최소 단어 이상 선택하여야 합니다.
최대 10 단어까지만 선택 가능합니다.
다음과 같은 기능을 한번의 로그인으로 사용 할 수 있습니다.
NTIS 바로가기다음과 같은 기능을 한번의 로그인으로 사용 할 수 있습니다.
DataON 바로가기다음과 같은 기능을 한번의 로그인으로 사용 할 수 있습니다.
Edison 바로가기다음과 같은 기능을 한번의 로그인으로 사용 할 수 있습니다.
Kafe 바로가기이 논문의 목적은 칸트 철학에서 인간 존엄성과 인권 사상을 이해하고 정리하는 데에 있다. “모든 사람은 날 때부터 자유롭고 평등한 존엄성과 권리를 가지고 있다”고 천명한 세계인권선언의 정신이 국내외적인 정치 현실에서 광범위하게 수용되고 있지만, 정치적 선언을 넘어서 인권을 보편적 가치로 인정하고 정당화하는 작업은 이미 완결된 과제는 아니다. 많은 부분에서 여전히 정치적 선언의 수준에 머물고 있는 인간 존엄성과 인권 문제에 대한 지속적인 이론적 ...
이 논문의 목적은 칸트 철학에서 인간 존엄성과 인권 사상을 이해하고 정리하는 데에 있다. “모든 사람은 날 때부터 자유롭고 평등한 존엄성과 권리를 가지고 있다”고 천명한 세계인권선언의 정신이 국내외적인 정치 현실에서 광범위하게 수용되고 있지만, 정치적 선언을 넘어서 인권을 보편적 가치로 인정하고 정당화하는 작업은 이미 완결된 과제는 아니다. 많은 부분에서 여전히 정치적 선언의 수준에 머물고 있는 인간 존엄성과 인권 문제에 대한 지속적인 이론적 탐구와 실천적 모색이 필요한 것처럼 보인다. 칸트의 인간 존엄성 사상과 인권 개념을 고찰하는 것은 근대적 인권 개념의 맹아를 살펴보는 일 이상의 의미를 갖는다. 미국 혁명과 프랑스 혁명의 열렬한 지지자였던 칸트는 인간 존엄성과 인권에 대해서 높은 가치를 두었다. 칸트는 무엇보다도 모든 개별 주체를 하나의 독립적인 인격체로서 인정하고서 이들 사이의 대칭적 관계 속에서 도덕적 관점을 정당화한 최초의 철학자로서 평가될 수 있다. 필자는 이 논문에서 칸트 인권 개념의 정리를 기초로 인권의 보편주의와 문화상대주의 문제를 검토하였다. 이를 통해 인간 존엄성의 가능 조건이 도덕성에만 국한되지 않는다는 점, 칸트의 인권 개념은 ‘엄격한 보편주의’만을 지지하기보다는 문화상대주의와도 소통가능한 ‘약한 보편주의’로 이해될 수 있다는 점을 제시한다. 이러한 폭넓은 해석에 다소간의 무리가 따르겠지만, 이는 칸트 실천철학에 대한 현대적인 응용 가능성의 차원에서 음미해 볼 여지가 있다고 하겠다. 칸트 철학에서 인간 존엄성의 가능 조건은 한 마디로 말해서 도덕성인데, 이것을 세부적으로 나누어 이성, 자율성, 도덕성, 그리고 인간성으로 고찰할 수 있다. 여기에서 이성이란 자기의식의 능력이자 법칙수립의 능력으로서 파악된다. 인간은 자기 자신을 객관화시켜 볼 수 있는 자아 표상 능력을 지니고 있을 뿐만 아니라, 보편적인 법칙을 수립하고 그에 따라 행할 수 있는 이성 능력을 가진 존재다. 자율성은 타인과의 공존가능한 방식으로 법칙을 수립할 수 있는 능력이다. 감성과 욕구를 뛰어넘어 도덕적인 행위를 선택할 수 있는 도덕적 자율성은 오직 인간에게서만 발견되는 능력으로서, 이는 인간을 다른 존재와 차별적인 가치를 지닌 존재로 특징짓는다. 또한 도덕성은 보편화될 수 있는 원칙에 따라 선의지를 행할 수 있는 가능성인데, 이는 의무의 준수, 곧 책임능력을 그 구체적 내용으로 한다. 따라서 인간 존엄성은 권리뿐만 아니라 의무 개념과도 결합되어 있으며, 인간 존엄성의 근거이유는 인간만이 자신을 도덕적으로 조절·통제할 수 있다는 점에 있다. 이성, 자율성, 도덕성의 유기적인 관계를 한 마디로 정리하면, 인간은 이성적인 존재로서 자유를 그 이념으로 삼아 도덕적으로 행할 수 있다는 것이다. 여기에서 이성적 혹은 도덕적 능력을 상실한 사람은 존엄한 존재로 간주될 수 없다는 문제가 제기될 수 있다. 그러나 칸트가 목적으로 설정한 것은 ‘인격성’이 아닌, ‘인격 속의 인간성’이다. 이는 도덕성의 실현뿐만 아니라, 합리적이지 않거나 도덕적일 수 없는 사람을 포함한 모든 인간에 대한 존중을 지시한다. 칸트의 정언명령의 ‘인간성의 정식’은 인간 존엄성 사상을 압축적으로 표현하고 있다. 이를 분석해 보면, (1) 인간은 이미 그 자신과의 관계 속에서 목적이며, 또한 (2) 인격(혹은 사람)은 타인에 의해서 목적이라고 인식된다는 점에서 객관적이다. (3) 인간성을 목적 자체로 대하는 것은 모든 도덕적 행위의 최상의 제약조건이며, (4) 목적 자체인 인간성은 유용성에 따라서 비교되거나 혹은 그 가치가 정해질 수 없다. (5) 우리는 우리 자신의 인간성뿐만 아니라 타인의 인간성을 촉진해야 할 의무가 있다. 칸트의 인간 존엄성 사상은 서양 근대의 보편적 평등주의와 맥을 같이 하고 있는데, 그 밑바탕에는 ‘모든 사람이 평등하다’는 근대적 평등주의의 이념이 자리잡고 있다. 인간은 목적이며 자연은 수단이라는 칸트의 주장은 인간의 자의적인 자연이용을 무차별적으로 옹호하는 것으로 비판되기도 한다. 물론 이러한 지적이 전혀 근거가 없는 것은 아니지만, 필자가 보기에 칸트의 초점은 이성적인 존재들간의 평등, 즉 인간과 인간관계에서의 평등에 대한 강조에 있다. 인간 존엄성의 근거에 대해서는 다양한 이견이 있을 수 있다. 혹자는 인간 존엄성의 문제를 논쟁의 여지가 없는 자명한 사실로서 받아들일 수 있고, 혹자는 형이상학적인 문제라고 꺼려할 수 있으며, 혹자는 인권 보장의 차원에서 실질적으로 인간 존엄성이 실현되기만 하면 된다는 식으로 생각할 수 있다. 인간 존엄성의 근거 물음에 대한 난점은 다음과 같이 정리될 수 있다. 첫째, 인간 존엄성의 근거를 묻는 일은 시대착오적이며, 현대사회의 다원성에 배치된 이론적 태도로서 간주된다. 둘째, 존엄성을 근거짓는 문제는 감정에 기초한 논증으로 빠질 가능성이 많다. 셋째, 인간 본성에 기초하여 인간 존엄성을 근거짓는 이론들은 그것이 ‘비정상인’ 인간에게서 발견되지 않는 경우와 동일한 특성이 고등동물에게서 발견되는 경우가 있다는 점에서 한계를 지닌다. 넷째, 어떤 인간까지를 존엄한 인간의 범주에 포함시킬 것인가 하는 문제와 관련하여 아포리아에 빠진다. 칸트는 자유를 인간으로서 갖는 유일한 원초적 권리라고 파악하고 있는데, 이는 칸트적 인권의 핵심으로서 해석된다. 칸트는 자유를 소극적인 측면과 적극적인 측면, 곧 특별한 잘못을 하지 않은 한에서 타인에 대한 구속으로부터의 독립과 타인에게 해가 되지 않는 한에서 자신이 원하는 것을 행할 수 있는 권리의 두 차원에서 이해한다. 칸트에게 자유와 평등은 서로 매개되어야 하는 두 원리라기보다는 오히려 동근원적인 개념으로 이해되어야 한다. 또한 자유권은 구체적인 내용을 가진 권리 요구가 아니라 그러한 권리를 가능하게 하는 근원적인 조건이다. 그런데 이 자유권은 칸트 이론에서 추상적인 논의로서 그치는 것이 아니라, 법적인 실천방안의 구체적인 형태를 띠고 있다. 자유권의 보장은 법적 통제원리에 의해서 주어질 뿐만 아니라, 이 법질서는 또한 자유의 원리에 의해서 작동된다. 따라서 칸트의 자유권은 법적 제도를 통해서 보장되어야 할 권리일 뿐만 아니라 법의 원리를 위한 근간으로서 이해된다. 보편주의와 문화상대주의 인권 담론과 관련하여 칸트의 인간성의 정식은 일반적으로 인권의 보편성에 대한 명시적인 표현으로 해석된다. 그러나 필자는 칸트의 입장을 다소 ‘약한 보편주의’로 해석할 수 있는 여지가 있다고 생각한다. 칸트의 인간성의 정식을, 인간성을 결코 단지 수단으로만 사용하지 않는 그런 방식으로 행하라는 소극적인 인간성의 정식과 인간성을 항상 목적으로 대하는 그런 방식으로 행하라는 적극적인 인간성의 정식으로 분절해서 이해하고 밀네의 주장을 따라 소극적인 인간성의 정식에 강조점을 둔다면, 그것은 최소한의 보편적인 인권 이론이 주장할 수 있는 적정선을 제시하고 있다고 할 수 있다. 이러한 개방된 해석 틀은 보편주의 대 문화상대주의 논쟁을 위한 일정한 시사점을 제공한다. 이러한 필자의 작업은 칸트 실천철학에 대한 이해의 지평을 확장함과 동시에 인권의 보편성을 둘러싼 논의를 풍부하게 하는 데에도 일정한 기여를 할 수 있을 것이다. 칸트를 현대적으로 응용한 인권 이론들을 비교해보는 것, 혹은 칸트의 『영구평화론』 (Zum ewigen Frieden)을 연대성과 관련하여 살펴보는 것도 칸트의 인권 개념을 보다 정밀하게 해 줄 것인데, 이러한 작업들은 필자의 추후 과제로 남겨둔다.
