방송과 통신은 전통적으로 다른 영역으로 인식되어 왔으며 상호 독자적인 규제 체계를 갖추고 있긴 하나, 방송과 통신 간 융합 현상으로 인해 양자 간 기존에 존재하였던 경계는 급속히 허물어지고 있다. 특히 글로벌 시장에서 발생하고 있는 방송사업자와 통신사업자 간 기업결합은 이러한 현상을 가속화하고 있다. 미국 통신사업자 AT&T의 위성방송사업자 DIRECTV 인수(2015), 다국적 통신사업자 Vodafone의 독일 방송사업자 Kabel Deutschland 인수(2014) 및 스페인 방송사업자 ONO 인수(2013) 등 방송·통신시장은 이종(異種) 사업자 간 기업결합이 활발히 일어나고 있는 영역이다. 국내에서도 2016년 통신사업자 SK텔레콤과 방송사업자 CJ헬로비전 간 추진된 기업결합에 대해 큰 논란이 있었다. 본 논문에서는 방송∙통신시장에서의 기존 기업결합 심사사례에 적용되었던 판단기준 및 절차, 그 문제점들을 살펴보고 이를 바탕으로 향후 기업결합에 적용될 심사기준 및 절차의 개선방향을 도출하였다. 우선 시장획정과 관련하여 유료방송의 상품 및 지역시장 획정, 이동통신 소매·도매시장 획정 등 기존 심사사례에서 문제되었던 쟁점들을 검토하였다. 방송∙통신시장의 획정에 있어서는 무엇보다 시장의 동태적 변화 방향을 고려하여야 하며, 새로운 서비스·기술의 진화·발전 및 기존 사업 영역의 퇴보 등을 반영하여 지속적으로 시장획정의 정합성을 따져보아야 한다. 특히 수요대체성 판단을 위한 분석 방법을 기계적으로 적용하는 것은 바람직하지 아니하며, 시장의 양면시장성, 일방향 대체성, 서비스·기술적 측면에서 우위를 점하고 있는 사업자가 부과하는 경쟁압력 등 시장이 갖는 고유한 특징을 폭넓고 유연하게 고려하고 연쇄적 대체관계 등 다양한 분석방식을 활용하여야 한다. 경쟁제한성 심사와 관련하여서는 국내외 기업결합 심사사례에서 주요한 쟁점이 되었던 유료방송 및 이동통신시장에서의 결합을 수평결합과 수직결합의 측면에서 살펴보았다. 유료방송사업자 간 수평결합에 대한 심사에 있어 국내 경쟁당국은 시장집중도나 점유율 변화를 주요 기준으로 활용하였으나, 향후에는 ...
방송과 통신은 전통적으로 다른 영역으로 인식되어 왔으며 상호 독자적인 규제 체계를 갖추고 있긴 하나, 방송과 통신 간 융합 현상으로 인해 양자 간 기존에 존재하였던 경계는 급속히 허물어지고 있다. 특히 글로벌 시장에서 발생하고 있는 방송사업자와 통신사업자 간 기업결합은 이러한 현상을 가속화하고 있다. 미국 통신사업자 AT&T의 위성방송사업자 DIRECTV 인수(2015), 다국적 통신사업자 Vodafone의 독일 방송사업자 Kabel Deutschland 인수(2014) 및 스페인 방송사업자 ONO 인수(2013) 등 방송·통신시장은 이종(異種) 사업자 간 기업결합이 활발히 일어나고 있는 영역이다. 국내에서도 2016년 통신사업자 SK텔레콤과 방송사업자 CJ헬로비전 간 추진된 기업결합에 대해 큰 논란이 있었다. 본 논문에서는 방송∙통신시장에서의 기존 기업결합 심사사례에 적용되었던 판단기준 및 절차, 그 문제점들을 살펴보고 이를 바탕으로 향후 기업결합에 적용될 심사기준 및 절차의 개선방향을 도출하였다. 우선 시장획정과 관련하여 유료방송의 상품 및 지역시장 획정, 이동통신 소매·도매시장 획정 등 기존 심사사례에서 문제되었던 쟁점들을 검토하였다. 방송∙통신시장의 획정에 있어서는 무엇보다 시장의 동태적 변화 방향을 고려하여야 하며, 새로운 서비스·기술의 진화·발전 및 기존 사업 영역의 퇴보 등을 반영하여 지속적으로 시장획정의 정합성을 따져보아야 한다. 특히 수요대체성 판단을 위한 분석 방법을 기계적으로 적용하는 것은 바람직하지 아니하며, 시장의 양면시장성, 일방향 대체성, 서비스·기술적 측면에서 우위를 점하고 있는 사업자가 부과하는 경쟁압력 등 시장이 갖는 고유한 특징을 폭넓고 유연하게 고려하고 연쇄적 대체관계 등 다양한 분석방식을 활용하여야 한다. 경쟁제한성 심사와 관련하여서는 국내외 기업결합 심사사례에서 주요한 쟁점이 되었던 유료방송 및 이동통신시장에서의 결합을 수평결합과 수직결합의 측면에서 살펴보았다. 유료방송사업자 간 수평결합에 대한 심사에 있어 국내 경쟁당국은 시장집중도나 점유율 변화를 주요 기준으로 활용하였으나, 향후에는 시장지배력이 확대 중에 있는 전국적 사업자의 경쟁압력이나 유료방송시장의 양면시장성 등을 반영한 심사가 필요하다. 이동통신시장에서의 수평결합에 대하여 국내외 경쟁당국은 독행기업을 근거로 경쟁제한성을 인정하였으나, 이러한 독행기업 기준의 적용을 위해서는 피인수회사의 파괴적 역할과 실제 시장에 부과한 경쟁압력에 대한 실증적 입증이 요구된다. 다음으로 수직결합과 관련하여서는 주로 봉쇄효과의 측면에서 심사가 이루어지고 있다. 수직결합의 경우 효율성 증대효과 등 시장에 미치는 다면적 영향이 감안되어야 하며, 이를 위해 봉쇄효과의 판단에 있어 시장의 구조적 봉쇄 수준이 아닌 당사회사가 실질적으로 봉쇄능력 및 유인을 보유하는지와 봉쇄로 인해 유효경쟁의 훼손이 있을지 여부가 심사기준이 되어야 한다. 마지막으로 심사절차와 관련하여 국내에서는 방송·통신사업자 간 기업결합에 대해 산업규제기관과 경쟁당국의 심사가 중첩적으로 이루어지고 있다. 이러한 중첩적 심사절차는 심사기간의 지연, 비용의 상승, 심사기준이나 결과의 불확실성 등으로 인해 많은 논란이 발생할 수밖에 없으므로, 신속한 심사를 유도할 수 있는 제도 마련, 규제기관 간 협력 체계 구축 등을 통해 사업자와 시장에 예측 가능성을 부여할 수 있는 방향으로 절차적 개선이 필요하다.
방송과 통신은 전통적으로 다른 영역으로 인식되어 왔으며 상호 독자적인 규제 체계를 갖추고 있긴 하나, 방송과 통신 간 융합 현상으로 인해 양자 간 기존에 존재하였던 경계는 급속히 허물어지고 있다. 특히 글로벌 시장에서 발생하고 있는 방송사업자와 통신사업자 간 기업결합은 이러한 현상을 가속화하고 있다. 미국 통신사업자 AT&T의 위성방송사업자 DIRECTV 인수(2015), 다국적 통신사업자 Vodafone의 독일 방송사업자 Kabel Deutschland 인수(2014) 및 스페인 방송사업자 ONO 인수(2013) 등 방송·통신시장은 이종(異種) 사업자 간 기업결합이 활발히 일어나고 있는 영역이다. 국내에서도 2016년 통신사업자 SK텔레콤과 방송사업자 CJ헬로비전 간 추진된 기업결합에 대해 큰 논란이 있었다. 본 논문에서는 방송∙통신시장에서의 기존 기업결합 심사사례에 적용되었던 판단기준 및 절차, 그 문제점들을 살펴보고 이를 바탕으로 향후 기업결합에 적용될 심사기준 및 절차의 개선방향을 도출하였다. 우선 시장획정과 관련하여 유료방송의 상품 및 지역시장 획정, 이동통신 소매·도매시장 획정 등 기존 심사사례에서 문제되었던 쟁점들을 검토하였다. 방송∙통신시장의 획정에 있어서는 무엇보다 시장의 동태적 변화 방향을 고려하여야 하며, 새로운 서비스·기술의 진화·발전 및 기존 사업 영역의 퇴보 등을 반영하여 지속적으로 시장획정의 정합성을 따져보아야 한다. 특히 수요대체성 판단을 위한 분석 방법을 기계적으로 적용하는 것은 바람직하지 아니하며, 시장의 양면시장성, 일방향 대체성, 서비스·기술적 측면에서 우위를 점하고 있는 사업자가 부과하는 경쟁압력 등 시장이 갖는 고유한 특징을 폭넓고 유연하게 고려하고 연쇄적 대체관계 등 다양한 분석방식을 활용하여야 한다. 경쟁제한성 심사와 관련하여서는 국내외 기업결합 심사사례에서 주요한 쟁점이 되었던 유료방송 및 이동통신시장에서의 결합을 수평결합과 수직결합의 측면에서 살펴보았다. 유료방송사업자 간 수평결합에 대한 심사에 있어 국내 경쟁당국은 시장집중도나 점유율 변화를 주요 기준으로 활용하였으나, 향후에는 시장지배력이 확대 중에 있는 전국적 사업자의 경쟁압력이나 유료방송시장의 양면시장성 등을 반영한 심사가 필요하다. 이동통신시장에서의 수평결합에 대하여 국내외 경쟁당국은 독행기업을 근거로 경쟁제한성을 인정하였으나, 이러한 독행기업 기준의 적용을 위해서는 피인수회사의 파괴적 역할과 실제 시장에 부과한 경쟁압력에 대한 실증적 입증이 요구된다. 다음으로 수직결합과 관련하여서는 주로 봉쇄효과의 측면에서 심사가 이루어지고 있다. 수직결합의 경우 효율성 증대효과 등 시장에 미치는 다면적 영향이 감안되어야 하며, 이를 위해 봉쇄효과의 판단에 있어 시장의 구조적 봉쇄 수준이 아닌 당사회사가 실질적으로 봉쇄능력 및 유인을 보유하는지와 봉쇄로 인해 유효경쟁의 훼손이 있을지 여부가 심사기준이 되어야 한다. 마지막으로 심사절차와 관련하여 국내에서는 방송·통신사업자 간 기업결합에 대해 산업규제기관과 경쟁당국의 심사가 중첩적으로 이루어지고 있다. 이러한 중첩적 심사절차는 심사기간의 지연, 비용의 상승, 심사기준이나 결과의 불확실성 등으로 인해 많은 논란이 발생할 수밖에 없으므로, 신속한 심사를 유도할 수 있는 제도 마련, 규제기관 간 협력 체계 구축 등을 통해 사업자와 시장에 예측 가능성을 부여할 수 있는 방향으로 절차적 개선이 필요하다.
