초록 ▼

용어보기논문에서 용어와 풀이말을 자동 추출한 결과로, 시범 서비스 중입니다. AI-Helper

북한의 국제조직범죄 활동과 대응방안 연구

북한이 국제적으로 자행해 온 불법 행위는 핵무기 및 미사일 개발 위협, 反인권범죄, 국제조직범죄 또는 초국가적 조직범죄 등 세 가지를 들 수 있다. 최근 북한의 핵무기 실험과 인권유린의 문제가 국제사회의 커다란 이슈로 조명되는데 비해 북한의 마약ㆍ위폐 등 전통적 국제조직범죄 유형이자 국제관계학에서 ‘비전통적 안보문제’ 분야로 분류하고 있는 이 영역에 대해서는 관심이 덜해진 면도 있다. 본 연구에서는 북한이 1970년대부터 국제적으로 자행해왔던 불법 활동을 국제조직범죄 영역에서 관찰하고, 그 중에서 마약, 무기밀매, 위조지폐, 가짜상품(담배 및 의약품), 인신매매, 밀수, ...

북한의 국제조직범죄 활동과 대응방안 연구

북한이 국제적으로 자행해 온 불법 행위는 핵무기 및 미사일 개발 위협, 反인권범죄, 국제조직범죄 또는 초국가적 조직범죄 등 세 가지를 들 수 있다. 최근 북한의 핵무기 실험과 인권유린의 문제가 국제사회의 커다란 이슈로 조명되는데 비해 북한의 마약ㆍ위폐 등 전통적 국제조직범죄 유형이자 국제관계학에서 ‘비전통적 안보문제’ 분야로 분류하고 있는 이 영역에 대해서는 관심이 덜해진 면도 있다. 본 연구에서는 북한이 1970년대부터 국제적으로 자행해왔던 불법 활동을 국제조직범죄 영역에서 관찰하고, 그 중에서 마약, 무기밀매, 위조지폐, 가짜상품(담배 및 의약품), 인신매매, 밀수, 사이버범죄 등 7가지 대표적 범죄유형을 연구대상으로 삼는다. 우선 국제연합에서 채택한 관련 국제협약들을 중심으로 국제조직범죄의 개념을 정립하고, UNODC(유엔 마약 및 범죄사무소)를 중심으로 대응하고 있는 국제조직범죄의 유형을 소개하며, 이 개념을 바탕으로 북한의 불법 활동 사례를 비교하여 북한이 국가차원의 국제조직범죄 집단이라는 판정을 도출하고자 한다. 따라서 본 연구의 목적을 요약하자면, 북한이 1970년대 초부터 자행한 국제조직범죄 사례를 모두 열거하고 분석하여 북한이 국가차원에서 국제조직범죄를 주도한 정황을 입증하는데 있다. 이어서, 북한의 국제조직범죄 활동이 2005년을 변곡점으로 삼아 변화된 모습과 현재의 상황을 살펴보고, 이에 대한 국제체제(International Regime), 국가간 협력(Inter-governmental cooperation), 국내적 차원(Domestic level) 등 세 가지 차원의 대응조치를 검토하며, 각 차원에 맞는 효과적인 대응전략을 대북정책 제언의 일환으로 제시한다.

Abstract ▼ AI-Helper

A Study on North Korea's Illicit Activities related with Transnational Organized Crimes and the Counter-measures

In September 1991, both Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) were simultaneously admitted to the United Nations as member state...

A Study on North Korea's Illicit Activities related with Transnational Organized Crimes and the Counter-measures