Human dignity and human rights have a normative force. The spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has worked its way into the political reality of the inside and outside of countries. Where individual rights are infringed and group rights are overridden, the effort to promote them in th...
Human dignity and human rights have a normative force. The spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has worked its way into the political reality of the inside and outside of countries. Where individual rights are infringed and group rights are overridden, the effort to promote them in theoretical and practical ways is consistently demanded. As we see in recent philosophy, it is a continuing problem. It might be one we can never solve and which will cause aporia, as do other problems in philosophy. Still, we need to study and investigate the issue of human dignity and human rights, each of which have been declared a good. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate human dignity and human rights in Kant's philosophy. First, the thesis describes a history of concepts of human dignity and examines reason, autonomy, morality, and humanity, the substance of Kant's human dignity. Then it analyzes Formulation of Humanity, which describes Kant's ideas about human dignity. After examining the relationship between Kant's ideas of human dignity and modern egalitarianism, the thesis will focus on the difficulty of describing why only human beings have dignity. Based on the resulting understanding of human dignity, the thesis then describes how Kant's concept of human rights differs from others. Kant's philosophy of the right of freedom, which the thesis examines, might be criticized for being too narrow since today's human rights extend from liberal rights to social rights and even to solidarity rights. While keeping that criticism in view, the thesis will emphasize Kant's Categorical Imperative as an archetype for the concept of human dignity and human rights. Finally, the thesis investigates the issue of universal human rights and cultural relativism. This thesis will extend understanding of Kant's practical philosophy and make discussion about the universality of human rights more clear and robust. 1. The condition and factors of human dignity 1) The condition of human dignity In an enlightened environment which emphasized reason, Kant placed a high value on the dignity and freedom of a human as a rational being. Freedom entered Kant's moral philosophy as the rationality of freedom and free will. He described a human as a free and equal moral being. Above all, in the nature of human rights, he described every individual subject as an independent, equal person and justified a moral viewpoint based on their relationship. In Kant's philosophy, morality alone is why humans have dignity. But human dignity can be determined by reason, autonomy, and humanity, as well as morality. Reason, autonomy and morality can be called the triangle of human dignity. These three strengthen the moral properties of human dignity, while the fourth factor, humanity, weakens it. I will describe four factors. (1) Reason According to Kant, humans have dignity because of reason, and a dignified being is a human who has a quality of reason. Reason can be understood in two ways. First, it is a quality of objectifying oneself or a quality of self-consciousness. Human beings are superior to other creatures in that they can see themselves as other objects and be the same individual throughout different experiences. Second, reason is the capacity to make law. Kant sees the nature of reason as moral law-giving and the capability of acting according to law (principle). Rational beings can make a universal law and act according to it. (2) Autonomy Humans