Combination between broadcasting and telecom companies, which were considered heterogenous firms before, are becoming global trend. Broadcasting and telecommunication industries are narrowing gap which existed before not only through convergence of technologies and services but also with merger of f...
Combination between broadcasting and telecom companies, which were considered heterogenous firms before, are becoming global trend. Broadcasting and telecommunication industries are narrowing gap which existed before not only through convergence of technologies and services but also with merger of firms operating in different markets. In 2015, AT&T, one of the biggest telecom operators in the US, acquired DIRECTV which offered satellite digital services to approximately 20 million subscribers nationwide. In Europe, Vodafone, providing telecom services in different member states of the EU, acquired Kabel Deutschland in 2013 and ONO in 2014. Each of the acquired firms was one of the major pay-TV service providers in Germany and Spain, respectively. In Korea, SK Telecom(“SKT”), the largest mobile telecommunication corporation, made an attempt to acquire CJ HelloVision(“CJHV”), the second largest pay-TV company, which was disapproved by the Korean Fair Trade Commission(the “KFTC”) in July 2016. However, despite this failure, considering global convergence trend, there expected to be continuous attempts of mergers between broadcasting and telecom companies in Korea and worldwide. In this thesis, based on the analysis of the previous merger cases in the broadcasting and telecommunication markets, regulatory guidelines and procedure applying to the merger review have been studied from the comparative legal perspective and the improvement measures thereof have been proposed. With respect to the relevant market definition, issues debated in the previous merger cases including product and geographic market definition of the pay-TV, retail and wholesale market definition of the mobile telecommunication have been examined in depth. Market definition in the broadcasting and telecommunication fields should consider dynamic changes of the markets and continuously be corrected in accordance with the technological evolution and service development of the relevant products and services happening constantly in the markets. Most of all, the judicial tests in the merger guidelines including hypothetical monopolist test and critical loss analysis should not be applied mechanically to individual market definition case. The market characteristics such as two-sided markets, asymmetric one-way substitution, competitive pressures coming from start-up companies and neighboring market etc. should be considered reasonably and various market definition methods including chains of substitution should be applied with flexibility. Regarding the anticompetitive effect review performed by the competition authorities, horizontal and vertical merger have been major issues in the broadcasting and telecom market and therefore this thesis focuses on the analysis of such two types of merger. In broadcasting and telecommunication industry, the market is rapidly changing with the development and introduction of the next generation technology and asymmetrical shift of consumers to the next stage platforms or services is continuously happening. Since the broadcasting and telecom markets are characterized by their constantly changing market conditions, the merger analysis should also take such possible changes into consideration in measuring merging firms’ market power in the relevant market. Without inclusion of reasonable prediction of the transition happening in the market and forward looking perspective, the merger analysis is highly likely to overstate or understate the competitive significance of merging parties. When it comes to the