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용어보기논문에서 용어와 풀이말을 자동 추출한 결과로, 시범 서비스 중입니다. AI-Helper

본 논문은 공정거래법의 집행과 관련하여 가장 논란이 되는 것들 중 하나인 부당한 공동행위의 의의, 요건 및 유형에 대해서 살펴본 다음, 부당한 공동행위에 대한 형사적 제재와 관련한 문제점과 개선방안을 검토하였다.
부당한 공동행위의 요건은 ① 둘 이상의 사업자, ② 합의(의사의 합치), ③ 공동행위의 부당성 세 가지이고, 합의에 따른 실행행위는 필요하지 않다. 부당한 공동행위는 경성 공동행위와 경성 공동행위와 연성 공동행위로 나눌 수 있는데, 전자는 그 성격상 경쟁제한 효과만 발생시키고 후자에 비해 불법의 정도와 시장경제에 대한 위협의 강도가 훨씬 크기 때문에 형사처벌의 요청이 크다.
부당한 공동행위에 대한 형사적 제재와 관련한 문제점과 개선방안은 실체법적인 측면과 절차법적인 측면으로 나누어 검토하였다.
부당한 공동행위에 대한 형사적 제재의 실체법상 문제점은, 부당한 공동행위가 성립하기 위해서는 형법상 일종의 음모에 해당하는 합의만 있으면 되고 실행행위의 착수가 불필요하며, ① 합의만 있는 경우, ② 미수에 그친 경우, ③ 기수에 이른 경우 모두 같은 법정형으로 처벌한다는 점이다. 통상 형법은 기수만 처벌하고 특별한 규정이 있을 때만 미수와 예비·음모를 처벌하며 각각 법정형이 달리 규정되어 있으나 부당한 공동행위는 세 경우 모두 동일한 법정형으로 처벌하기 때문에 헌법상 비례원칙과 평등원칙에 반할 소지가 있으므로 각각 법정형을 달리 규정하는 것이 타당하다.
부당한 공동행위에 대한 형사적 제재의 절차법상 문제점은 세 가지인데, ① 전속고발제도, ② 공정거래위원회의 증거 수집 곤란 및 공정거래위원회 수집 증거의 형사절차 사용 곤란, ③ 처분시효와 공소시효의 부조화 문제이다.
공정거래위원회가 전속고발제도를 지나치게 소극적으로 행사하여온 까닭에 부당한 공동행위에 적절하지 대응하지 못한다는 비판이 끊임없이 있어왔다. 공정거래법 위반과 형사처벌 여부는 전문성을 가진 공정거래위원회가 1차적으로 판단하는 것이 타당하고 전속고발제도 폐지는 형벌의 과잉발동과 기업 활동 위축을 초래할 수 있다는 이유로 전속고발제도 존치를 주장하는 견해도 일리가 있으나, 경성 공동행위는 위법성 판단이 용이하고 그 폐해가 워낙 중하기 때문에 그에 대한 전속고발제도를 폐지하는 것이 타당하다.
공정거래위원회의 조사는 강제조사가 아닌 임의조사로서 증거 수집에 매우 취약하다. 공정거래위원회의 임의조사는 형사절차에 비해 절차적 권리가 철저히 보장된다고 보기 어렵기 때문에 그러한 조사과정에서 획득한 자료를 형사절차에서 그대로 사용하는 것은 적절하지 않다고 볼 여지가 있다. 따라서 범칙조사권이나 사법경찰권을 도입하여 고발기준에 해당하는 사건의 경우에는 엄격한 적법절차에 따라 강제조사를 하는 것이 타당할 수 있다.
공정거래위원회의 고발에 따라 검찰의 공소제기가 이루어지기 때문에 처분시효보다 공소시효가 더 장기여야 하는 것이 논리적으로 타당하나, 공정거래법의 현실은 그 반대이다. 이러한 부조화 문제를 해결하기 위해서 ① 공정거래법에 조세범처벌법과 같은 공소시효 특례 규정을 두는 방안, ② 부당한 공동행위에 대한 징역형 상한을 올려 공소시효를 장기화하는 방안, ③ 공정거래위원회 조사기간 중에는 공소시효를 정지하는 규정을 신설하는 방안을 검토해 볼 수 있다.

Abstract ▼ AI-Helper

Criminal enforcement against unfair collusion (or cartels) has been one of the most contentious issues in the enforcement of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA). The author makes analytical reviews on the meaning, legal elements, and typology of unfair collusion, followed by examinati...