have dignity in the sense that they have autonomy and a capability to establish law as a way of coexisting with others. A universal law is a moral law with which everyone must conform and which must be established in a way that goes beyond one's natural self-interest. Therefore, moral autonomy is found only in humans and shows humans as capable of discriminated value. (3) Morality For Kant, morality is a concept coexistent with human dignity. "Morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality, is that which alone has dignity." He suggests morality is the capability to act in good will according to a universal principle. Of course, this does not mean humans always act morally, but only that they are capable of acting morally and ought to do so. The fact that part of morality is observance of obligation or the capability of being responsible suggests that human dignity is concerned with the idea of duty as well as of rights. The prerogative which humans have as dignified beings different from other creatures is not an unconditional privilege, but a special right which springs from moral self-control. (4) Humanity We have seen that the condition of human dignity consists of reason, autonomy, and morality, and morality is the main idea in it. But can a person who has lost a rational or moral quality be treated as a dignified being? Kant suggested not personality as the deciding factor but the humanity in the person so we can treat the person who cannot conform with a moral law―the mentally disabled or immature, including infants and children―as dignified persons. Second, humans have a dignity even if they cannot realize good will, because they are capable of pursuing it. Kant's philosophy of humanity has often been considered only as regards morality, while ignoring its aspects of animality and irrationality. But humanity is one of the conditions of human dignity, although it plays a role to weaken its moral-centered system. Therefore, Kant's views on human dignity do not emphasize only its moral aspects, but include its human aspects as well, even regarding a person who lacks rational capability. 2) Analysis of Kant's human dignity (1) Analysis of Formulation of Humanity The Formulation of Humanity―"Act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means."― represents Kant's thoughts on human dignity well: (a) As a human being regards himself, humanity is already an end in itself. "Rational nature exists as an end in itself" and "The human being necessarily represents his own existence in this way." That is, he is an end in himself (Selbstzweck fuer sich) before he is an end in connection with others (Selbstzweck an sich). (b) Treating humanity as an end in itself is the ultimate limit of every moral action. According to Kant, "the subject of ends …… must be made the basis of all maxims of actions, …… as the supreme limiting condition in the use of all means." Regarding others' humanity in ones thought means that, even when we use others as a means to our ends, we admit that others can establish for themselves an end, and we can try to act in a way that does not disturb their will. (c) Humanity as an end in itself can not be weighed or determined by its utility and price. Regarding the life of someone who has humanity as a means for something of a practical value is a fault in any case, and it is an undervaluation of humanity. (2) Human dignity and universal egalitarianism Kant's philosophy of human dignity is concerned with western universal egalitarianism. In other words, the universal egalitarianism of "every person is equal" is based on the philosophy of human dignity. Kant's assertion that human beings are ends in themselves, with nature as their means, is criticized as defending humans arbitrary use of nature. Of course, this is plausible, but Kant's point puts an emphasis on equal relationships between persons, on equality between rational beings. "Kant's exclusionary