategy are to be used for mobilization. The first strategy Kim Il Sung implemented was accommodation strategy including urging frugality and high productivity as he launched the Economy-Defense Parallel Policy when he could not expect the free aid from USSR. So he moved the budget for economy to defense sector which was a restructuring strategy. After that even when USSR restarted the aid to DPRK, Kim Il Sung did not stop the mobilization his own country's resources into war preparation. In this result, the wide expanding of the military economy revoked the turmoil in the national economy by making the economy three folded: the party economy, military economy and people's economy.
Prior to the development of defense industry, Kim Jong-il was forced to try recovering the socialist economic system that had been being paralyzed and reconstructing financial condition. In particular, for the recovery of finance, Kim cut spending by abolishing food rationing system, imposed tax on the market through the July Economic Reform, executed currency reform, and promoted hard currency earnings by the military. By making a change in the system itself, Kim Jong-il introduced the elements of market economy and relied on the market when changing the way of financial distribution was no longer sufficient to support defense construction as financial shortage worsened. Even in time of economic crisis, Kim Jong-il continued to import weapons from overseas. Kim owned 1.1 million troops, the fourth most in the world in those days, who were deployed to construction sites, business, and farming to make a breakthrough for economic recovery. The troops were deemed an example of combat mentality. Military-First Politics can be interpreted as an ‘Ideology-Economy Parallel Policy’ with emphasis on the military.
Utilizing the Production Possibility Frontier (PPF), widely applied in Economics, this study attempted a dynamic explanation with a graph that the increased military expenses by North Korea may lead to the shortage phenomenon of people's economy. Moreover, another dynamic analysis was performed using Indifference Curve and Budget Constraint to examine that inefficiency in the ruling system may be displayed as side effects of the expansion of military expenses and promotion to high positions by military regime. Due to lack of relevant statistics and data, the explanation provided by this study is not comprehensive enough, but it is useful in that the study may help understand relevant phenomena.
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