horizontal merger cases in the Korean pay-TV market, most of the previous cases were mergers among system operators (providing cable TV service in each licensed area) and there was one attempted merger between cable TV operator and IPTV service provider (in SKT/CJHV case). In those cases, the KFTC has focused on the increase of pay-TV operators’ market shares and elevated market concentration in individual local area, after defining the relevant market into local areas where each cable TV operator provided pay-TV services. However, in the Korean pay-TV market, IPTV service operators providing nationwide services are attracting more and more subscribers with better service qualities and various TV contents and raising its market shares in a rapid pace, while cable TV operators are continuously losing their subscribers to its competing platforms. In assessing anticompetitive effects of merger, the competitive constraints the merging entities face following the merger should be reasonably considered. If there is other leading competitors in the market surpassing the ability of the merging parties even after the merger, the merging entities may not have the incentive and ability to engage in anticompetitive activities such as increasing price unilaterally. Rather, in such a case, it is highly probable that the market will become more competitive with the increased competitive pressure newly brought up by the merging firms to efficiently compete with the leading companies. In the future merger cases in the Korean pay-TV market, the competition agency should take into consideration competitive constraints coming from nationwide service providers and rapid changes happening in the Korean pay-TV market. Further, as for performing the economic analysis on the pay-TV market, the characteristic of the pay-TV market as two-sided market requires different perspectives. Unlike analyzing the single-sided market, the indirect network externalities involved with the TV platform and the competitive constraints coming from both sides of market (subscribers and home-shopping channel providers) should be reasonably considered. Without reviewing the interaction between two different sides of the market, the merger analysis may not capture all the significant competitive constraints the merging parties face and thereby the result likely comes out with serious errors. To point out the adverse competitive effects on the mobile telecommunication retail market in the Korean and US merger cases, the competition authorities have applied maverick theory determining the acquired firm has been playing disruptive role in mobile telecommunication market. This maverick theory was adopted by the US antitrust agencies as a tool to identify coordinated effects caused by horizontal mergers. However, strict proof and empirical evidence should be preceded before applying maverick theory for the purpose of proving coordinated effects arising from merger. All of the players in the market engage in different levels of competitive activities and therefore competitive activity itself may not be the factor of identifying a maverick firm. To be recognized as a maverick, such a firm should have the incentive and ability to disrupt market conditions which can be clearly proved with its past conducts in the market or other conspicuous evidences. Without such limitation, the antitrust agencies can easily fall into temptation to apply maverick theory to block a horizontal merger without sufficiently analyzing other competitive effects of the merger. In the media markets, vertical combinations between content producers and distribution companies have drawn attention of antitrust agencies. In such merger cases, it has been a major concern during the merger review whether the vertically integrated firm would exclude other content companies from the distribution system or foreclose other platform operators from the relevant market by implementing discriminatory pricing strategies for merging firms’ contents. In this category of merger, the review standard should be: (1) the merging parties would have