claim [such as ends-means distinction] can be made out only as a corollary of his positive argument that rational beings alone are to be regarded as ends in themselves." He also relies on a purely formal concept of person to suggest a human dignity, an indifferent personal concept which is concerned with egalitarianism. Human as having his own end, or reason which makes such a human possible, is a concept which ignores personal characteristics and conditions. Every person is not equal in fact, though each must be treated that way. It is not because of personal character which a specific person has, rather of the fact every person exists as a person of transcendental personality without any difference. 3) The difficulty in describing reasons for human dignity Some might think the idea of humans infused with reason and dignity is incontrovertible, while others reject it on metaphysical grounds and still others accept it only if realized as an aspect of human rights. Describing the reasons for human dignity is difficult. First, asking a reason for human dignity can be regarded as anachronistic, an attitude which goes against our own time's pluralism. Further, the question seems to be concerned with religious or metaphysical issues, and trying to find common ground on the subject can necessitate giving up certain cultural differences and diversities. Second, assertions such as human beings have dignity or every person has equal value is not stating a fact but stating a position. Therefore, even though it is important and logical to question the reason for human dignity, the subject has an inexplicable property. Third, the argument that humans have dignity on the grounds of a certain human nature is limited, since there is a case for the assertion that human nature is not found only in human beings but in all higher animals. It may be argued that biological beings and subjects of rights are one and the same. In Animal Liberation, P. Singer, a representative philosopher of animal liberty, asks why only being human must be treated as an end in itself. If the reason is that humans are different from other beings because of intelligence or language, the logical rebuttal is that some humans are literal idiots, and some higher animals are capable of using language. Fourth, it is difficult to determine which persons can be referred to as dignified. New approaches to old questions are needed in these days of genetic engineering. Is the starting point of humanity the early or middle stage of germ or fetus? These kinds of problems make the start and the end of person ambiguous. So, along the same lines, the question of which person deserves dignity and which does not has become ambiguous as well. 2. Human rights as a realization of human dignity 1) Development of Human rights and its philosophical enterprise Theorists discuss human rights through their own concept of it. A. MacIntyre argues that believing in human rights is same as believing in witchcraft. To him, human rights belong to humans and are the reason why people should not be hindered from the pursuit of life, freedom, and happiness. On the other hand, J. Rawls referred to human rights as those supportable by a legal system, such as the rights of life and security, individual property, and freedom of conscientiousness. An agreement about the concept may be necessary before a productive discussion can take place. 