초록

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Abstract ▼ AI-Helper

In this study, we attempted to analyze the effectiveness of the Improper Solicitation and Graft Act (ISGA) which was enforced in Korea since 2016. To provide a realistic analysis on whether the ISGA would effectively prevent public servants from committing corruption, we compared how the incentive s...

In this study, we attempted to analyze the effectiveness of the Improper Solicitation and Graft Act (ISGA) which was enforced in Korea since 2016. To provide a realistic analysis on whether the ISGA would effectively prevent public servants from committing corruption, we compared how the incentive structure of accepting a bribe changes prior to and after enforcement. However, in contrast to most extant studies, we modelled the situation using N-person game theory since corruption of public officials can be understood as a problem of collective action and the decision making process should incorporate how an individual's strategic situation changes relative to others' choices. We also used the analytic narratives method to overcome limitations inherent in game theory models as actual human behavior is not always consistent with rational choice theory. Results from the analyses indicate that the effectiveness of ISGA increases with the magnitude of the benefit-to-cost ratio (r) of rejecting a bribe, with the intensity of punishment (F), and with the probability of punishment (p), while it decreases with the amount of economic efficiency (E) gained by an individual public servant's integrity.

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