the incentive and ability to foreclose other competitors; (2) the merging firms’ foreclosure would raise such competitors’ costs; and (3) such foreclosure would eventually have adverse competitive effect on the relevant market. Meanwhile, in the telecom market, vertical combinations between MNO and MVNO have been reviewed in several merger cases in the EU and Korea. In the telecom market, while most of the MNOs have significant market power based on their independent network facilities and large customer base, MVNOs face competitive constraints arising from wholesale agreements to be supplied with mobile telecom service elements from MNOs. Therefore the foreclosure effect analysis in the vertical integration should focus on the input foreclosure toward the MVNOs rather than the customer foreclosure toward the MNOs. When reviewing the input foreclosure, the review standard should focus on the possibility of the increase of price charged to the end users derived from the rise in MVNO’s cost as a result of input foreclosure. With the improvement of the substantial merger review standard by taking into consideration dynamic factors in the broadcasting and telecom markets and prioritizing ultimate consumer benefits, procedural reform in the dual merger review process needs to be pursued. Like dual review process in the US where both FCC and DOJ have regulatory authority over media and telecom mergers, the mergers between broadcasting and telecom operators in Korea should go through merger review processes with two different governmental enforcers, the KFTC and Ministry of Science and ICT and Future Planning (which is in charge of sector-specific regulation in Korea). Even for media mergers, prior consent from Korea Communications Commission (another sector regulator in Korea) is additionally required. However, this complicated merger procedure is costly and inevitably involves uncertainties and inefficiencies. The dual review system in the media and telecom mergers needs more clarification on how to allocate power and authorities to different regulatory bodies, and the process of cooperation and coordination between independent governmental organizations should be established for the purpose of minimizing unnecessary social costs incurred due to the inefficient review procedure.
Combination between broadcasting and telecom companies, which were considered heterogenous firms before, are becoming global trend. Broadcasting and telecommunication industries are narrowing gap which existed before not only through convergence of technologies and services but also with merger of firms operating in different markets. In 2015, AT&T, one of the biggest telecom operators in the US, acquired DIRECTV which offered satellite digital services to approximately 20 million subscribers nationwide. In Europe, Vodafone, providing telecom services in different member states of the EU, acquired Kabel Deutschland in 2013 and ONO in 2014. Each of the acquired firms was one of the major pay-TV service providers in Germany and Spain, respectively. In Korea, SK Telecom(“SKT”), the largest mobile telecommunication corporation, made an attempt to acquire CJ HelloVision(“CJHV”), the second largest pay-TV company, which was disapproved by the Korean Fair Trade Commission(the “KFTC”) in July 2016. However, despite this failure, considering global convergence trend, there expected to be continuous attempts of mergers between broadcasting and telecom companies in Korea and worldwide. In this thesis, based on the analysis of the previous merger cases in the broadcasting and telecommunication markets, regulatory guidelines and procedure applying to the merger review have been studied from the comparative legal perspective and the improvement measures thereof have been proposed. With respect to the relevant market definition, issues debated in the previous merger cases including product and geographic market definition of the pay-TV, retail and wholesale market definition of the mobile telecommunication have been examined in depth. Market definition in the broadcasting and telecommunication