2) Kant's idea of human rights If a philosophical project is to clarify the idea of human rights, investigating Kant's ideas on the subject would be useful. But did Kant have ideas on the subject? Not only was there no systematic theoretical framework in Kant's views on human rights, but there were no critical minds concerned with human rights in Kant's day. If we still discuss Kant's human rights, it is because he suggests the archetype of human rights. According to J. Donnelly, the concept of human rights is to give body to Kant's Categorical Imperative politically. The list of human rights results from considering what it means to treat being human as an end in itself. (1) Liberal rights as the core of Human rights Modern theories of natural rights are that all human beings have certain rights simply by virtue of their being persons. These modern theories of natural rights help us to understand Kant's "freedom" or "original right." "Freedom(……), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, is the only original right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity.―This principle of innate freedom …… is, independence from being bound by others. …… and finally, his being authorized to do to others anything that does not in itself diminish what is theirs." Kant suggests freedom is the only original right, a right which springs from the fact that a human being has his humanity or that he is a man. Therefore, it would not unfair to understand Kant's original right as human right. Kant approaches freedom in two ways. The negative approach states that a human being is not bound by others so long as he does no harm to others. The positive approach states that one can do what he wants so long as he does no harm to others. We can call the former a right of negative freedom and the latter a right of positive freedom. A right of negative freedom is concerned with modern egalitarianism in the sense that every person is equal and apart from other individuals' particular personalities. In fact, freedom and equality are not two principles needing to be mediated, but are, rather, rooted in the same ground. In the case of the right of positive freedom, extending one's freedom is independent from other individuals' freedom and relies on an equal relationship. A right of positive freedom prescribes our actual way of acting or describes the extent of our acting. We can say a positive right of freedom is allowed by universal law since it is not a special right given only to a certain groups or grade, but a right belonging to every person. Therefore, Kant's right of positive freedom determines the relationship of my rights to another's. But the right of freedom, whether positive or negative, is formal rather than material; it does not indicate a specific content, but it is a fundamental condition to make specific content possible. (2) Human rights as a legal realization of human dignity As we have seen, a right of freedom is the core of human rights. The discussion of this right of freedom is not limited only to an abstract idea but has a concrete and practical aspect. According to Kant, "Right is therefore the sum of the conditions under which the choice of one can be united with the choice of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom." A right is defined as a regulative principle for the external possibility of freedom, an ideal principle by which to guarantee a positive freedom. In fact, a guarantee of the right to freedom is given by legal regulative principle. Therefore, Kant's right of freedom is not only a right which should be guaranteed by legal system, but also a basic element for understanding of legal law. Because a right of freedom or human rights should not be considered only as principle, we need a concrete legal device to guarantee human rights. "Right and authorization to use coercion therefore mean one and the same thing." This is achieved through universal will. An argument for protecting a certain individual does not spring from his own will and need, but from a universal will, since "a unilateral will cannot serve as a coercive law for everyone with regard to possession that is external and therefore contingent." But even though human rights are thereby guaranteed, only external freedom should be and can be limited. So even in the guaranteeing of a right of freedom, respect for human beings is guaranteed only in indirect way. Kant's idea about legal human rights has a limitation. First, it is too narrow to include the social rights or solidarity rights toward which human rights are now moving. Second, Kant's human rights rely on individualistic possessiveness, since he substantiates the individual himself as ignoring the society to which he belongs, and thus makes human rights an individualistic possession. 