In September 1991, both Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) were simultaneously admitted to the United Nations as member states. Since then, South Korea’s perception on North Korea has shifted from a mere anti-governmental organization in terms of the South Korean constitution to an actual independent state. Despite the given responsibility as a member state of United Nations; to abide by international norms and the overall abstract ethics of the international community, North Korea has ignored the value of human rights and democracy those are required in today’s international community. North Korea continues its hereditary succession of inhumane dictatorial rule, commits different types of international illegal activities, and consequently symbolizes itself as the most representative country of “rogue state” or the “Axis of Evil.”
While North Korea persistently preserves its system of dictatorship and rejects open-door policies to remain as a closed state, the end of cold war in the end of 1980s and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe led to a dramatic decrease in supports from Russia and China. In the following 1990s, (especially from the mid of 1990s and onwards) North Korea faced the worst economic difficulties and went through the so-called “Arduous March,” a country-scale famine in which millions of North Koreans died from starvation or hunger-related diseases. Having been pushed to the edge of the precipice, North Korea has been known to expand its drug production that was originally initiated in the 1970s. This process was conducted by the state-led pharmaceutical company, where mass production of high purity synthetic drugs were made and smuggled to Asian regions (such as Japan, China, Taiwan), United States and Europe. The state-led technique and equipment were not only used for drug production and trafficking, but also for creating counterfeit dollars, fake cigarettes of a worldwide known label, and fake medicines. Media all over the world reported that this international smuggling is one of the main ways of how North Korea obtains foreign currency, especially US dollars. From 2000 to 2004, mass drug smuggling and counterfeit dollar incidents that occurred in Australia, Japan, Taiwan and United States revealed their relationship with North Korea’s movements. Since then, international control and countermeasures towards North Korea have been enforced, and hence from 2005 it seemed as if North Korea’s traditional way of obtaining foreign money through drug trafficking and creating counterfeit money, shrunk in size. However in reality, North Korea’s illegal activities related with transnational organized crimes did not actually halt. The drug trafficking and counterfeit dollar businesses were simply substituted by the smuggling of fake cigarettes and other products. To make things worse, the scale of North Korea’s illegal activities and its effect has evolved into an even larger scale. Recently, it has been reported that North Korea has continuously worked on developing its own nuclear weapons, and has been illegally providing missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to areas of constant conflicts and crises; Syria, Iran and Lebanon. Other methods of foreign currency acquisition that still continue involve smuggling of endangered species and jewelry through North Korean diplomats, and cyber-crimes through cyber routes.
Despite severe denunciations by the international community on North Korea’s persistence on dynastic-like hereditary succession of three generation (which is nowhere else to be found on modern history) and nuclear weapon experiments that violate international norms, North Korea is in a dilemma whether it should continue its so-called “business for foreign currency acquisition” so that Kim Jong-un can secure his governing fund, or not. As a country that is condemned for the absence of international trade infrastructure and the avoidance of meeting the principle orders of international community, it seems that continuing the illegal methods rather than the initiation of legal external trades is a more feasible way of obtaining foreign money.
In comparison to the recent spotlight on North Korea’s illegal activities on nuclear weapon development and violation of human rights, North Korea’s traditional ways of committing international organized crime, such as drug trafficking, smuggling, counterfeit currency and products, which are classified as ‘non-traditional’ security areas or ‘human security’ issues, are relatively unknown. However, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the United Nations body established in 1991 to be exclusively responsible for certain types of international crimes, has played a core role together with more than 190 member states in laying the foundation of preventing and halting the worldwide drug crimes. In addition, United Nation has organized the Committee on Narcotic Drugs (CND) under the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), has already adopted three international treaties to block drug production and illegal trades from 1961 to 1988, and arranged UNODC to fulfill practical tasks of the CND. Also United Nations with the major action of UNODC adopted the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) in 2000 making the definition of ‘Transnational Organized Crime’ clearly. Nonetheless transnational organized crime has expanded further more in the globalization era of 1990s, and the organizational reaction of the United Nations is still limited in a sense that it is mostly concerned with comprehensive and normative measures, simply demands the member states to comply with the norms related to the international treaty, and focuses on the inter-governmental cooperation and domestic competences of the relevant countries instead of making a global-scale prescription.
