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Abstract ▼ AI-Helper

This paper tries to provide empirical support for a formal model of social policy development which has been presented in a former paper of this study. In the direct democracy, median voter's social policy preference is critical because he is Condorcet winner in a pair-wise pure majority voting. But...

This paper tries to provide empirical support for a formal model of social policy development which has been presented in a former paper of this study. In the direct democracy, median voter's social policy preference is critical because he is Condorcet winner in a pair-wise pure majority voting. But, in the more general setting, we should think of various political institutions as a collective choice device. For this reason, I draw a formal model which formulates three contrasting types of political institutions which are distinguished by the developments of political democracy and the differences of electoral rules. Comparative patterns of key variables which measure political institutions, social policy developments, and social policy preference provide support for my arguments. My empirical results suggest that three political institutions are associated with very different policy outcomes. Compared to other institutions, committee system entails more targeted subsidy, less universal benefit. On the contrary, proportional elections produce more universal benefit, less targeted subsidy.

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