fields should consider dynamic changes of the markets and continuously be corrected in accordance with the technological evolution and service development of the relevant products and services happening constantly in the markets. Most of all, the judicial tests in the merger guidelines including hypothetical monopolist test and critical loss analysis should not be applied mechanically to individual market definition case. The market characteristics such as two-sided markets, asymmetric one-way substitution, competitive pressures coming from start-up companies and neighboring market etc. should be considered reasonably and various market definition methods including chains of substitution should be applied with flexibility. Regarding the anticompetitive effect review performed by the competition authorities, horizontal and vertical merger have been major issues in the broadcasting and telecom market and therefore this thesis focuses on the analysis of such two types of merger. In broadcasting and telecommunication industry, the market is rapidly changing with the development and introduction of the next generation technology and asymmetrical shift of consumers to the next stage platforms or services is continuously happening. Since the broadcasting and telecom markets are characterized by their constantly changing market conditions, the merger analysis should also take such possible changes into consideration in measuring merging firms’ market power in the relevant market. Without inclusion of reasonable prediction of the transition happening in the market and forward looking perspective, the merger analysis is highly likely to overstate or understate the competitive significance of merging parties. When it comes to the horizontal merger cases in the Korean pay-TV market, most of the previous cases were mergers among system operators (providing cable TV service in each licensed area) and there was one attempted merger between cable TV operator and IPTV service provider (in SKT/CJHV case). In those cases, the KFTC has focused on the increase of pay-TV operators’ market shares and elevated market concentration in individual local area, after defining the relevant market into local areas where each cable TV operator provided pay-TV services. However, in the Korean pay-TV market, IPTV service operators providing nationwide services are attracting more and more subscribers with better service qualities and various TV contents and raising its market shares in a rapid pace, while cable TV operators are continuously losing their subscribers to its competing platforms. In assessing anticompetitive effects of merger, the competitive constraints the merging entities face following the merger should be reasonably considered. If there is other leading competitors in the market surpassing the ability of the merging parties even after the merger, the merging entities may not have the incentive and ability to engage in anticompetitive activities such as increasing price unilaterally. Rather, in such a case, it is highly probable that the market will become more competitive with the increased competitive pressure newly brought up by the merging firms to efficiently compete with the leading companies. In the future merger cases in the Korean pay-TV market, the competition agency should take into consideration competitive constraints coming from nationwide service providers and rapid changes happening in the Korean pay-TV market. Further, as for performing the economic analysis on the pay-TV market, the characteristic of the pay-TV market as two-sided market requires different perspectives. Unlike analyzing the single-sided market, the indirect network externalities involved with the TV platform and the competitive constraints coming from both sides of market (subscribers and home-shopping channel providers) should be reasonably considered. Without reviewing the interaction between two different sides of the market, the merger analysis may not capture all the significant competitive constraints the merging parties face and thereby the result likely comes out