This study investigates on the illegal activities of North Korea regarding transnational organized crime, especially on seven types of crimes; drugs, firearms trafficking, counterfeit currency, fake products (cigarettes and medicines), human trafficking, smuggling, and cyber-crime. First, international treaties adopted by the United Nations will be examined to establish the definition of transnational organized crime, then the different types of transnational organized crime that are mainly dealt by the UNODC will be introduced, followed by the cases of generally known traditional transnational organized crime organizations. With the definition in mind, the cases of illegal activities by North Korea will be compared, so as to conclude that North Korea is a transnational organized crime organization in a state level. The time scope for the research is from the early 1970s when North Korea started to produce drugs and illegally traded them, to the current time in 2016, after the illegal activities have shrunk in size and transformed in 2005. As for the spatial scope, it will be restricted to the seven types of crimes (those are mentioned above) organized by the UNODC, and hence all the cases that involve these types of crimes in North Korea and their changes and intentions will be analyzed. Lastly, national reactions of the countries that are related to the North Korea’s illegal activities will be analyzed and interpreted.
Therefore, the primary goal for this research is summarized as the following: the cases of transnational organized crime by North Korea from the early 1970s will be narrated and analyzed to show that North Korea has taken the lead to commit transnational organized crimes in a national level. Moreover, the year 2005 is regarded as the turning point for North Korea’s transnational organized crime activities, so the changes after this year and the current situation will be examined. The measurements taken in the international, transnational and domestic level will be inspected, and based on these ideas, effective counterstrategy will be presented. In order to clarify the purpose of this research three questions are made to specify the research content.
First, did North Korea take the lead to commit transnational organized crimes in a governmental and national level?
In order to answer this question, the definition of ‘Transnational Organized Crime’ needs to be established first. Hence, the UNTOC(November, 2011) that was created by the international norms, is used as the grounds for introducing the definition, then the generally known crime organization, such as Yakuza, Mafia and Triad are introduced to broaden the understanding of the topic. Moreover, the most representative types of crimes that are committed worldwide are introduced by examining the role and activities of UNODC, which follows the practices of UNTOC. Currently UNODC’s annual report shows that the core priorities are the seven types of crimes; drug crimes, firearms trafficking, counterfeit money and money laundering, fake products (cigarettes and medical supplies), human trafficking, smuggling, cyber-crimes. These are in a separate field from the four main international crimes that are dealt by the international law; war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and crime of aggression.
Second, how did the transnational organized crime activities of North Korea evolve?
It is suspected that North Korea has committed transnational organized crimes to obtain foreign currency, so that the governing fund for the hereditary succession from Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-Il to Kim Jong-un could be secured. However, North Korea as a member state of United Nations, cannot help but be criticized for violating the international norms and ethics in the national level. Thus, it is important to understand the political intention and strategical background on why North Korea has decided to be involved in the transnational organized crime despite the expected chaos in its economy and society.
Third, throughout the years did international community and South Korea’s counter-measures on North Korea effective? If not, what could be the new counter strategies?
As previously stated, North Korea’s activities on transnational organized crimes have developed from the 1990s and these were revealed in 2004. In August 2004, the combination of United States’ successful operations and the money laundering in Macao-based bank, Banco Delta Asia (BDA) imposed a freezing on the money that were to be sent to North Korea, striking a blow in North Korean government. This resulted in shrinking of the North Korea’s illegal acts, and hence it is evaluated as the most effective measurement throughout the years. Meanwhile, the victim countries regarding the mass transnational organized crime by North Korea are known as United States, Japan, Australia and China. Therefore, assessments of the measurements taken by these countries, together with the United Nations’ counter-measures in international level are crucial for the research.
North Korea’s illegal activities are mainly divided into three categories; 1) nuclear weapons and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), 2) crimes against humanity, and 3) transnational organized crimes. Among these, this research investigates on the third category. The significance of the research has been continuously stressed by the U.S. State Department and the Congressional Research Service. Also, many American scholars, such as Sheena Chestnut Greitens, presented their studies related to this topic. Bearing in mind of the previous researches, this research narrates all cases of North Korea’s transnational organized crimes until the early 2016, and seeks to explain the reality of state-led transnational organized crimes in North Korea, while introducing the definition of transnational organized crime agreed by the international regime and comparing the generally known terms (such as Yakuza) in transnational organized crime. In consequence, this will lead to a rational conclusion that North Korean government itself is a transnational organized crime organization. It is essential to note that this research attempts to add novelty by two main ways. First, it argues that the turning point of North Korea’s transnational organized crime activities is 2005, and explains the differences before and after this point to analyze different methodological features. Second, it creates an ‘analysis tool’ to introduce international and domestic counter strategies.
