Modernization theory per se has fallen out of favor, in large measure because neither industrialization nor its concomitant social changes were found to have followed the same trajectory in all societies. Yet, some of these theories’ fundamental premises about the uniformity of social transformation...
Modernization theory per se has fallen out of favor, in large measure because neither industrialization nor its concomitant social changes were found to have followed the same trajectory in all societies. Yet, some of these theories’ fundamental premises about the uniformity of social transformations persist. The purpose of this essay is to show that recent changes in the South Korean family that accompanied industrialization were no mere automatic response to the industrialization process. Comprehending these changes requires a consideration of shifting cultural understandings about family and kinship, the government’s choice of industrialization policies, and the ways in which easier communication and transportation have fostered a rethinking about possibilities for maintaining ties among separated kin. Modernization theorists hypothesized that families would become smaller as a result of industrialization. Careful scrutiny of South Korean families, however, do not substantiate the claim that a smaller family size has been the result of succumbing to the functional demands of an industrialized way of life. First of all, a majority of Korean households appear to have been composed of nuclear families even before industrialization. Second, the high rates of rural emigration by the younger segment of the population, which separated adult offspring from their siblings and parents, was encouraged by the government’s choice of an urban- and industrial-zone-centered export-oriented capitalist industrialization strategy. Third, higher standards of education, the rising cost of raising children, and various governmental birth-control campaigns have shifted cultural understandings about the ideal number of children that parents can raise adequately. Fourth, the development of easier communication and transportation between persons living in separate residences has made possible the maintenance of a quasi-family relationship over distances. Indeed. recent research has shown that which persons belongs to one’s own “family” is often a contested issue in contemporary South Korea. And finally, stronger ties between married women and their natal parents have encouraged an extension of family relationships with matrilateral relatives, despite a continued if weakening reluctance of elderly parents to live with their married female rather than male offspring. In sum, new Korean family forms appear not to be the result of an automatic functional adaptation to the demands of industrial life, as modernization theorists hypothesized, but have resulted in no small measure from governmental and individual choices made in light of shifting cultural understandings about the nature of the family and obligations of intergenerational reciprocity in new settings.
Modernization theory per se has fallen out of favor, in large measure because neither industrialization nor its concomitant social changes were found to have followed the same trajectory in all societies. Yet, some of these theories’ fundamental premises about the uniformity of social transformations persist. The purpose of this essay is to show that recent changes in the South Korean family that accompanied industrialization were no mere automatic response to the industrialization process. Comprehending these changes requires a consideration of shifting cultural understandings about family and kinship, the government’s choice of industrialization policies, and the ways in which easier communication and transportation have fostered a rethinking about possibilities for maintaining ties among separated kin. Modernization theorists hypothesized that families would become smaller as a result of industrialization. Careful scrutiny of South Korean families, however, do not substantiate the claim that a smaller family size has been the result of succumbing to the functional demands of an industrialized way of life. First of all, a majority of Korean households appear to have been composed of nuclear families even before industrialization. Second, the high rates of rural emigration by the younger segment of the population, which separated adult offspring from their siblings and parents, was encouraged by the government’s choice of an urban- and industrial-zone-centered export-oriented capitalist industrialization strategy. Third, higher standards of education, the rising cost of raising children, and various governmental birth-control campaigns have shifted cultural understandings about the ideal number of children that parents can raise adequately. Fourth, the development of easier communication and transportation between persons living in separate residences has made possible the maintenance of a quasi-family relationship over distances. Indeed. recent research has shown that which persons belongs to one’s own “family” is often a contested issue in contemporary South Korea. And finally, stronger ties between married women and their natal parents have encouraged an extension of family relationships with matrilateral relatives, despite a continued if weakening reluctance of elderly parents to live with their married female rather than male offspring. In sum, new Korean family forms appear not to be the result of an automatic functional adaptation to the demands of industrial life, as modernization theorists hypothesized, but have resulted in no small measure from governmental and individual choices made in light of shifting cultural understandings about the nature of the family and obligations of intergenerational reciprocity in new settings.
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