3) Universal human rights and cultural relativism Today, the idea of universal human rights is criticized on many fronts, the most important of which is that of cultural relativism. The cultural relativist argues that the concept of human rights is from western tradition, and its wide spread is cultural chauvinism. On the other hand, proponents of universal human rights argue that human rights are natural and inalienable. Can we resolve this controversy to a significant degree? What kind of suggestions can we find for this problem in Kant? In fact, Kant's Formulation of Humanity is read generally as revealing a universality of human rights, although there may be room for Kant's claim to be described as an weak universality. Kant's Formulation of Humanity consists of two requirements: (a) Act so you never use humanity merely as a means. (b) At the same time, act so you always use humanity as an end. The first requirement can be referred to as a negative formulation of humanity and the second as a positive formulation of humanity. A. J. M. Milne says "The significance of the humanity principle is that on its negative side it sets a universal minimum moral standard to which, on rational grounds, every particular morality should conform." I'd like to investigate an issue of universal human rights and cultural relativism by referencing Milne's argument. Through this, I will argue that a negative formulation of humanity is the minimum limitation that theories of universal human rights can argue. Kant does not reject the fact that humanity can be used as a means, but it should be prohibited for humanity to be used only as a means, so basic rights are diminished. Therefore, the schools of universal human rights and cultural relativism, if they do not go too far, can agree to the minimum universal human rights. For a productive discussion to take place, we should search out the possible overlap of the two arguments: Don't act in a way that fails to respect a human being. This is consistent with a negative formulation of humanity, which suggests the minimum line that the school of universal human rights can argue. This reading provides the first step toward the solution of the controversy between universal and relative human rights. This thesis has attempted to analyze Kant's thoughts regarding human dignity in order to construct the author's own views on the subject. Based on Kant's concept of human rights, the thesis investigated the issue of universal human rights vs. cultural relativism, suggesting that Kant's reason for human dignity is not limited only to morality, and that Kant's concept of human rights can be read as a weak universality rather than supportive only of a strict universality. This broad interpretation might be considered by some to be somewhat extreme, but it would be useful for contemporary practical application. It would be an important project to contrast O. Hoffe and O. O'Neill's theories, both of which are adaptations of Kant's thought regarding human dignity. Investigating the relationship between Kant's Perpetual Peace (Zum ewigen Frieden) or social contraction and solidarity rights, which is considered as the third generation of human rights, would be interesting as well. I hope to deal with these projects later.
저자 | 강현정 |
---|---|
학위수여기관 | 전남대학교 대학원 |
학위구분 | 국내석사 |
학과 | 철학과 |
발행연도 | 2005 |
총페이지 | 1책 |
언어 | kor |
원문 URL | http://www.riss.kr/link?id=T10213269&outLink=K |
정보원 | 한국교육학술정보원 |
*원문 PDF 파일 및 링크정보가 존재하지 않을 경우 KISTI DDS 시스템에서 제공하는 원문복사서비스를 사용할 수 있습니다.
Copyright KISTI. All Rights Reserved.
※ AI-Helper는 부적절한 답변을 할 수 있습니다.