Among the seven types of transnational organized crimes, drug trafficking has been one of the most sensational and serious crimes to cope with, due to the fact that it has the largest scale out of the seven crimes. In 1970s, most of the drug trafficking cases that were detected were arranged by the North Korean officials. In 1980s, this expands to a larger scale owing to the relationship between North Korean officials and the local organizations. In August of 1992, the then Chairman of the National Defense Commission, Kim Jong-Il, conducted the so-called “White Bellflower Project,” and North Korea’s drug production and illegal trade have become the most active in the 1990s. In the mid of 1990s, North Korea suffered from a disastrous flood and subsequently the production opium experienced a slump. Hence from 1996, the production of methamphetamine increased. It is estimated that the maximum production capability per year reached 10 to 15 tons at that time. In the 2000s, continuing the active production of drugs in the 1990s, it has developed a massive sealift for drug trafficking to Japan and Taiwan. In April of 2003, the 'Pong-su' incident, in which a North Korean cargo ship that contained heroine was found on the Australian territorial waters, revealed the heroin trafficking to Australia and showed how North Korea’s marine drug trafficking had reached its climax in the 2000s. North Korea’s income through drug trafficking in 2000s is estimated to be as much as a billion dollar per year. This financial gain contributed as a major source for maintaining the Kim Jong-Il’s political power. Through the profits of drug trafficking, Kim Jong-Il was able to rule by his own style. In other words, he was able to provide luxuries for his privileged class, such as party officers, military authorities, and law enforcement agencies, so that they would keep their loyalty towards him. North Korea’s drug trafficking activities dramatically decreases in 2005. The international pressure and control measurements pushed forward by United States were valid, and the drug problems of North Korea also went through domestic social problems, and hence, the production and distribution of drugs are relatively constrained. However, through the "Chines Route" the drug smuggling from North Korea is still detected and North Korean's drug trafficking with Chinese organized crime groups also is still engaging in.
The second type of transnational organized crime, arms trafficking in North Korea, exceeds the level of firearms that are normally the objects of UNTOC. Not only the conventional weapons in the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) level, but also missiles, Weapons of Mass Destruction and their components have all been observed enough in the smuggling history. However, according to the Article 4 of UNTOC’s illegal firearms trade prevention protocol, the scope of these transnational arms trafficking leads to controversy on whether they could be treated as an ‘illegal trades of small-size firearms.’ But the past cases show that North Korea’s arms trafficking has used the legality of arms trade between countries by combining illegal trades and smuggling, and in some cases it is highly suspected that North Korea has made deals with crime organizations.
The third type, the production and distribution of counterfeit money have been revealed by United States’ Operations Royal Charm and Smoking Dragon. Through the Operation Royal Charm in October 2004, United States was able to uncover a ship that arrived in the Newark port of New Jersey. In the container of the ship, they found out that 338,000 counterfeit US dollars were disguised as stationery products. Then on the following December, three million dollars were found, adding up in total to 3,380,000 US dollars which were all "Supernotes". In addition, more cases were uncovered in Los Angeles and Long Beach of California, by the Operation Smoking Dragon. In this operation, 1,200,000 counterfeit US dollars and fake cigarettes of well-known tobacco firms that are worth 40,000,000 dollars and drugs such as Ecstasy were exposed. Even this Supernotes were found in Europe soils which were delivered by former IRA (Irish Republican Army) and KGB members connected with North Korea.
The fourth type, the production and distribution of fake cigarettes have brought about substantial profits for North Korea. It is reported that North Korea has loaded the fake cigarettes in Rajin and Nampohang, transferred in the port of China or South Korea then made illegal trades worldwide. Some of the harmed cigarette firms, such as Philip Morris International, Lorillard, Japan Tobacco, have been constructing investigation teams to find the factories that produce fake cigarettes in North Korea.
The fifth type, smuggling in North Korea can be divided into three types. First, the way in which North Korean diplomats use their diplomat status to buy tax free products or regional specialties, re-sell these products in their country or other countries in a normal price, which is a basic sustentative form. The target products for this type of smuggling are not confined, as long as they could result in huge profits. In recent cases, the products included liquor and cigarette products that can be bought by the diplomat privilege, medical supplies that may have huge cost differences depending on the countries, or regional specialties such as high-quality cigars. Second form of smuggling exceeds the profits of the former sustentative smuggling and seeks to obtain larger profit margin. Not only does this include diplomat’s tax exemption or alleviation for high-priced jewelry, but also targets rare products like elephant tusks and rhino horns, which are internationally forbidden to be traded. This type of smuggling cannot be independently by North Korean diplomats. It requests international network conducted by the North Korean officials in headquarters. Third type of smuggling is established in the borders between North Korea and China. The border smuggling comprises of different sizes; from a small sack-form to purchase daily necessities for the North Korean public, to a mass smuggling in the governmental level to obtain foreign currency. As previously mentioned, ‘marine routes’ for drug trafficking have been recently controlled, but the ‘China routes’ still seem to be active.