with serious errors. To point out the adverse competitive effects on the mobile telecommunication retail market in the Korean and US merger cases, the competition authorities have applied maverick theory determining the acquired firm has been playing disruptive role in mobile telecommunication market. This maverick theory was adopted by the US antitrust agencies as a tool to identify coordinated effects caused by horizontal mergers. However, strict proof and empirical evidence should be preceded before applying maverick theory for the purpose of proving coordinated effects arising from merger. All of the players in the market engage in different levels of competitive activities and therefore competitive activity itself may not be the factor of identifying a maverick firm. To be recognized as a maverick, such a firm should have the incentive and ability to disrupt market conditions which can be clearly proved with its past conducts in the market or other conspicuous evidences. Without such limitation, the antitrust agencies can easily fall into temptation to apply maverick theory to block a horizontal merger without sufficiently analyzing other competitive effects of the merger. In the media markets, vertical combinations between content producers and distribution companies have drawn attention of antitrust agencies. In such merger cases, it has been a major concern during the merger review whether the vertically integrated firm would exclude other content companies from the distribution system or foreclose other platform operators from the relevant market by implementing discriminatory pricing strategies for merging firms’ contents. In this category of merger, the review standard should be: (1) the merging parties would have the incentive and ability to foreclose other competitors; (2) the merging firms’ foreclosure would raise such competitors’ costs; and (3) such foreclosure would eventually have adverse competitive effect on the relevant market. Meanwhile, in the telecom market, vertical combinations between MNO and MVNO have been reviewed in several merger cases in the EU and Korea. In the telecom market, while most of the MNOs have significant market power based on their independent network facilities and large customer base, MVNOs face competitive constraints arising from wholesale agreements to be supplied with mobile telecom service elements from MNOs. Therefore the foreclosure effect analysis in the vertical integration should focus on the input foreclosure toward the MVNOs rather than the customer foreclosure toward the MNOs. When reviewing the input foreclosure, the review standard should focus on the possibility of the increase of price charged to the end users derived from the rise in MVNO’s cost as a result of input foreclosure. With the improvement of the substantial merger review standard by taking into consideration dynamic factors in the broadcasting and telecom markets and prioritizing ultimate consumer benefits, procedural reform in the dual merger review process needs to be pursued. Like dual review process in the US where both FCC and DOJ have regulatory authority over media and telecom mergers, the mergers between broadcasting and telecom operators in Korea should go through merger review processes with two different governmental enforcers, the KFTC and Ministry of Science and ICT and Future Planning (which is in charge of sector-specific regulation in Korea). Even for media mergers, prior consent from Korea Communications Commission (another sector regulator in Korea) is additionally required. However, this complicated merger procedure is costly and inevitably involves uncertainties and inefficiencies. The dual review system in the media and telecom mergers needs more clarification on how to allocate power and authorities to different regulatory bodies, and the process of cooperation and coordination between independent governmental organizations should be established for the purpose of minimizing unnecessary social costs incurred due to the inefficient review procedure.
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