초록

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Abstract ▼ AI-Helper

In this study, we analyze North Korea’s nuclear issue from the theoretical perspectives of offense-defense balance and security dilemma embedded in the balance perception. We argue that the North Korean nuclear crisis in the 1900s resulted from North Korea’s security dilemma and perceived changes of...

In this study, we analyze North Korea’s nuclear issue from the theoretical perspectives of offense-defense balance and security dilemma embedded in the balance perception. We argue that the North Korean nuclear crisis in the 1900s resulted from North Korea’s security dilemma and perceived changes of offense-defense balance vis-a-vis the United States. The second nuclear crisis was a result of the clash between two layers of security dilemma, that is, one by North Korea and the other by the United States. After 9.11, a non-governmental terrorist group may impose great security threat to the United States under absolute asymmetry of military capability. The U.S. response to the increased security threat drove Washington into perceiving Pyongyang as the Axis-of-Evil with nuclear and mass-destruction capability. Thus, the conflicts between Pyongyang’s and Washington’s security dilemma generated a spiral effect. We frame the spiral effect between the two countries in accordance with theoretical framework of “Offense-Defense Theory,” which may be rooted back to the Robert Jervis’s study on misperception and security dilemma. We argue that perception on the changes of offense-defense balance may bring about similar consequences in the absence of actual empirical measurement of balance. September 11 expands the range of explanatory power of this theory into a conflict between two asymmetrical states, such as North Korea and the United States. Thus, this study suggests solution of fundamental environments of the current nuclear crisis before searching immediate situational solutions.

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