The sixth type, human trafficking can be divided into two categories in terms of the international issues. First, the cases of which North Korean women are sold to China and sent across the Chinese border. Second, the cases of state-led labor exploitation. In this case, North Korea provides North Korean labor, makes contracts with workplaces in foreign countries, such as, Russia and China, and takes over more than 90% of the wages in return for the labor.
The seventh type, cyber-attack is divided into three types; cyber-war, cyber-terror, cyber-crime. In North Korea, it is rather difficult to define and categorize the crimes according to the purposes, because the same hacker organization can arrange terror or commit crime simultaneously or selectively depending on their needs. Since January 2003, the representative state-led cyber-attacks count up to 20 cases. Among them, two cases had the purpose of obtaining financial profit. In August of 2011, North Korea’s ‘Auto Program’ development and distribution incident was revealed, and in June of 2012, the circulation of North Korea’s malware game program was exposed. These two cases are considered as representative examples of traditional cyber-crimes.
Now that all seven types of transnational organized crimes are introduced, the research evaluates the argument that North Korea is a transnational organized crime organization in a national level. In this study, two conclusions of the case analysis are made in a chronological perspective. First, from 1990 to 2004, North Korea has intervened in most of the seven transnational organized crimes in a national level, and hence, North Korea can be determined as the crime organization in a national level. Second, since 2005, some types of transnational organized crimes were deviated from the national initiative, but new types of crimes, such as cyber-crimes, have been reinforced in a national level. Therefore, it can be concluded that despite changes in its sizes and types, North Korea’s transnational organized crime activities have continued until today.
The counter-measures on such illegal activities are so far limited. The international community with United Nations as its center has coped with this issue in a macroscopic and general manner, being incapable of inducing substantial changes. However, relevant countries have taken certain measurements in the national level. As for the United States, they have successfully controlled North Korea through money laundering the Banco Delta Asia. Australia seized the Pong-su ship of North Korea that contained masses of heroin in Australian territorial waters, and took action for a strict restriction on North Korean diplomats. Japan also shows appropriate reactions regarding the Yakuza and drug crimes. It has worked on prohibiting the entry of North Korean ships. In contrast, China still does not take firm steps on North Korea. Although it acknowledges that the distribution of North Korea’s methamphetamine is becoming a serious concern, China still seems to rest on a relatively cordial relationship with North Korea.
This study listed all different ways of transnational organized crimes that North Korea has committed so far. The features were analyzed to establish counter strategies in international regime level, inter-governmental cooperation level and domestic level. The seven types of transnational organized crimes of North Korea are described and the immediate measurements are primarily introduced, respectively. This first-step measurements are then classified into three levels; international regime, inter-governmental cooperation and domestic, so that a comprehensive and macroscopic political measurements are established. Thus, the overall measurements on North Korea’s transnational organized crime activities are made, however, these are only based on the past cases that were exposed. Therefore, future prospects on new illegal acts should be discussed.
First, ‘China route’ will continue. The system in which the raw material for drugs, counterfeit currency, fake cigarettes and medical supplies, are imported, finished as final products in North Korea, and re-sold to China and other parts of the world through the ‘China route,’ will be persisting. Second, the illegal acquisition of foreign currency will continue through ‘Cyber route.’ Third, the system of providing North Korean labor in other foreign countries to obtain foreign currency will continue to expand. Fourth, North Korea’s arms trafficking will go beyond the scale of conventional weapons and dispread to missiles, nuclear arms and weapons of mass destruction. This phenomenon is already clearly apparent in 2016. Ever since Kim Jong-un, who has continued the hereditary succession of the three generations, more than 25 trials of missile experiments and five rows of nuclear experiments have been conducted. The international community is deeply concerned and hopes to reinforce counter strategies through UN Security Council’s resolution. The North Korean leadership avoids the restriction of international community and it will eventually become more interested in the illegal acquisition of foreign currency to secure the governing fund of the Kim's ‘Court Economy.’ Thus, the withering transnational organized crime in 2005 has the possibility to expand once again in many different ways. It is predicted that another year of the changes could be recreated in 2016.
This study is constrained in a way that it has applied and analyzed North Korea’s illegal activities and established counter strategies by only focusing on the definition of transnational organized crime. In this perspective, the transnational organized crimes in North Korea have been again limited to seven types, the analyzed cases were fragmentary and peripheral, and the new strategies were mapped out just by these cases. Nevertheless, the results of the study could be used as a platform for researches in North Korea’s other illegal acts, such as crimes against humanity and production of WMD, and it is anticipated that the study could also be used as a preceding research data for investigating the counter strategies in similar ‘rogue countries.’