Criminal enforcement against unfair collusion (or cartels) has been one of the most contentious issues in the enforcement of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA). The author makes analytical reviews on the meaning, legal elements, and typology of unfair collusion, followed by examinations on legal problems in criminal enforcement against unfair collusion with suggestions of legislative improvement for solving the problems.
Illegal unfair collusion require three necessary elements including (1) multiple undertakings, (2) an agreement ('consensus of intent'), and (3) unfairness. Implementation of agreement is not required for illegality. Unfair cartels can be divided into two types: hard-core and soft-core cartels. Hard-core cartels are, by their nature, so likely to infer anti-competitive effect, and significant threats to the market economy, that they have been highly demanded to be condemned criminally.
Problems and legislative improvement with regard to criminal enforcement were examined legally both in terms of substantive and procedural matters.
A substantive problem in criminal enforcement against unfair cartels is that an illegal unfair cartel requires only the existence of an agreement, which is equivalent to a ‘conspiracy’ in a criminal terms, but does not require any execution of such an agreement. Unfair cartel agreements, whether or not they are put into implementation by the conspirators, are punishable under the single statutory penalty standard. In the criminal law, in general, only the completed crimes are punishable, and the case of an attempt, a malice aforethought or a conspiracy can be punished exceptionally under special legislations with distinguished statutory penalty standards. In the case of unfair cartels, on the contrary, a single statutory penalty standard is applied to all cases including: (1) when there are only agreements (‘malice aforethought or conspiracy’), (2) when such agreements were put into execution incompletely or when the agreements were fully executed without causing any anti-competitive effects (‘attempted offense’), and (3) when the execution is fully implemented with anti-competitive consequence (‘completed crime’). This is more likely than not contrary to the constitutional principles of liability and equality. Therefore, it is necessary to stipulate differentiated penalty standards for each of the above-mentioned three case situations.
Procedural problems in criminal penalties against unfair cartels are related to: (1) the exclusive power for accusation by the Fair Trade Commission (KFTC), (2) the difficulty in collecting evidence by the KFTC, and obstacles to use evidence collected by the KFTC for criminal procedure, and (3) a mismatch between statutory limitation periods of the KFTC administrative sanction and the criminal prosecution.
There has long been criticism that unfair cartels could not be addressed sufficiently due to the KFTC’s hesitancy to exercise its exclusive power to file complaints for the prosecution procedure. It is sensible to argue that the KFTC should continue to have the excusive power to make criminal complaints because the KFTC, with its specialty in competition laws, deserves the primary discretion to decide whether the law is violated and/or an offense should be criminally punished, and the lift of exclusive power of the KFTC will end up with excessive punitive actions and the contraction of business activities. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to propose that the KFTC’s exclusive power for accusation should be repealed in regard to hard-core cartels because they are manifestly unlawful and incur significant harmful effect.
The KFTC conducts its investigation on the basis of the voluntary cooperation by the investigated parties. Due to the nature of voluntary investigation, the KFTC is limited in its ability to gather evidence. Evidence collected through the KFTC investigation is also vulnerable in its admissibility. A party may cooperate to the KFTC investigation without giving no thought of being criminally accused by the KFTC. Then, when the KFTC files a criminal complaint in the later stage, it is possible that, during the criminal procedure, the accused party may deny the admissibility of the evidence gathered by the KFTC on the ground that the rights to appropriate defense and due process were not guaranteed by the KFTC as it should be the case with the criminal procedure. Therefore, in dealing with the hard-core cartel cases, the KFTC should adopt an investigative method of forcibly collecting evidence using search & seizure warrants issued by the court. Particularly, it should adopt the judicial police power to conduct hard-core cartel investigations in the compulsory manner under due process and prior consultation with the public prosecutor.
If the KFTC transfers a case for prosecution at a time when the statute of limitations is almost expired, the prosecutor may be in trouble conducting its own investigation and prosecution. It is worthwhile to see whether the KFTC's accusation at a time when the expiry of limitation period is imminent stems from institutional problems under the MRFTA. Since a prosecutor's indictment is possible only after the administrative action is taken by the KFTC, it is reasonable that the statute of limitations, the period of criminal indictment, should be longer than the limitation period of administrative sanction. However, the reality is that the former is shorter than the latter.
Reasonable measures to address the problem of mismatch between the statutory limitations of administrative action and that of criminal prosecution for such violations of the MRFTA are suggested as follows: First of all, it is necessary to consider establishing special provisions on the criminal statute of limitations in the MRFTA. Considering that the limitation for administrative action against unfair cartels is basically seven years, the criminal statute of limitations needs to be at least seven years. Next, it is necessary to consider raising the longest prison term for unfair cartels from three to five years. This will increase the statute of limitations from five to seven years, equal to the basic seven-year administrative statute of limitations for unfair cartels, which could somewhat resolve the problem caused by the gap between the administrative and the criminal statute of limitations. Finally, it is necessary to consider establishing a new rule in the MRFTA that the criminal statute of limitations shall be suspended from the time the KFTC initiates an investigation until it makes a decision.

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